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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Challenge of Industrial Democracy
The realities of economic organization in modern industrial states
pose a critical dilemma for all who care about democratic ideals. Tech-
nological developments and attendant complicated divisions of work
have enabled these states to transform their citizens' standards of living;
such developments have also, however, brought hierarchical economic
organizations' that are unresponsive to the influence of most individual
employees. A society that claims to be democratic cannot ignore this
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I I See M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
245-48 (T. Parsons ed. 1947).
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condition.' Enhancing individuals' control over their own lives requires
institutions that will facilitate democratic decisionmaking about eco-
nomic production as well as governmental authority.
This Article contributes to thought about such institutions by inte-
grating two potentially conflicting strategies to mitigate modern hierar-
chical industrial organization through the dispersal of decisionmaking
power. The first of these strategies encourages bargaining between in-
dependent collectives of employees and the managerial elite that gov-
erns the employees' workplace. This strategy has, to a large extent,
been adopted as the formal industrial policy of this country.3 Those
who view collective bargaining as one model of industrial democracy
understand that when employees in similar economic roles aggregate
their economic power, they achieve a greater voice in the terms and
conditions of their own employment relationship.4
The second strategy facilitates direct employee supervision over
managerial elites. This supervisory power can be achieved in one of
three ways: through collective bargaining, through complete or partial
worker ownership of the firm, or through governmental command. The
employees' supervisory power can be exclusive, or it can be shared, to
varying degrees, with nonemployee investors. For the traditional corpo-
rate firm, this strategy includes some level of employee representation
on the firm's board of directors.' The second strategy has had only mi-
2 See C. GUNN, WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 37
(1984); D. NIGHTINGALE, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: AN INQUIRY INTO EMPLOYEE
PARTICIPATION IN CANADIAN WORK ORGANIZATIONS 6, 66 (1982); Jackall & Levin,
Work in America and the Cooperative Movement, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN
AMERICA 3, 8 (R. Jackall & H. Levin eds. 1984); Greenberg, Producer Cooperatives
and Democratic Theory: The Case of the Plywood Firms, in WORKER COOPERATIVES
IN AMERICA supra, at 171-72; Salpukas, Unions: A New Role?, in THE WORKER AND
THE JOB: COPING WITH CHANGE 99, 108-09 UJ. Roscow ed. 1974).
' The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982),
declares it to be
the policy of the United States to ... encourag[e] the practice and proce-
dure of collective bargaining and [to protect] the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of represent-
atives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. § 151.
" See, e.g., H. CLEGG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALIZATION 121
(1951) (discussing the achievement of greater industrial democracy by the formation of
employee teams working together for a common purpose); Kohler, Models of Worker
Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(aX2), 27 B.C.L. REv. 499, 548
(1986) ("What the term worker participation (and industrial democracy) meant to the
framers of [the Labor] Act .. . is clear: collective bargaining.").
' Most state corporate laws assign supervisory power over corporate management
to a board of directors which, at least theoretically, has power to dismiss that manage-
ment. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) ("The business and affairs of
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nor influence on the American economy to date.' As collective bargain-
ing has recently been limited and contracted,' however, this alternative
strategy has provoked new interest.
Most of those who have addressed the relationship between the
two strategies have taken one of two somewhat polar positions.' On the
one hand, some assume that the success of the participatory strategy
must further undermine collective bargaining.' On the other hand,
every corporation organized under this Chapter shall be managed by or under the di-
rection of a board of directors. . . ."). In most publicly held corporations, management
is more likely to have practical sway over its supervisory board than vice versa. See M.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 139-48 (1976); M. MACE, Di-
RECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 191 (1971). Participation in board supervision, how-
ever, must be a necessary element of employee participation in the supervision of corpo-
rate management. Moreover, employee representation on corporate boards arguably
could strengthen the board's practical authority over management. See infra notes 60-
62 & 259 and accompanying text.
' The strategy has never been completely ignored, however. There have been dus-
ters of worker-owned and controlled firms throughout America's industrial history. See
Jones, American Producer Cooperatives and Employee-Owned Firms: A Historical
Perspective, in WORKER COOPERATIVES, supra note 2, at 37. Moreover, a century
ago, before focusing almost exclusively on collective bargaining as its preferred route to
industrial democracy, American labor was very involved in the cooperative movement.
See, e.g., G. GROB, WORKERS AND UTOPIA 44-45 (1961) (noting that the Knights of
Labor envisioned a cooperative commonwealth and, in 1880, allocated sixty percent of
its funds for co-ops).
7 The most important aspect of this contraction has been the relative decline in
collective bargaining linked to the decrease in the unionized portion of the American
work force. For example, in 1945, the portion of the work force in unions was nearly
thirty-six percent of nonagricultural employment. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, (BULL. No. 2070), HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 412
(Dec. 1980). In 1978, however, this portion declined to only 22.3 percent. See DIREC-
TORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS-1984-85 EDITION 2 (C. Gifford ed. 1984).
The trend continues: the percentage of union members of all those employed is now less
than twenty percent. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EM-
PLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 213 (1986).
Another important limiting factor may be the unwillingness of the Supreme Court
to approve a flexible expansion of the scope of mandatory bargaining. See First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 667-80 (1981) (holding that an employer
need not bargain over at least some decisions to discontinue operations). A broad scope
of bargaining has been one reason that the second model of direct employee supervision
of management may have seemed less important in America than in Europe where
bargaining has traditionally been more confined. See Summers, Codetermination in the
United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC.
REG. 155, 159 (1982) ("[Section 8(d) of the NLRA has] been interpreted expansively
to cover a much wider range of subjects than collective bargaining agreements cover in
most other countries.").
' One interesting exception is Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation De-
bate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39 (1988).
Klare's essay, which focuses on worker participation in management of the shop floor,
can be read as a complement to this Article.
I See H. CLEGG, supra note 4, at 131 ("The trade union cannot then become the
organ of industrial management;... . [n]or can the union enter into an unholy alliance
for the joint management of industry, for its opposition functions would then become
19881
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others conclude that direct employee supervision of management should
not concern industrial democrats because it poses no threat to collective
bargaining.10
This Article takes a different perspective. It agrees with those who
assume that direct employee supervision can threaten collective bar-
gaining. The Article also argues that this threat should concern those
who wish to moderate organizational hierarchy by developing demo-
cratic institutions. Whatever the share of employee supervisory power
over management, direct supervision does not obviate giving employees
the right to choose independent collective bargaining. This Article also
contends, however, that the threat posed to collective bargaining by di-
rect employee supervision should not and need not preclude adoption of
the second strategy. It should not because direct employee supervision
can help achieve numerous democratic goals. It need not because any
threat that such supervision poses can be met through the formulation
of appropriate legal doctrine without impeding the achievement of those
goals. By hypothesizing such a formulation, the Article attempts to con-
tribute to the development of an integrated strategy to expand democ-
racy in the American economy. 1
subordinate, and finally stifled."); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial Sys-
tem: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(aX2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1662 n.2 (1983) (recognizing that many union
supporters "consider even 'benign' employee representation plans [to be] a management
device to undermine union solidarity").
This has been the view of British trade union leaders and the Labor Party. See K.
BRADLEY & A. GELB, WORKER CAPITALISM 75 (1983). Some advocates of collective
bargaining have also voiced skepticism about importing from other societies systems of
industrial democracy that have not developed in this country concurrently with collec-
tive bargaining. See, e.g., Aaron, Labor Relations Law in the United States From a
Comparative Perspective, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1247, 1262-65 (1982) (arguing
that foreign laws and institutions should be studied not so that they can be adopted in
America, but so that they can add new perspectives to our own system).
1" See Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 172-73 (1988) (arguing that current
legal doctrines frustrate employee participation); Summers, supra note 7, at 163-67
(discounting the threat to collective bargaining because "[tihe incongruence between
collective bargaining and codetermination . . . may be more a philosophical abstraction
than a practical problem"); Note, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Cor-
porate Boards of Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 640-45 (1981) (concluding that
collective bargaining would not be threatened by union participation in management if
the union officials had majority support of the membership); see also Note, Rethinking
the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section
8(aX2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 2024 (1987) (advocating a two-pronged system permitting
employees to choose either an adversarial or cooperative framework).
"1 The extent to which the efficiencies of modern economies necessarily entail hi-
erarchical decisionmaking within firms is a matter of contemporary debate. Compare
0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 270 (1985)
("[Ilnveighing against hierarchy is rhetoric; both the logic of efficiency and the histori-
cal evidence disclose that non-hierarchical modes are mainly of ephemeral duration.")
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B. The Critical Labor Law Principles
The doctrine formulated in this essay reflects American labor
law's attention to threats to collective bargaining of the kind posed by
employee supervision. The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or
"the Act") in general, and section 8(a)(2) of the Act in particular, sup-
port certain principles that should guide the reconciliation of the two
strategies.12 This Article will apply these principles to several varia-
tions on the model of employee supervision of management: (1) minor-
ity employee representation on supervisory boards, achieved through
the application of economic leverage; a3 (2) employee control of supervi-
sory boards, achieved through employee ownership of enterprises, in-
cluding those in which all employees have an equal voice;1 and (3)
employee participation on supervisory boards mandated by governmen-
tal policy expressed in legislation. a5 Each application explains how the
benefits plausibly claimed for each variation can be enhanced, rather
than compromised, by collective bargaining."
Two cogent reasons justify the historical skepticism of most Amer-
ican labor leaders and many other collective bargaining advocates to-
with S. BOWLES & H. GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL
REFORM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ECONOMIC LIFE 74-81 (1976) (disputing
three theories: that the development of the factory system demonstrates the efficiency of
a hierarchical division of labor; that job fragmentation and routinization lead to in-
creased productivity; and that no other form of work organization is more productive).
Although this Article stresses the potential for significant hierarchy in worker-con-
trolled firms, see infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text, it purports to take no
general position on the efficiency debate. Instead, the Article explores how the dispersal
of decisionmaking power through the institutions of industrial democracy can mitigate
the effects of hierarchy.
12 See 29 U.S.C. §§151-69 (1982). Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to "dominate or interfere with the formation or adminis-
tration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it."
n See infra notes 38-116 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 117-253 and accompanying text. The Article rejects the conclu-
sion that section 8(a)(2) principles should not apply to employee-owned and controlled
firms. See, e.g., Note, Worker Ownership and Section 8(aX2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 91 YALE L.J. 615, 629-33 (1982) (arguing that employee-owned firms
do not require section 8(a)(2) restrictions and should, therefore, be exempt).
15 See infra notes 254-311 and accompanying text.
18 This Article does not directly consider shop-floor worker participation in man-
agement as a form of employer supervision of management. See T. KOCHAN, WORKER
PARTICIPATION AND AMERICAN UNIONS: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 185-202
(1984). Shop-floor worker participation schemes may be an important benefit of both
collective bargaining and employee supervision. See infra note 197 and accompanying
text. They may also present threats to collective bargaining similar to those presented
by employee supervision. See Klare, supra note 8, at 8; Kohler, supra note 4, at 545-
51. Because such schemes do not constitute even partial employee control of top man-
agement, however, they are not the primary topic of this Article.
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ward direct employee supervision of management.1" First, union leaders
reasonably fear that their participation in firm management could
render them less effective advocates of the interests of the employees
they represent.1 8 Union leaders may become less effective because those
leaders who have a responsibility to evaluate management's contribu-
tion to a general enterprise cannot as easily advance the interests of a
fraction of that enterprise - the members of their bargaining unit. To
the extent that union leaders' supervision of a firm's management actu-
ally gives those leaders influence over the direction of the firm, it may
be especially difficult for them to be critical.
The second reason union leaders should be wary of schemes pro-
viding for worker participation in the supervision of management con-
cerns the effect of such supervision on employees' perceptions.
Whatever the objective reality of union leaders' ability to perform si-
multaneously the roles of inside collaborators and outside critics, per-
formance of the first role may have an inevitable impact on the subjec-
tive perceptions of employees whose allegiance is necessary for the
effective performance of the second role. Also, worker supervisory
schemes could cause represented or potentially represented employees
to believe that collective bargaining is no longer important to the pro-
tection of their interests. Collective bargaining, in other words, could
seem superfluous if it were preempted by an alternative system. 9
American labor law should be able to address the dual concerns of
potentially conflicting roles and preemption of collective bargaining be-
cause both influenced the development of the NLRA. The Act gener-
ally attempts to avoid socially wrenching industrial warfare between
the owners of capital and the providers of labor" by channelling the
17 See D. ZWERDLING, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 172-74 (1978) (citing an ex-
ample of a union leader who resigned from a board of directors because he could not
"do a good job representing his union members and corporate management at the same
time"); Ellenberger, The Realities of Codetermination, AFL-CIO AM. FEDERATION-
IST, Oct. 1977, at 10, 13-15.
18 See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 172; McCormick, Union Representa-
tives as Corporate Directors: The Challenge to the Adversarial Model of Labor Rela-
tions, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 219, 222-24 & 224 n.26 (1982) (view of William
Winpisinger, then-Vice President of the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers).
19 See J. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM 108-11 (1977). Continental la-
bor leaders in Western Europe may be more supportive of employee supervision of
management than labor leaders in North America because continental collective bar-
gaining is typically conducted on the national or industry level, rather than the firm or
plant level. National or industry bargaining is less likely to be preempted by employee
control of the firm. See D. NIGHTINGALE, supra note 2, at 140.
20 See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. 2225, 2233
(1987) ("The overriding policy of the NLRA is 'industrial peace.'" (quoting Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954)).
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inevitable conflict of interests in the modern workplace2' into meaning-
ful bargaining between independent representatives of each interest.22
To that end, the Act prohibits employer discrimination against poten-
tially constructive union activity,2" and mandates establishment of em-
ployee bargaining units bounded by particular shared interests.24 With
regard to direct worker supervision of management, however, the most
important aspect of the Act's encouragement of collective bargaining is
the proscription of employer domination of, interference with, or sup-
port of unions.
This proscription, expressed in section 8(a)(2) of the Act,25 rests
on two presumptions: first, independent employee representatives best
serve employee interests; and second, management-dominated employee
groups can influence employees to reject independent representatives
even when doing so is contrary to the employees' interests.26
Proscription of employer interference with labor organizations was
intended to ensure that employer-supported representational systems do
not function as legal, structural, or psychological barriers to the devel-
opment of independent collective bargaining. The original advocates of
section 8(a)(2) stressed that it was intended to protect the capacity of
employees to choose the kind of independent representatives that could
effectively advance their interests in collective bargaining.27 These ad-
21 See 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 17 (2d ed. 1977) ("The con-
flict between capital and labour is inherent in an industrial society and therefore in the
labour relationship. Conflicts of interest are inevitable in all societies. There are rules
for their adjustment, there can be no rules for their elimination."); see also R.
DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 249-57 (1959)
(discussing the structural origins of industrial conflict); Kohler, supra note 4, at 515
(same) (citing R. DAHRENDORF, supra, at 249-57).
22 In its statement of purpose, the Act makes clear that the reason it encourages
and protects collective bargaining is to channel conflict into constructive bargaining be-
tween two independent and relatively equal groups. Such chanelling "safeguards com-
merce from injury, impairment, or interruption." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see also S.
REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AT, 1935 at 2300, 2300-01 (1985)
[hereinafter 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (noting that the purpose of the National Labor
Relations Act is to "promote equality of bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees, to diminish the causes of labor dispute, [and] to create a National Labor Rela-
tions Board.")
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
24 See id. § 159.
25 See id. § 158(a)(2).
28 See, e.g., H. CLEGG, supra note 4, at 21 (discussing the general principle that
"unions must be independent. . . of management"); 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 125 (1938),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ANNUAL REPORTS,
1936-1942 (1985) [hereinafter NLRB REPORTS] (discussing the substantial control the
employer has over employees and noting that, therefore, "employees are alertly respon-
sive to the slightest suggestion of the employer").
27 See 79 CONG. REC. 7570 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
1988]
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vocates assumed that employer involvement with a company representa-
tional system would inhibit employees' free choice of an alternative sys-
tem of collective bargaining through an independent union.2" The
Supreme Court soon affirmed that the NLRA prohibited the recogni-
tion of employee representatives who were not independent of employ-
ers, regardless of the apparent level of employee support.29
Moreover, both the original advocates of section 8(a)(2) and the
administrators and jurists who originally implemented it perceived that
independent collective bargaining could be threatened by employer sup-
port of, or involvement in, an employee representational system, even if
that support or involvement were not intended to coerce employees' free
choice. In order to ensure that collective bargaining was not a sham
with employers on both sides of the table, 0 it was necessary to elimi-
nate the potential for employer interference with employee representa-
tives as well as actual, proven interference. Thus, Senator Wagner
stressed that effective labor-management cooperation could arise only
note 22, at 2334 (Senator Wagner explaining the redrafted legislation enacted in 1935);
78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at
15-16 (Senator Wagner's introduction of the bill that would develop into the NLRA).
28 See 78 CONG. REC. 4224 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 22, at 24 (The formal right to choose an independent representative may not be
sufficient because an employer may "exercise a compelling force over the collective ac-
tivities of [the] workers. Freedom must begin with the removal of obstacles to its exer-
cise." (reprinting newspaper article by Senator Wagner)); see also To Create a Na-
tional Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Education
and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 39 [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (comments of Senator Wagner);
H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2925-27 (discussing threats to employee free choice posed
by company unions); 79 CONG. REc. 2337 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 2443 (Congressman Boland).
I Opponents of the bill argued unsuccessfully that employee freedom would be best
served by allowing employees to choose employer-supported unions. See National La-
bor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education
and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 549-50, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 1935-36 (testimony of A.B. Trembley, representative of Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. employee group); id. at 733-34, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 2119-21 (brief submitted by Association of Employees, AT&T
Co.); Senate Hearings, supra, at 673-75, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 711-13 (testimony of Francis Maloney, representative of employees'
committee for New York Telephone Co.); id. at 723-26, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 762-64 (testimony of Arthur Young, Vice President, U.S.
Steel Corp.); id. at 888-89, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at
926 (testimony of Nathan Miller, General Counsel, U.S. Steel Corp.).
2 See NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241,
251 (1939).
1o See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 3067 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1147]
("[Clollective bargaining is 'a sham when the employer sits on both sides of the table by
supporting a particular organization with which he deals'. ... ).
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from bargaining between completely independent entities,"' and that
section 8(a)(2) was aimed at eliminating the inevitable conflicts-of-in-
terest created when employer representatives are on both sides of the
table. 2 The Board, from its earliest decisions, has interpreted section
8(a)(2) to operate as a prophylactic against any potential conflict-of-
interest no matter how small and regardless of the absence of proof of
coercive employer intent.3
This history suggests that principles in accord with American la-
bor law can address both the conflicting roles and the preemption of
collective bargaining concerns. This Article shall develop three such
principles to guide the reconciliation of the two models of industrial
democracy. First, in order to address the conflicting roles concern, an
"undivided responsibility principle" should be applied with a set goal:
to prevent the strategies and tactics of unions with responsibility to re-
present particular employee interests from being formulated or imple-
mented under any significant influence from individuals who supervise
management on behalf of other interests. This principle supports the
uncontroversial section 8(a)(2) proposition that traditional corporate
board members and other supervisors of management should not inter-
fere with union affairs.3 ' However, the principle also prohibits man-
agement from influencing unions by placing union leaders in positions
of divided responsibility on corporate boards or other management su-
pervisory committees. 5
Second, in order to prevent management from manipulating the
employees appointed to supervise management, an "independent em-
31 See 78 CONG. REC. 4230 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 28, at 24-25 (reprint of newspaper article by Senator Wagner).
11 See H.R. REP. No. 1147, supra note 30, at 18, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 3067 (discussing the hollowness of a union effectively
controlled through an employer's financial support); 79 CONG. REC. 7570 (1935), re-
printed in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2333-34 (statement of Senator
Wagner).
33 See 3 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 26, at 125-26; see, e.g., Kunst, 100
N.L.R.B. 146, 150 (1952) (payment for refreshments at meeting as illegal company
interference); Shell Oil Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 835, 847 (1937) (company's allowing union
use of telephone as evidence of illegal company influence); see also International Ass'n
of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940) (employer can violate § 8(a)(2) even
though the acts constituting the violation were not directly authorized by or attributable
to it).
34 See, e.g., Welsbach Elec. Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 503, 510-13 (1978) (employer
found in violation of § 8(a)(2) when it permitted its high level supervisors to partici-
pate in union activity, including holding union office and bargaining on behalf of union
members), enforced, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979).
35 Cf H. CLEGG, supra note 4, at 21-23 (positing that the independence of unions
from management as well as from the state is one of the central tenets of the collective
bargaining model of industrial democracy).
1988]
10 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ployee representative principle" should be established. As explained be-
low, this principle not only addresses the preemption of collective bar-
gaining, but also helps employee supervision of management to serve
the goals of industrial democracy.
Third, in order for employees to appreciate and receive the bene-
fits of both models of industrial democracy, the functions of the system
of employee supervision of management should be kept distinct from
the functions of collective bargaining. Like the independent employee
representative principle, this "distinction of functions principle" should
address the preemption of collective bargaining and ensure contribu-
tions to industrial democracy from employee supervision.
This Article suggests that the underlying philosophy of section
8(a)(2), and other aspects of American labor law, support achieving the
integration of the two models of industrial democracy through these
three principles. The Article does not argue that legislative intent re-
quires such an integration or that all prior interpretations of the labor
laws are consistent with it. For example, the Board has sometimes
loosely interpreted section 8(a)(2) to permit institutional arrangements
that could undermine the achievement of the undivided responsibility,
independent employee representative, or separation of functions princi-
ples. 6 In light of the general purposes of section 8(a)(2) and of the
Wagner Act mentioned above, however, no judicial3" or Board interpre-
" See, e.g., Spark Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (1977) (employer's con-
trol over employees' council did not violate § 8(a)(2) when council's activity was lim-
ited to dispute resolution and did not include bargaining over wages, hours, or working
conditions), enforcement granted in part and denied in part sub nom., NLRB v. Sil-
ver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981);
Anchorage Community Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 575, 578-79 (1976) (union pension
trust loan to an employer under terms similar to an arm's length agreement did not
disqualify that union from negotiating on behalf of the employer's employees).
11 A questionable, albeit prominent, line of circuit court decisions approving em-
ployer support for employee representational systems holds that § 8(a)(2) proscribes
only actual employer interference with employee representatives, rather than structures
or relationships with the potential for such interference. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles
v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974) (arguing that employer's participation in
employees' committee fell on the permissible side of the "line between cooperation,
which the Act encourages, and actual interference . . . which the Act condemns"), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th
Cir. 1967) (Employees' committee's meeting with employer representatives either on
company property or with company-provided food and drink constitutes cooperation
rather than "active domination"); NLRB v. Post Publishing Co., 311 F.2d 565, 569-70
(7th Cir. 1962) (thirty-eight year history of employers permitting union to hold meet-
ings on company property, use company duplicating machine, and retain profits shows
cooperation rather than actual employer domination); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1955) (holding that company's grievance proce-
dure did not violate the Act and noting that "[wiords and actions which might dominate
the employees . . . do not constitute domination proscribed by the Act unless the em-
ployees are actually dominated"). The Board and some circuits have not joined this
[Vol. 137:1
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tations are sufficiently compelling to prevent, without legislative
amendment, the legal integration of the two models of industrial de-
mocracy this Article articulates.
The Article argues that the application of its three principles
would serve two democratic goals. First, the principles would protect
the benefits of employee participation in management supervision with-
out sacrificing the tenets of the NLRA. Second, they would disperse
power within worker-controlled firms and thus ensure firms a high
level of internal democracy.
II. PRIVATELY ARRANGED MINORITY EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
ON SUPERVISORY BOARDS
This Article divides into three modes the institutional structures
providing for direct employee participation in the supervision of man-
agement. This division facilitates the application of the three principles
discussed above because both the plausible rationales for, and the po-
tential threats to, collective bargaining among the three modes may dif-
fer in important respects.
The modes are defined by two factors: first, whether employee
participation is arranged by the firm without external governmental
commands; and second, whether employees formally control, as well as
participate in, the supervision of management. The first grouping is
characterized by an absence of governmental compulsion and by em-
line, however. See, e.g., Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir.
1965) (noting that "[iut has been consistently held that employer support of an 'inside'
or 'independent' labor organization, even absent company domination, constitutes un-
lawful interference with employees' freedom of choice within the meaning of section
8(a)(2)"); Fire Alert Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 910, 917 (1970) (finding employer domination
and rejecting the argument that employees appear to be satisfied with employer in-
volvement), enforced 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2895 (10th Cir. 1971).
These decisions also claim that § 8(a)(2) was intended only to eliminate coercive
employer interference with free employee choice of representatives, rather than to en-
sure that collective bargaining by independent representatives would not be discouraged
by the presence of alternative representational schemes. See, e.g., Classic Indus. v.
NLRB, 667 F.2d 205, 208 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating "[wie do not believe the Board had
to treat the semblance of arm's length bargaining as truly indicative that the Shop
Committee was free from employer influence") ; Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 630
(noting that proscribing any type of employer cooperation "would undermine . . . the
purpose of the Act as a whole - fostering free choice - because it might prevent the
establishment of a system the employees desired"); NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc.,
405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum) ("So long as the acts of cooperation do not
interfere with the freedom of choice of the employees, they are not in violation of the
Act"); Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204 (permitting representational scheme where
employees' committee worked cooperatively with company and agreeing that committee
"adequately represented its members" in the absence of a union); Chicago Rawhide,
221 F.2d at 170 (permitting a non-union "happy and cooperative employer-employee
relationship" where no actual employer interference has been shown).
19881
12 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ployee participation in management supervision without control of the
firm.
Management of the typical firm in our economy is formally super-
vised by boards of directors selected by those who own stock in the
firm. 8 Shares usually, but not always,3 9 are issued in return for contri-
butions of a portion of the firm's operating capital.4 Although the for-
mal authority of corporate directors is seldom used,41 the board's legal
status does provide a group not aligned with management with a poten-
tial means to control or modify firm policy.
Employees or their representatives can achieve membership on a
management supervisory board selected by shareholders through several
routes. First, collective bargaining representatives can achieve board
membership for their nominees through negotiations.42 Unions cannot
use their bargaining power to obtain binding commitments from a
group of shareholders to elect the unions' nominees to a board because
the shareholders themselves, in contrast to the management controlled
by the board, have no obligation to bargain with any collective repre-
sentative. Unions, however, can obtain commitments from the manage-
ment of a firm to nominate particular employee representatives as part
of a management-endorsed slate for its supervisory board.43 Manage-
ment endorsement in most cases is tantamount to election to member-
ship on a board.44 Furthermore, unions could make the election of their
11 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. §§ 141(d), 170 (1983) (defining board selec-
tion process and granting the board the power to declare dividends).
" Entrepreneurs, for instance, may receive shares for rendering services to the
corporation. See Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 565, 64
A.2d 581, 595 (1948); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152(1) (1983).
40 See, e.g., DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1983) ("The capital stock ... shall be
deemed to be fully paid and nonassessable stock, if: (1) The entire amount of such
consideration has been received by the corporation in the form of cash [or] services
rendered . . .")
41 See, e.g., M. MACE, supra note 5, at 179 (noting that most boards of directors
serve primarily as a source of advice and counsel).
42 In 1976, for instance, before Chrysler confronted an economic crisis, the United
Auto Workers presented Chrysler's management with a demand for worker participa-
tion on its board. See Whitney, Auto Union Seeks Directors' Seats, N.Y. Times, May
13, 1976, at 51, col. 8.
11 See, e.g., Fraser, Worker Participation in Corporate Government: The
U.A.W.-Chrysler Experience, 58 CHI.[-] KENT L. REV. 949, 949 n.2 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Fraser, Worker Participation] (discussing the nomination of Douglas Fraser by
management to the Chrysler Board). Fraser was, in fact, elected to the board. See Fra-
ser, Labor's Voice on the Board, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1980, at 13, 13 [hereinafter
Fraser, Labor's Voice]; Chrysler Announces Rebates: Shareholders Elect Union's Fra-
ser to the Board, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1980, at DI, col. 4.
"" Reviewing Securities and Exchange Commission data, Ralph Nader, Mark
Green, and Joel Seligman discovered that, for the eighteen years ending in 1973, "man-
agement ... won 99.9 percent of all proxy solicitations in 10 out of 18 years. In 1973,
99.7 percent of the directorial elections in our largest corporations were uncontested."
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nominees a condition subsequent to the continuation of their total col-
lective agreement.
The second means by which employees or their representatives can
be placed on shareholder-selected boards is by employee ownership and
control of a substantial portion of voting shares. Such control can be
utilized by collective bargaining representatives either alone or in com-
bination with other bargaining leverage.45 It also can be utilized by an
employee representative that is not a bargaining agent, but has a suffi-
cient number of proxies to convince management to include one or
more of its nominees on management's slate of nominees, perhaps in
exchange for a pledge to support the entire slate.4"
Third, nonemployee shareholders could be convinced to elect em-
ployees to a supervisory board by management acting independent of
any pressure from employee groups. Although unlikely, management's
unilateral nomination of employee representatives may seem more
plausible after the following discussion of the benefits and effects of
employee representation on nonemployee-shareholder-controlled corpo-
rate boards.
A. The Plausible Goals
It is highly unlikely that a minority employee contingent on a su-
pervisory board will alter the nature of the firm or markedly affect the
division of the firm's returns between the contributors of labor and cap-
ital. Because shareholders and their board representatives have a strong
interest in minimizing corporate liabilities, including claims of employ-
Management's slate ran "unopposed 99.0% of the time in 12 out of the past 18 years."
R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 80-81
(1976). There is no reason to think there has been a change in the last decade and a
half.
,, In fact most of the prominent examples of American unions obtaining seats on
corporate boards have included the issuance of stock to employees in exchange for wage
concessions as well as the allocation of board seats to employee representatives. This
was the deal struck by the UAW and Chrysler. See Olson, Union Experiences With
Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues Raised by ESOPS, TRASOPS, Stock
Purchases and Co-operatives, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 729, 776-77 It was also the deal
struck first between Pan American Airlines and four of its five unions, and then by the
other airlines that negotiated wage concessions in the wake of airline deregulation. See
Olson, supra, at 778-79; The Short Flight of Employee Ownership in The Airline In-
dustry, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP REP. 1, 1 (1987).
4" For instance, the trustees of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan with delegated
control over shares owned by employees could negotiate employee representation on a
board of directors proportionate to the employees' ownership share of stock in the firm.
For a discussion of such plans, see infra note 121. Trustees, however, might be re-
stricted, by their fiduciary duties from representing employees as employees rather than
as investors. Furthermore, most tax-qualified ESOPs require pass through of voting
rights on shares allocated to individual employees. See id.
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ees, they are not likely to permit management to undertake strategies
that appear to threaten directly the goal of profit maximization. Never-
theless, it is rational for collective bargaining representatives, and possi-
bly even for employee-shareholder representatives or management, to
desire the presence of one or more minority employee representatives
on a firm's supervisory board.
The presence of employee representatives could facilitate the flow
of credible information about the firm from management to employ-
ees.4 For unions, obtaining comprehensive information about a firm's
operations can be both very important and very difficult. Management
has only a limited obligation to share information about the firm with
collective bargaining representatives. An employer, for instance, has no
legal obligation to share any information about the firm's financial con-
dition that management itself has not made central to collective bar-
gaining by claiming a formal inability to meet the union's demands.48
Moreover, management is not required to provide any information
about its consideration of decisions concerning non-mandatory subjects
of bargaining.4" Inasmuch as those decisions can include the elimina-
tion of jobs through the discontinuance of operations,5" unions may
have no warning of developments critical to those they represent.
Timely information about management decisions that are not
"' See Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-first
Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 682 (1983); Summers, supra note 7, at 165-66;
Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1208-09 (1984).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956) (employer's
unwillingness to disclose financial reasons supporting wage proposal may be evidence
of failure to bargain in good faith); Dallas Gen. Drivers Local 745 v. NLRB, 355 F.2d
842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (company not required to supply union with information
when reason for denying wage increase was the area wage rate and not ability to pay);
NLRB v. Southland Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1965) (employer must
supply financial evidence of inability to pay higher wages); see also Washington
Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333, 1338 (4th Cir. 1986) (employer's assertion of
competitive disadvantage does not require disclosure of financial data); cf. Shedlin, Reg-
ulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the Impact on the Ameri-
can System of Labor-Management Relations, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 441, 445-48 (1980)
(predicting an improvement in labor relations as a result of mandated disclosures).
9 See, e.g., International Woodworkers of Am. Local 6-7 v. NLRB, 263 F.2d
483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (differentiating between wage and hour information, which
must be disclosed, and production and sales information, which may not be "essential to
the union to enable it to bargain intelligently"); General Aniline and Film Corp., 124
N.L.R.B. 1217, 1219-20 (1959) (report of management consultant does not concern
"terms or conditions of employment" and does not have to be provided to union).
10 See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981)
(company's economically motivated decision to close part of its business is not a
mandatory term of collective bargaining). See generally Harper, Leveling the Road
from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargain-
ing, 68 VA. L. REv. 1447 (1982) (criticizing First National Maintenance for distin-
guishing between effects of high wages and of other high costs on corporate profits).
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mandatory bargaining topics can be useful to collective bargaining rep-
resentatives for two reasons. First, such information can give unions
time to develop a packet of concessions that might influence manage-
ment not to eliminate jobs.5 Second, timely warning can enable unions
to exert bargaining leverage to extract management concessions on the
effects of a business transformation. These concessions would concern
issues over which management is obligated to bargain, including sever-
ance pay and pension refunding.52 An employee representative who is a
full member of a corporate board with complete access to information
about the firm's operations,53 and with authorization to share that in-
formation with collective bargaining representatives5 can thus provide
substantial benefits to the represented employees. Complete information
about a firm's finances and operational strategies can guide the bar-
gaining agent's own strategies concerning when and how to press for
further benefits and when to concede to maintain job security.
51 Unions can induce management to compromise on nonmandatory bargaining
topics by offering concessions; they simply cannot insist on or coerce compromise. See
First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682; NLRB v. Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342, 349
(1958).
52 See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681-82.
13 Board members have such access under traditional corporate law doctrine. See
Machen v. Machen & Mayer Elec. Mfg. Co. 237 Pa. 212, 223, 85 A. 100, 104 (1912)
("The right of a director to inspect the books of a corporation... exists at common law
... [and] is unqualified .... ."); W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 2235 (rev. perm. ed. 1987) ("The directors, as trustees for the
stockholders, are entitled to full and complete information as to the corporation's af-
fairs."). Most state laws also grant shareholders a limited right to inspect corporate
books and records for a proper purpose. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)
(1983) ("[Plroper purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably related to such person's
interest as a stockholder. . . ."). This right, however, has not always given stockholders
a way to obtain non-public information about firms through the purchase of stock. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 329, 191 N.W.2d 406,
411 (1971) (denying information to a shareholder who purchased one share of stock in
Honeywell for the admitted purpose of impressing a "reordering of priorities upon...
managment and ... other shareholders" after discovering that Honeywell was produc-
ing fragmentation bombs during the Vietnam War).
" Traditional corporate law imposes a responsibility on directors not to disclose
confidential corporate information. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 app. at
1181 (7th Cir.) (reprinting N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, MANUAL §202.01) ("[D]irectors
and officers . . . must not disclose confidential information they may receive in the
course of their duties . . . ."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987). Cf. Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 497-98, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80-81
(1969) (holding that a sale of corporate stock by corporate officers in response to inside
information of corporate losses was an abuse of the officers' fiduciary obligations). In
order for the benefits of employee representation to be obtained, this duty would have
to be modified. Disclosure to employees of information that would not harm the corpo-
ration if known by potential competitors should be permitted. Any shareholder interest
in keeping employees, as opposed to competitors, in the dark should not be a basis for
imposing a duty of secrecy on employee representatives. See Summers, supra note 7, at
173.
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To the extent that collective bargaining is a zero-sum game
between employees and shareholders, a management responsive to
shareholders' interests should resist such assistance to the employees'
bargaining agent. Collective bargaining, however, like most bargaining,
is not simply a zero-sum game. There are reasons shareholders would
want their management representatives to agree to ensure a more cer-
tain flow of information about the firm to employees. These reasons
can become salient as the firm confronts economic difficulties. Employ-
ees may be willing to accept the sacrifices a firm's management deems
necessary for the continuance of operations only if the employees are
convinced that they have the information critical to management's judg-
ment." Moreover, employees asked to make sacrifices in difficult eco-
nomic times may insist on a continuing supply of information that will
tell them when they can attempt to compensate for their prior losses. 6
Furthermore, in bargaining situations that have been tainted by suspi-
cion, granting employees a credible information source may benefit
shareholders more than it harms them by making it easier for the bar-
gaining parties to structure employee benefits in a way that is closer to
Pareto optimality.
Finally, just as employee representatives can serve as a conduit of
information about the firm to unions, they also can serve as a source of
information to shareholder representatives about employee interests,
concerns, and needs.5 Well functioning collective bargaining represen-
tatives should serve such a communication function, but situations may
exist in which employee representatives on supervisory boards can com-
municate more effectively to management. Management has legal au-
thority to keep off of the bargaining table certain fundamental business
decisions that must be addressed at the board table.5 Management may
want an employee perspective on these decisions, but may not want
them to be raised at the bargaining table because they may invite ag-
gressive bargaining as well as disrupt any progress on mandatory top-
ics. Thus, if employees are to have a real opportunity to affect manage-
ment decisions on certain major corporate issues before they are made,
11 See K. BRADLEY & A. GELB, supra note 9, at 26 (suggesting that perceived
informational asymmetry leads to noncooperation between labor and management).
" This must explain in part why some unions have asked for board seats as well
as stock for employees in exchange for wage concessions. See supra note 45.
" See Fraser, Worker Participation, supra note 43, at 956-57 (noting how he
could stress worker perspectives to Board); see also Craver, supra note 47, at 682 (stat-
ing the benefits of communication between labor and management); Summers, supra
note 7, at 164-65 (discussing four ways in which codetermination aids collective
bargaining).
58 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 667 (1981) (termi-
nation of particular operations).
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that opportunity may have to come through supervisory boards rather
than collective bargaining. Furthermore, even decisions subject to col-
lective bargaining may be more easily discussed before they are adopted
by management and defended in an adversarial confrontation at the
bargaining table.5"
This discussion of the plausible benefits of employee membership
on nonemployee-controlled supervisory boards suggests that such mem-
bership can be most useful as a supplement to collective bargaining.
Employee membership benefits employees by creating a process that
can be utilized to bring a more satisfactory and certain stream of future
substantive benefits. This process may be more valuable to employees
facing an uncertain future and ultimately less expensive to a share-
holder controlled firm than the immediate grant of substantive benefits.
Even in the absence of pressure from a collective bargaining part-
ner, however, shareholder representatives might decide, either in re-
sponse to an employee-shareholder group or unilaterally, that the two-
way communication provided by employee board members could bene-
fit their firm. A supervisory board more aware of employee concerns
can move management to account for those concerns while preserving
the economic interests of the shareholders. Further, a credible informa-
tion source can help secure the loyalty of unorganized employees facing
an economy in flux.
In addition, direct communication from employee representatives
to shareholder representatives might make the board a more effective
monitor of management in the interest of both shareholders and em-
ployees. 60 Most individuals agree that today's typical corporate board
does not actively control firm management in part because of a lack of
alternative informational sources about firm operations. 1 By providing
information, employee directors can help to control managerial waste
and opportunism. Because employees cannot exit the firm or diversify
their human capital as easily as shareholders can exit the firm and
diversify their financial capital, employee representatives on the board
may also have more of an incentive to monitor management than do
9 Cf Fraser, Labor's Voice, supra note 43, at 13 ("Workers need and deserve a
voice in determining their own destiny. To be effective, that voice must be heard before
decisions are made, rather than afterward. We need to play a role in the decision-
making process instead of reacting once the corporation has set its course.").
60 See Summers, supra note 7, at 175; Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis of
Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 919,
940-41 (1982).
61 See M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 143-44; see also M. MACE, supra note 5,
at 190 ("What . . . directors do is determined in large part by the location of the
powers of control of the company, and by how the holders of the powers of control
choose to exercise those powers.").
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other outside directors.62
The potential attractiveness to shareholders of employee member-
ship on nonemployee-shareholder-controlled boards also suggests, how-
ever, that such membership might provide a potential threat to, as well
as an opportunity for, collective bargaining. By applying the three la-
bor law principles articulated in the Introduction, this section attempts
to explain how any such potential threat can be averted without sacri-
ficing the plausible benefits of this first mode of direct employee partic-
ipation in the supervision of management.
B. Maintaining the Independence of Collective Bargaining Agents
The undivided responsibilities principle was formulated to ensure
that the capacity of unions to represent the particular interests of their
members remains unimpaired. The principle demands that the internal
processes of collective bargaining agents be free of any substantial in-
fluence from individuals who supervise management on behalf of other
interests. Corporate laws, however, impose a duty on all corporate su-
pervisory board members to supervise management on behalf of the
corporation in general and in the interests of shareholders in particu-
lar. 3 The application of the undivided responsibility principle therefore
guarantees that no individual in any formal or informal position of
leadership in a union can serve as a traditional member of a corporate
supervisory board." In order for an active union leader to have any
supervisory authority over a firm's management, that leader's authority
82 See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir. 1947) (" 'The
directors owe a duty of managing the corporate affairs honestly and impartially in
behalf of the corporation and all the stockholders * * * .' ") (quoting 19 C.J.S. Corpo-
rations § 764 (1940)); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668,
684 (1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders."); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982) ("Di-
rectors and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stock-
holders" (emphasis added)); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) ("A
director is a fiduciary[,] [as] is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stock-
holders." (citations omitted)); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir.
1972) (Officers and directors of a corporation "occupy a quasi-fiduciary relation to the
corporation and to its stockholders."); Blum v. Fleishhacker, 21 F. Supp. 527, 530
(N.D. Cal. 1937) (An individual who is a bank's director and president occupies a
fiduciary relation towards the bank and its stockholders), modified, 109 F.2d 543, (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 665 (1940); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498,
248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969) ("[I]t is admittedly wrong for an
officer or director to use his position to obtain trading profits for himself in the stock of
his corporation . . ").
" The Teamsters have had an unwritten rule that prohibited union officials from
serving on a corporate board. See Labor's Voice on Corporate Boards: Good or Bad?,
Bus. WK., May 7, 1984, at 151, 152.
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must be formally and effectively exercised on behalf of only the particu-
lar employees the leader's union represents.
This application of the principle at first may appear to be unnec-
essary to protect independent unions. Most union leaders who could
obtain seats on corporate boards would have little difficulty maintaining
primary allegiance to the unions that nurtured their careers. Regardless
of formal legal duties to maximize corporate wealth on behalf of
residual claimants to that wealth, such leaders naturally would be in-
clined to evaluate managerial performance from the perspective of
union employees.6 5 Furthermore, isolated union leaders on corporate
boards should be able to avoid lawsuits enforcing any formal duty to-
ward corporate interests beyond the employees the union represents. A
disgruntled shareholder might challenge a director's loyalty because, as
a union member, the director had an interest in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. A defense of such a loyalty claim, however, would need
only to satisfy an objective, arms-length bargaining, fairness test under
the law of most jurisdictions.6 Not surprisingly, corporate supervisory
boards often include representatives of other non-shareholder interests
affected by the corporation, such as major suppliers, customers, and
holders of senior securities, without generating troublesome litigation.
Some corporate law decisions, especially those approving corporate
charitable contributions, even suggest that corporate directors can ap-
propriately attempt to serve social goals broader than the short-term
profit-maximization of shareholders.
67
" See, e.g., Fraser, Worker Participation, supra note 43, at 955-58 (statement of
how Douglas Fraser viewed his role on Chrysler Board).
66 See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165-66, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39
(1960) (approving employee stock option plan in which two interested directors partici-
pated); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983) (setting a standard of good faith and
fairness); see also Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 36-44 (1966) (historical review of legal reaction to busi-
ness transactions between a corporation and its directors or officers in which such direc-
tors or officers are interested). Furthermore, if a majority of disinterested directors ap-
prove the transaction, the challenging party may have the burden of proving unfairness.
Cf. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (interpreting DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144 as providing against invalidation of an agreement solely because an
interested investor was involved)
67 See, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58, 58-59
(W.D.N.Y. 1922) (subscriptions to college endowment funds authorized by directors
are valid); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 397-98, 192 A.2d 817, 821-22
(1963) (dictum noting that the common law has long regulated business for the com-
mon good); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154-55, 98 A.2d 581, 586-87
(1953) (corporations have power to make reasonable charitable contributions without
an express statutory provision); see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 180-
81, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1968) (holding that corporate directors may consider impact
of business decision on neighborhood when neighborhood decline could affect long run
corporate interests).
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Loyalty to the union movement and adequate insulation from the
pressures of lawsuits, however, do not ensure that union leaders will
consider only the interests of represented employees when serving on a
corporate supervisory board. If the board-related responsibilities of
union leaders are not formally distinguished from the responsibilities of
other board members, or if traditional board members are not required
to accept a formal distinction, the union leaders undoubtedly would be
placed under direct and subtle pressure from their board peers to join
in the discharge of a general mutual duty toward the corporation as an
entity. 8
Testimony of union leaders who have served as directors suggests
that they may modify their definition of employee interests in order to
rationalize away any conflict between those interests and the corporate
interest that traditional directors are to advance.6" When defining the
duties of corporate directors, the law often equates the general interest
of the firm with the interests of shareholders.7 This compatibility is
theoretically coherent because maximizing corporate wealth will benefit
those with marginal claims on the corporation.7" Equating the interests
of those with fixed prior claims, however, such as employees in the
traditional firm, with the interests of residual claimants, is not rational.
Merging these two sets of interests requires compromising both. For
instance, union leaders who, as supervisory board members, review
8 See, e.g., Olson, supra note 45, at 746 (discussing conflicts of interests exper-
ienced by union members on the board of Vermont Asbestos Group); Rudolf, The Ob-
jective Nature of the Democratization Process in the Workplace, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J.
399, 412-13 (1988) (noting the experience of workers on boards of European
codetermined enterprises).
9 Consider, for instance, this statement from Jim May, who served simultane-
ously as local union president and board director at Hyatt-Clark:
Conflicts between being an owner-director and a local union presi-
dent? I don't have a conflict. If you're a president of a union, or any union
official for that matter, the first thing should be the job security of your
membership. And if you're a director of a company, your main interest
should be the good and welfare of all the company and all its employees.
So, a healthy company is a secure company, and a secure company means
security of the work force. So, it's not conflicting to me.
The Hyatt-Clark ESOP: An Interview with Jim May, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1985, at
25, 29 [hereinafter Hyatt-Clark ESOP]. May does not note that there may be a tradeoff
between maximum job security and increasing wages.
70 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684
(1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders."); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982) ("Directors
and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders."
(emphasis added)).
71 But see infra text accompanying notes 296-98 (nonemployee owned and con-
trolled firms may make decisions that maximize short term profits at the expense of
long term growth).
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plans for a risky but potentially highly profitable new venture, could
not make calculations of the probable impact of the venture on incum-
bent represented employees that would be identical to calculations of
the probable impact on shareholder interests. 2
Once the probability is accepted that a union leader will consider
more than employee interests during supervisory board deliberations, so
must the possibility be accepted that the leader's union activity will be
influenced. Most human beings cannot totally separate aspects of their
lives; experiences in one role will inevitably influence other roles to
some indeterminate extent. Even lifelong union officials could be influ-
enced by the experience of making decisions from the perspectives of
the interests of an entire corporation and its shareholders."8 Having re-
sponsibility for two conflicting sets of interests, such as those of employ-
ees and shareholders, facilitates an understanding of how best to reach
a common ground acceptable to all concerned. Such responsibility,
however, may also make it more difficult to serve as an advocate of one
set of those interests; and it is the role of advocate, not mediator, that
the model of collective bargaining requires union leaders to play. 4
The more significant the union leaders' influence on management,
the harder it would be for those leaders to advocate employee claims on
the corporation's assets. As the influence increased, so would the likeli-
hood of a serious conflict of interest as well as the tendency for leaders
to view the corporation's decisions as their own. Thus, union leaders
who are among a substantial minority of employee representatives on a
72 Mike Kearney, a union president who served on the board of Seymour Spe-
cialty Wire, an employee-owned company, has testified that he viewed his board and
union responsibilities to be in conflict sometimes. "'If I'm going to make a decision
that's going to shut the company down, I shouldn't be up there. People couldn't under-
stand that. "Hey, you should be representing hourly people!" . . . But remember, I
don't have my union hat on when I'm up there, I've got my director's cap on.'"
Brecher, Upstairs, Downstairs: Class Conflict in an Employee Owned Factory, ZETA
MAG., Feb. 1988, at 68, 71 (quoting Mike Kearney).
"3 Although the American experience is limited, some union officials have testified
that management supervisory responsibilities have affected their views:
At the worker-owned South Bend Lathe, Inc., for instance, one union offi-
cial whom management placed on the board recently resigned; he said he
couldn't do a good job representing his union members and corporate
management at the same time. A second union official has remained on
the board; he acknowledges that the experience of sitting down with man-
agement and "getting a deeper understanding of some of the problems
your opponent across the table faces" has "moderated" his views.
D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 173; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
74 Jim May, the local union president who simultaneously served on the Hyatt-
Clark board, explained how his union's view of grievance arbitration had become less
"militant" and "more amicable" after employee ownership of a portion of the com-
pany's stock had given him a seat on the board. See Hyatt-Clark ESOP, supra note 69,
at 31.
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supervisory board would be more influenced by their board experience
than those leaders who felt isolated on a large board.
Even an isolated individual, however, could be somewhat moved
by the collegial experience of supervisory board membership. The
larger group would expect the individual to consent to board decisions
and, as an equal board member, to consider more than just the interests
of a limited group of employees. In some situations, even a lone em-
ployee representative might ultimately defend controversial board deci-
sions in the face of union member criticism. 5
Furthermore, regardless of the objective realities, employees' per-
ceptions that a leader's advocacy has been impaired by experience on a
corporate board may render the union a less effective bargaining agent.
Rank and file employees' natural suspicion of relatively privileged
union leadership can only be aggravated if that leadership also has the
privilege of membership on a corporate supervisory board. Such suspi-
cion detracts from the ability of the leadership to achieve employee soli-
darity and, therefore, from the collective benefits employee solidarity
can gain from management. Moreover, union leaders who sense em-
ployee suspicion can overreact by becoming too aggressive or by engag-
ing in excessive, unproductive posturing during bargaining. Trust be-
tween union leaders and the employees they represent is critical to
effective collective bargaining; anything that impairs the trust impairs
bargaining.76
The threat to effective collective bargaining posed by union leaders
serving on shareholder-controlled boards, however, need not be ac-
75 Professor Stone contends that the law should not be concerned about union
leaders' subjective perceptions of the world being influenced by conflicting duties im-
posed upon them as corporate board members. She argues that a union membership is
free to choose whether it "has more to gain from sharing corporate power on the board
of directors than it has to lose from the risk of betrayal." Stone, supra note 10, at 148.
This argument reflects a rather romantic view of the ability of union membership to
control its leadership, and ignores the possibility of managerial and union elites com-
bining to compromise the interests of rank and file employees. The argument would
also support the notion that employees should have the freedom to choose unions totally
dominated by management. The rejection of the "employee free choice" position by the
NLRA, see supra text accompanying notes 27-33, was intended to protect employees
from representation by elites who are not totally independent of management.
11 Union dissident movements generally are organized because trust between
union leaders and some rank-and-file employees has broken down. For instance, lead-
ers of the Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU) formed their challenge to the
Teamsters hierarchy in order to restore the trust between employees and their repre-
sentatives that they believe is necessary for effective bargaining. See S. FRIEDMAN,
TEAMSTER RANK AND FILE 226 (1982) (describing power struggle between employers
and union officials who have an interest in a complacent work force and the TDU,
which is attempting to bargain over wages and working conditions and take over the
union). Even among the rank and file, "bonds of trust [are] needed ... if they are to
mobilize themselves successfully." Id. at 22.
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cepted to achieve the benefits of employee participation. The threat can
be significantly reduced by requiring employers to assign union leaders
special responsibilities as supervisory board members to represent only
the employees represented by their union." These leaders would not be
placed in two conflicting roles. They would need to consider only the
same interests raised in both their board and collective bargaining roles.
Moreover, they could legitimately resist pressure to consent to board
decisions made on behalf of the corporation as an entity or on behalf of
shareholders that could potentially harm employees. Their role as po-
tential critics of such decisions thus would not be compromised.
The additional contact with shareholder representatives and man-
agement during and surrounding board meetings should not impair
union leaders' role as collective bargaining agents as long as the leaders
could maintain their distinct function as employee representatives. Such
contact is similar to collective bargaining and does not threaten a
union's independence any more than does a long and well functioning
collective bargaining relationship. Any established close contact can en-
gender divisive suspicion from rank and file employees, but supervision
that is part of a system of employee representation, and through which
union leaders obtain no personal benefit,"8 should not produce em-
7This duty, of course, would not always conflict with the duty of traditional
directors. Shareholders and employees both benefit by the general success of their firm
and by the enlargement of the resources it commands. Moreover, both employees and
shareholders are harmed by the diversion of corporate opportunities to third parties and
by self-dealing directors. The law regarding these matters, therefore, could be basically
the same for employee or shareholder representatives and could be enforced by share-
holders through derivative suits.
11 Thus, the decision of some union officers not to accept compensation for board
service seems wise for practical, if not for legal, reasons. See Fraser, Worker Participa-
tion, supra note 43, at 954 (recounting his request during the 1979 negotiations with
Chrysler that he not receive compensation if made the representative of the UAW on
the Board of Directors).
A corporate employer's compensation of a union leader for serving on its board of
directors arguably could constitute a violation of the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(4) (1982), which proscribes em-
ployer payment of anything of value to officers of labor organizations "with intent to
influence" them in the discharge of their representative or union duties. See id.
§ 302(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(1) (1982). The law also proscribes compensation to
any employee representative. These provisions were intended to prevent bribery of em-
ployee representatives. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in
1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2318, 2330-31 and 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959
(LANDRUM-GRIFFIN) 397, 410-11 (1959) [hereinafter 1 NLRB, LMRDA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY] (addressing danger of conflict between union officials' fiduciary duty to
union and personal financial interests); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-
11 (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 768-69
(fiduciary principle forbidding any person in a position of trust to make any personal
profit from her position should also apply to union officers and their employees). A
more sensible reading of the provisions in question, however, would allow any reasona-
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ployee suspicion that is qualitatively different from that derived from
collective bargaining.
79
Granting union leaders special board seats to represent only em-
ployees their union represents, however, may not be as easily obtaina-
ble a goal as granting them undifferentiated, traditional seats. The
grant of a specialized seat may be unacceptable under traditional corpo-
rate law. That law protects the expectations of those who contribute
equity capital to corporations. One of those expectations is that the cor-
poration's management will be supervised by board members primarily
concerned about residual shareholder interests. Courts have accepted
special elections to supervisory boards of representatives of senior pre-
ferred stockholders whose dividends have been missed as long as these
elections are provided for in the corporation's articles. 80 The duties of
preferred stockholder representatives are not distinct, however, from
those of other board members; their special function on the board seems
to be only overseeing the fulfillment of formal corporate commitments
ble compensation that other board members received. See BUREAU OF LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE
FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 70-71 (1987) (U.S. Department of
Labor's interpretation of exception to § 302(a) in § 302(c) permitting "payments 'with
respect to the sale or purchase of an article or commodity at the prevailing market
price'" as also exempting union officer/director compensation insofar as it is at the
same rate and for the same services as other directors (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 186 (c)(3)
(1982))).
79 Clarifying the duties of union directors should also avoid any problem with
§ 501(a) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.
§ 501(a) (1982). That provision imposes a fiduciary duty on union directors, requiring
them "to refrain from dealing with [the union] as an adverse party or on behalf of an
adverse party in any matter connected with [their] duties and from holding or acquiring
any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such organiza-
tion." Id. This provision has been interpreted to address more than the protection of
union money and property. See, e.g., Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379,
1386 (9th Cir.) (under § 501 union officials have fiduciary duties beyond solely mone-
tary interests), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1978); Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825, 834-35 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1067 (1973). Under existing precedent, this provision should not inhibit good faith
participation on boards of directors by union officers as long as the union's constitution,
bylaws, or resolutions authorize that participation. See generally Carr v. Learner, 547
F.2d 135, 137-38 (1st Cir. 1976) (fiduciary duty imposed by § 501 is not breached by
poor performance in the collective bargaining process); McNamara v. Johnston, 522
F.2d 1157, 1163-65 (7th Cir. 1975) (union's constitution, bylaws, and resolutions de-
fine fiduciary duties of a union officer), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); H.R. REP.
No. 741, supra note 78, at 81, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 2480, and 1 NLRB, LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 78, at 839 (not-
ing that "the committee bill extends the fiduciary principle to all the activities of union
officials and other union agents or representatives").
8" See, e.g., Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 27 Del. Ch. 356, 365,
38 A.2d 743, 748 (1944) (preferred stockholders are entitled to vote for election of
directors if corporation defaults in dividend payments); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 221 (Supp. 1986) (debenture holders may also be given voting rights).
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to the senior stockholders who elected them."' Conceivably, therefore,
minority residual shareholders could successfully object to an amend-
ment to a corporation's articles that compromised the rights to the full
supervisory board representation they expected when they invested. Re-
gardless, a very strong claim could be made that a corporation would at
least have to observe the special procedures necessary to amend its arti-
cles to provide for special employee representation on its board.82 Mere
disclosure to shareholders before a board election of union officials' in-
tent to represent only employee interests should not suffice.83
Even if it is acceptable to include on supervisory boards represen-
tatives who are only responsible to a limited group of employees, it may
still not always be feasible to obtain the shareholder and board ap-
proval necessary to rewrite the corporate articles. On the one hand, a
union that has adequate collective bargaining or other economic power
to achieve any kind of effective representation on a corporate board
should often be able to achieve that representation on behalf of the em-
ployees it represents in collective bargaining. This conclusion appears
to be true because the benefits to employees of employee representatives
on supervisory boards would not be decreased, nor the cost to manage-
ment significantly increased, by the clarification of the representatives'
duties. Broader and more timely communication between management
and employee representatives, if effective at all, would be made more
candid by a formal recognition of the employee representatives' exclu-
sive duties toward employees. A firm's articles of incorporation may
have to be amended in any event to affirm the right of directors to
81 See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 658 (Del. Ch.
1975) (board elected by preferred shareholders "serves the corporation itself and the
common shareholders as well as those by whom it was put in office"), appeal dismissed
mem., 365 A.2d 136 (Del. 1976).
81 These procedures typically include a special board resolution, notice, class vot-
ing, and passage by at least a majority of the stock entitled to vote, rather than a simple
majority of a voting quorum. See DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1983) (require-
ments for amending the certificate of incorporation after the corporation has received
payment for its capital stock). Shareholder voting rights generally may be changed by
amendment. See, e.g., Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 135, 122 A.
696, 705 (1923) (the right to vote is not beyond the general authorized power to
amend); Metzger v. George Washington Memorial Park, Inc., 380 Pa. 350, 352, 11
A.2d 425, 429 (1955) ("no property or contractual rights are affected where the method
of voting is changed by charter amendment"). But see Faunce v. Boost Co., 15 N.J.
Super. 534, 540, 83 A.2d 649, 652 (1951) (holding invalid as inequitable, and an im-
pairment of contract, an amendment that took voting rights from one class of stock
without their consent and granted them to another).
83 Apparently the Chrysler Board of Directors thought that mere disclosure in the
proxy statement to shareholders would suffice. See Fraser, Worker Participation,
supra note 43, at 955-56 (proxy statement sent to shareholders containing Fraser's
claim that he would only act as a representative of the workers if elected to the Board).
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secure information about the firm on behalf of employees as well as
shareholders. 4
On the other hand, surely it is possible that the management and
shareholders of some corporations would more readily accept union
leaders as general board directors than as special employee representa-
tives. Regardless of the inability of one or two employee representatives
to determine the ultimate decisions of a large corporate board on which
they serve, these representatives could influence how the board deliber-
ated. Shareholder representatives might prefer that a board's delibera-
tions be formally concerned only with general corporate and share-
holder interests, and not become an open debate between
representatives of conflicting interests. Shareholders may also be un-
willing to sacrifice the symbol of complete shareholder control of boards
of directors.
Even if the corporate laws, or management and shareholders, are
unwilling to accept a compromise of board loyalty to shareholder inter-
ests, permitting union leaders on the board as traditional directors is
not warranted because of the availability of two additional options.
While not preferable, each seems adequate to achieve the goals of em-
ployee representation on nonemployee-shareholder-controlled supervi-
sory boards and would pose little threat to union independence.
First, union leaders could serve as employee monitors of the board
with full rights to all the information available to the board, but with-
out rights to vote and press independently issues before it.85 Such an
arrangement would serve the informational and, for the most part,
communication goals of employee board representation without sub-
stantially affecting the board's deliberative processes or challenging the
symbol of shareholder corporate control.86
" Although corporate laws generally give directors unqualified access to corporate
records, see supra note 53 and accompanying text, directors have a duty to use the
information they obtain only for the corporation. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24
N.Y.2d 494, 498-99, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969) (corporate
fiduciaries occupy a position of trust toward the corporation that recognizes no higher
claim). Therefore, a union director's freedom to use corporate information to help the
employees that director represents, rather than the corporation and its residual claim-
ants, should be clarified.
8" In France, non-voting employee representatives sit on company boards as advi-
sors. See Fabricius, Co-determination in European Company Law, in THE
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 101, 115 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1973)
("Works Councils" are comprised of the head of the enterprise and a representative of
the trade union whose function is exclusively advisory.).
8 Some commentators, concerned about the impact on the relative control of
residual claimants by even minority employee representation on corporate boards, find
this option more acceptable. See Williamson, supra note 47, at 1208-09 (labor repre-
sentation on boards of directors valuable for informational purposes).
[Vol. 137:1
EMPLOYEE SUPERVISION
The second alternative would completely avoid the effects of union
leaders serving in conflicting roles. Unions could nominate or accept as
traditional board members employees who are not formally or effec-
tively influential in union affairs. These employees could have general
duties of loyalty toward the firm, but they could also be given authority
to provide unions with information. As long as they remained in com-
munication with union representatives they could serve in board delib-
erations as spokespersons for employees."s Both the informational and
communication goals would be achieved without qualifying the symbol
or reality of shareholder control of supervisory boards. This alternative
also need not present risks of compromising union independence. The
perspectives of rank and file employees may be influenced by general
service on a corporate board, but such influence should not appreciably
threaten union independence. Nor would union solidarity be impaired
by rank and file employees' perceptions that their interests were not
being loyally represented by their leaders.8"
Implementing the distinction articulated above between the kinds
of supervisory duties that could be imposed on union leaders and those
that could be imposed on other employee representatives would not re-
quire any amendment to the labor laws. It could be achieved by devel-
87 Some evidence does suggest, however, that union leaders may be unsatisfied
with delegates that they cannot completely control. See Stern, Whyte, Hammer &
Meek, The Union and the Transition to Employee Ownership, in WORKER PARTICI-
PATION AND OWNERSHIP 81, 104 (W. Whyte, T. Hammer, C. Meek, R. Nelson & R.
Stern eds. 1983) (noting that union leaders found it difficult to present their ideas and
information to the Board of Rath Packing through the "rather passive" worker mem-
bers and had to rely on the members they had selected from outside the company).
Furthermore, unions are much less likely to use their political or economic power to
achieve this sort of employee representation. During discussion of codetermination leg-
islation, the British trade unions insisted that they control any employee representation.
See TRADES UNION CONGRESS, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 46 (3d ed. 1979) (justifying
the exclusion of nonunionists on the grounds that the majority of the workers that
would be affected belonged to unions or were unlikely to join unions in the future).
Management might also be somewhat less willing to have other employees on their
board. See Fraser, Worker Participation, supra note 43, at 954 (Chrysler insisted that
Fraser be appointed.).
" This option would have the ancillary benefit of avoiding, without litigation or
special legislation, the potential antitrust problems raised by having officers of the same
international union serve on the boards of competitive firms. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 19
(1982) (Clayton Act proscription of interlocking directorates). See generally Olson,
supra note 45, at 803-09 (addressing antitrust implications of union representation on
boards of different firms within the same industry); Steuer, Employee Representation
on the Board: Industrial Democracy or Interlocking Directorate?, 16 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 276-82 (1977) (discussing whether employee representation on
multiple boards would violate proscriptions against interlocking directorates); Note, La-
bor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, 92 YALE L.J. 106, 117-18
(1982) (proposing a two-part test for identifying a limited group of employee board
members to whom antitrust sanctions should be applied).
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oping section 8(a)(2) doctrine. The Labor Board has held that when
active union members become supervisors of employees for whom their
union negotiates, the member-supervisor's involvement in union affairs
can constitute employer interference in violation of section 8(a)(2).89
The Board has demanded that supervisory employees not only be dis-
qualified from serving on union negotiating committees, but also from
voting in union elections that could affect a policy relevant to their em-
ployer.90 If the experience of being a shop-floor supervisor could affect
the perspective of a union member on labor-management relations, so
could the experience of supervising high-level management on behalf of
interests other than those of bargaining unit employees.
Admittedly, however, a line of section 8(a)(2) cases exists of even
more direct relevance that would have to be overruled in order to use
section 8(a)(2) to implement the undivided responsibilities principle. In
these cases, the Board has held that individuals influential in the union
can sit on a board that supervises a management with whom their
union negotiates as long as the union representatives do not constitute a
majority of the board and the union does not own a substantial part of
the enterprise.91 By finding section 8(a)(2) violations only when evi-
89 See Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174, 184 (1957) (par-
ticipation of master mechanics in bargaining on behalf of union constituted unlawful
interference with the administration of the union's affairs); see also Jeffrey Mfg. Co.,
208 N.L.R.B. 75, 83 (1974) (permitting supervisor to serve as union president and
handle disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement violates section
8(a)(2 )); University of Chicago Library, 205 N.L.R.B. 220, 225 (1973) (supervisors'
participation on union negotiating committee, engaging in picketing, or attending the
national convention as a delegate, violates section 8(a)(2)); Powers Regulator Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 1185, 1188 (1964) (noting that "when an employer ... deals with a union
negotiating committee which includes a supervisor in its membership, the employer
thereby interferes with the administration of the union in violation of section 8(a)(2)").
The doctrine has been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Mon River Towing, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 421 F.2d 1, 7 (3d Cir. 1969) (upholding Nassau doctrine); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. N.L.R.B., 276 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1960)
(same).
"o See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp., 254 N.L.R.B. 634, 640 (1981) (supervisory em-
ployees may not participate in union elections); Schwenck, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 640, 642
(1977) (managerial and supervisory employees violated the Act by attending union
meetings, voting in several elections, and holding elective office in the union); Nassau,
118 N.L.R.B. at 175 (allowing executives and supervisors to vote at union meetings
held unlawful); see also Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. N.L.R.B., 287 F.2d
354, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (dictum) (indicating some supervisory involvement in
union may be acceptable, but supervisory participation in contentious debate can inhibit
other employees); Employing Bricklayers' Ass'n, 134 N.L.R.B. 1535, 1535-36 (super-
visor may not even vote in election of delegate to union's international convention),
enforced, 292 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1961).
" Compare St. Louis Labor Health Inst., 230 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1977) (finding
§ 8(a)(2) violation when union officer or agents had significant control over supervi-
sory board) and Medical Found. of Bellaire, 193 N.L.R.B. 62, 64 (1971) (same) and
Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 135, 139-40 (1970) (same) with Anchorage
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dence exists of union officials actually succumbing to a conflict of inter-
est rather than just potentially being vulnerable to a conflict, these cases
seem to be in tension with section 8(a)(2) philosophy and general
Board 8(a)(2) doctrine.92 Furthermore, on their facts, some of the cases
seem naively unrealistic about the likelihood of conflict.93
C. Avoiding the Preemption of Collective Bargaining
The independent employee representative principle and the distinction
of functions principle are closely related. Both principles are formulated
primarily to address the same concern: that management can use direct
worker supervision of management, as it used company-dominated un-
ions in the past,"4 to convince employees that they need not and should
not seek to be represented by an independent collective bargaining
agent.
1. The Independent Employee Principle
The independent employee representative principle prohibits man-
agement from influencing the establishment or maintenance of any sys-
tem for selecting individuals to represent employees on corporate
boards. American corporate law permits management to nominate, and
shareholders to elect, employees or employee agents to serve on their
boards of directors.9 5 Labor law, however, should not permit manage-
Community Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 575, 578-79 (1976) (not finding a § 8(a)(2)
violation because union controlled only a minority of board seats) and UMW Welfare
and Retirement Fund, 192 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1022 (1971) (same).
92 See supra text accompanying note 33 (Board has always interpreted § 8(a)(2)
to protect against the possibility, however small, of conflicts of interest).
11 For instance, in Anchorage Community Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. at 575-76, the
Teamsters not only served as bargaining agent for many of the hospital's employees,
but also held seven of the fifteen seats on the hospital's board of trustees and four of the
five seats on the board's executive committee. See id. This representation presumably
arose in part because 10 percent of the hospital's income was derived from servicing
Teamster members insured by the union's health and welfare trust fund. See id. In
addition, the Teamsters had made a $10 million construction loan to the hospital. See
id. The union officials on the hospital's board of trustees must have discharged their
trustee responsibilities as more than representatives of the hospital employees. Their
experience on the board can only have compounded the difficulty which the Teamsters'
other involvement with the hospital must have presented to their serving as indepen-
dent, forceful advocates of the hospital employees during collective bargaining. See also,
e.g., Child Day Care Center, 252 N.L.R.B. 1177, 1181 (1980) (union represented day
care center employees although one-half of supervisory board was union-appointed and
chairperson of the board was a union officer).
" See supra note 26-33 and accompanying text (The prohibition in section
8(a)(2) stemmed from the fear that employees would be influenced by management-
supported and dependent labor organizations.).
" The law prescribes the duties of board members; it does not prescribe their
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ment to present any board members, regardless of their jobs or other
affiliations, as employee representatives unless the representatives are
chosen through some process or organization totally independent of
management. Corporations should not be permitted to create special
employee seats on their boards of directors to be filled with their own
nominees. Nor should management be able to establish its own selec-
tion procedures for employee representatives. Finally, management
should not ask employees to communicate their views and grievances to
board members it has designated as employee representatives.
Management should present as employee representatives only
board members who have been chosen by independent organizations or
through independent processes. For example, representatives selected
by an independent union that serves as the collective bargaining agent
of the employees to be represented would be acceptable. Representa-
tives selected by groups of employee shareholders would also be accept-
able, as long as these groups were not established, maintained, or in
any way interfered with, by management.
The above restrictions reduce management's incentive to attempt
to inhibit the employees' desire to bargain collectively. The underlying
presumptions are the same as the ones associated with section 8(a)(2). 96
First, organizations or processes that are dependent on management do
not provide as good an opportunity to influence management as those
that are independent; employee representatives who owe their positions
to management will not be forceful representatives against manage-
ment. Second, employees can be influenced by the existence of a man-
agement-supported, dependent, inferior alternative organization to
forego the independent, superior alternative.
The cost of the restrictions suggested by the independent employee
representative principle are minor; they would not impede the achieve-
ment of the plausible, legitimate goals of employee participation in
nonemployee-shareholder-controlled supervisory boards. The restric-
tions do not affect collective bargaining agents' authority to bargain to
expand their access to corporate information or their opportunity to
communicate employee concerns to management. They thus do not im-
pede more flexible bilateral governance of the firm. Nor do these limi-
identities. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1983) ("Directors need not be
stockholders unless so required by the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws. The
certificate of incorporation or bylaws may prescribe other qualifications for directors.");
id. § 142 (discussing the duties of officers but omitting any mention of their identities).
" See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (Labor-management relations
are best served by reducing the potential for employers to inhibit employees' free
choice; the best representatives of employee interests are those who are completely inde-
pendent of management.).
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tations affect an independent employee-shareholder group's authority to
bargain for representation on the board. Employee shareholder groups
would still be able to present to management particular concerns of
employees about the direction of the enterprise. The restrictions do not
even hinder a management that unilaterally wishes to expand the cor-
porate information available to employees or to provide a better chan-
nel of communication between employees and the board. Information
can be made available to employees, and their comments on business
operations solicited, without presenting particular individuals as em-
ployee advocates or representatives to management. There is only one
reason management would insist on violating the independent employee
principle: to instill in employees the misconception that the employees
had someone collecting information for them and advocating positions
on their behalf.
2. The Distinction of Functions Principle
Application of the distinction of functions principle helps avoid
any risks that the management of a nonemployee- shareholder-con-
trolled firm will utilize employee representatives to discourage interest
in traditional collective bargaining. This principle requires that the role
of employee representatives on corporate supervisory boards be kept
distinct from the role of collective bargaining agents at the bargaining
table. Employee representatives, including those independently chosen
by employees, should not negotiate agreements on behalf of employees,
either with management or with other nonemployee- shareholder rep-
resentatives. Nor should they commit their own board power to man-
agement or accept commitments of management towards employees.
These restrictions ensure that employee representation on shareholder-
dominated boards will not become an inferior form of collective bar-
gaining that might cause employees to forego the superior form pre-
ferred by the Labor Act.
Collective bargaining through employee-bound representatives is
generally an inferior form of bargaining for several reasons. First,
board representatives may represent employees with conflicting inter-
ests who are thus not in a unit appropriate for bargaining.97 Second,
"' The Act directs the Board to select bargaining units "in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed" by the NLRA. 29
U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). The Board facilitates the development of effective collective
bargaining by including only employees with a community of interest in the same bar-
gaining unit. See NLRB v. Purnell's Pride, Inc., 609 F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980)
(community of interest determined by "'bargaining history, operational integration, ge-
ographic proximity, common supervision, similarity in job function, and degree of em-
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board members may not enjoy majority support among the employees
they represent.98 Third, and most importantly, board representatives
may lack the ability to lead job actions that give employees bargaining
leverage. The only special bargaining leverage that would be possessed
by minority employee representatives on corporate boards is their
promise to support management on critical issues. Given the normal
pattern of consensual decisionmaking on most issues by shareholder
representatives,9" this leverage does not seem significant. Thus, man-
agement should not be permitted to suggest to employees that indepen-
dent employee board representatives can produce effective collective
bargaining.
When unions are legally established as collective bargaining
agents, circumstances are somewhat different. Under the NLRA, col-
lective bargaining agents should be able to agree to nontraditional
forms of bargaining for the employees they represent. Unions estab-
lished as bargaining agents have the competence to determine whether
a particular form of bargaining threatens their status. Thus, the dis-
tinction of functions principle, which provides paternalistic protection
against union preemption, ought to be waivable by union leaders, in
contrast to the nonwaivable undivided responsibility principle, which
insulates union leadership from seduction by management. 00
Even when unions are established, however, a risk exists that ne-
gotiations at the board level will be presented as obviating traditional
collective bargaining. Unions should be authorized to take this risk but
never forced to accept it. Reversal of the presumption against negotia-
tion through employee board representatives, therefore, should not be a
ployee interchange' ") (quoting NLRB v. J.C. Penney Co., 559 F.2d 373, 375 (5th Cir.
1977)). The definition of "appropriate unit," however, has been modified in certain
instances to accommodate other policy concerns. See, e.g., St. Francis Hosp., 271
N.L.R.B. 948, 953-54 (1984) (adopting a "disparity-of-interest" test in the health care
field to avoid a proliferation of bargaining units); see also St. Vincent Hosp. & Health
Care Center, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 64, at 6 (Apr. 9, 1987) (adopting the "disparity-of-
interest" test until the adoption of formal rules governing health care units).
"' Only unions supported by a majority of employees within an appropriate bar-
gaining unit can serve as collective bargaining representatives. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1982); see also ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961) (granting minority
union exclusive representation constitutes unlawful support in violation of section
8(a)(2)).
See M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 140-48.
100 The Court and Board have permitted unions to waive only certain employee
statutory rights. See Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA (Pts.
1 & 2), 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 335, 680-704 (1981). Compare NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,
415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974) (union cannot waive employee organizational rights) with
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (union may waive employee
rights to engage in economic strikes) and NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
395, 399, 404-09 (1952) (union can waive rights to bargain over terms of employment).
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mandatory topic of bargaining. 0 '
More importantly, only employees represented by an exclusive
bargaining representative should be allowed to reverse the presump-
tion.' 2 Corporate board members should, therefore, always be prohib-
ited from negotiating for unorganized workers. Employee representa-
tives on supervisory boards can help provide these employees with
information, can attempt to influence the boards by communicating em-
ployee needs and concerns to the boards, and can discharge all the re-
sponsibilities of other board members. They cannot, however, commit
employees, or their own power, to management, accept commitments of
management toward employees, or conduct any kind of negotiations or
discussions with an eye toward such commitments.
Like the undivided responsibility and independent representative
principles, the distinction of functions principle does not impede
achievement of the goals of employee representation. It only prohibits
an employee representative to a corporate board from negotiating with
management on behalf of employees unless authorized to do so by the
employees' bargaining agent. This prohibition does not block the ex-
change of information and facilitation of communication - the primary
goals of employee representation on shareholder- controlled boards.'0 3
3. Reconciling Board Law With the Independent Representative
and Distinction of Functions Principles
Both the independent representative and the distinction of func-
tions principles can be given legal force through elaboration of section
8(a)(2) doctrine. In order to understand the relevance of section 8(a)(2),
it is first necessary to appreciate that any system devised to represent
101 This means that employers would not be able to insist that unions agree that
such bargaining occur. See NLRB v. Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958). The
courts often consider traditional forms of bargaining when deciding whether an issue
should be a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) ("While not determinative, it is appropriate to look to indus-
trial bargaining practices in appraising the propriety of including a particular subject
within the scope of mandatory bargaining."); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395, 408 (1952) (In determining the subjects of collective bargaining, the courts
should consider the bargaining traditions that have been established.).
102 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) (mandating that employee-selected bargaining
representatives shall function as exclusive representatives of all employees within bar-
gaining unit).
"03 This proscription does not have any other real costs for employees. See supra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text. It is improbable that an employee representative,
unsupported by a union, would be able to obtain concessions that a nonemployee share-
holder-controlled board would not find appropriate to grant unilaterally after hearing
the employee representative articulate employee concerns.
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employees to management can be a "labor organization."'' Section
8(a)(2) prohibits management from interfering with, supporting, or
dominating such an organization.'0 5 Section 2(5) of the Act defines "la-
bor organization" to include "any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages," or other terms -and "conditions of
work." °0 The Supreme Court has defined "dealing" broadly to include
making recommendations as well as actually negotiating.07
Arguably the entire supervisory board becomes a "labor organiza-
tion" under the Act when it includes individuals whose purpose, in
part, is to deal with management on behalf of employees. This view,
however, which would seem to prevent any mixing of employee and
shareholder representatives on the same management supervisory
board, distorts reality and magnifies the threat that employee represen-
tation on corporate boards poses to collective bargaining. The Labor
Board has developed an exception to the section 2(5) definition of labor
organization that would exclude supervisory boards with employee rep-
resentatives. This exception holds that employee groups do not consti-
tute labor organizations if they exercise independent managerial au-
thority rather than merely make recommendations to those who do
exercise such authority.108 Because of this exception, most corporate
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
105 See id. § 158(a)(2).
"s6 Id. § 152(5).
107 See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 214 (1959); see also NLRB v.
James H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706, 708 (3d Cir. 1946) (holding that employer-
dominated employee organization limited to making recommendations to management
concerning employment practices constituted a labor organization under the NLRA);
Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993, 995 (1961) (holding that the
mere presentation to management of employee views concerning issues of employment
by an employee group constituted "dealing" with management under section 2(5)),
modified, 305 F.2d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 1962) (affirming Board finding of a labor organ-
ization). NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982), is difficult to
reconcile with Cabot Carbon. In finding that a committee was not a labor organization,
the Scott court stated that "the Committee was a part of a company plan to determine
employee attitudes regarding working conditions .. rather than a method by which to
pursue a course of dealings." Id. at 294. The court acknowledged, however, that the
distinction between "communication of ideas" and a "course of dealings" could be diffi-
cult to apply. Id.
101 See Mercy-Memorial Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1121 (1977) (griev-
ance committee not a labor organization because it was created to give employees a
voice in grievance resolution, and not to negotiate an outcome); Spark's Nugget, Inc.,
230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (1977) (employee council created to resolve grievances was not
a labor organization; the council did not deal with management, but rather performed a
function for it), enforced in part and denied in part sub nom., NLRB v. Silver Spur
Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming portion of Board decision regard-
ing the status of the grievance committee), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981); see also
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boards are not labor organizations because most boards have at least
formal, independent authority over management.
Employee representatives on nonemployee-shareholder-controlled
boards, however, do not have independent authority over management.
They can only deal with, and make recommendations to, management
and to the dominant group of nonemployee-shareholder representatives
on the traditional corporate board. The system through which such
representatives are selected and operate, therefore, should fall within
the section 2(5) definition, and not the board's "independent decision
maker" exception."'
Thus, on the one hand, an employer's management could violate
section 8(a)(2) by establishing, supporting, or interfering with the sys-
tem by which employees select their representatives for service on a
supervisory board. On the other hand, an employer with non-manage-
rial employees or employee agents on its board of directors would not
violate section 8(a)(2) if these employees or agents were selected by
some organization or process completely independent of the employer's
management. There would also be no violation if the employees did not
serve, were not elected, and were not presented in any way as employee
representatives. This doctrine is precisely what the independent em-
ployee representative principle demands.
Expressing the distinction of functions principle in section 8(a)(2)
doctrine is also not difficult once a process or plan for employee partici-
pation in nonemployee-shareholder-controlled corporate boards is
viewed as a labor organization under the Act. The Board and the Court
have held that an employer violates section 8(a)(2) by bargaining with
a labor organization that does not have majority support in a unit of
employees appropriate for bargaining.110 To do so provides the minor-
ity union with "support" that could distort free choice in the employ-
Note, Employee Representative on the Corporate Board of Directors: Implications
Under Labor, Antitrust and Corporate Law, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 375-76 (1980)
(contending that supervisory boards that include employees do not meet statutory defi-
nition of labor organization because they are employers, rather than deal with
employers).
109 See SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., IST
SESS., COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73D CONG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONG.) 22-23
(Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1347
(stressing that the word "plan" was added to the definition of labor organizations to
insure that all representational systems, not just those in the form of labor unions,
would be covered); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 241-42, reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 271-72 (testimony of Mr. Edwin Witte em-
phasizing that labor organization must include plans for the selection of employee
representatives).
110 See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1961).
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ees' selection of bargaining representatives.111 The policy underlying
this doctrine demonstrates the need to proscribe bargaining with an em-
ployee representative on a corporate supervisory board unless that rep-
resentative is an agent of a union with majority support in a unit of
employees appropriate for bargaining.112
The Labor Act's concern with the protection of a preferred form
of collective bargaining by exclusive representatives indeed raises the
question of the applicability of section 8(a)(5) doctrine to employee rep-
resentation on shareholder-controlled boards." 3 Section 8(a)(5) might
be applied to prohibit management from treating employees or em-
ployee agents on a supervisory board as employee representatives when
the employees are represented by an exclusive bargaining agent that did
not voluntarily approve the board representatives. Dealing with some
board members as employee representatives could be viewed as violat-
ing the employer's obligation to treat one bargaining agent as an exclu-
sive agent."'
Nevertheless, this application of section 8(a)(5) seems both exces-
"I1 See id. at 738-39.
... This proscription might be extended further to require the approval of exclu-
sive bargaining agents before permitting any employee representatives on supervisory
boards to make any recommendations to management concerning employee grievances,
labor disputes, or working conditions. This extension seems a short step from an ac-
knowledgement that a system for employee representation on a supervisory board be-
comes a labor organization by being a process to present employee recommendations to
management. The acceptance of such a system would seem to give it as much support
as the minimal financial support that the board has proscribed through section 8(a)(2).
See, e.g., NLRB v. H & H Plastics Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 678, 680-81 (6th Cir. 1968)
(lack of financial support, other than that provided by the company, led to the conclu-
sion that the company had provided unlawful assistance to a union, in violation of
section 8(a)(2)).
This extension, however, would significantly restrict employee representation on
corporate boards and is doctrinally unnecessary. It would prevent management from
agreeing to place particular individuals as employee representatives on the board in
response to pressures from any independent employee group, including employee share-
holders, that it did not or could not accept as a majority representative of an appropri-
ate bargaining unit. This result is restrictive because, in the absence of unions, it would
prevent any employees from using their power as shareholders to communicate em-
ployee concerns to management from a supervisory board position. Doctrinally, this
extension is unnecessary because the type of communication between employee repre-
sentatives and management that is sufficient to qualify a representational process as a
labor organization under section 2(5) need not be sufficient to constitute illegal em-
ployer "support" under section 8(a)(2).
13 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) (refusal to bargain with employee representa-
tives constitutes unfair labor practice).
"14 See NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 1939)
(affirming Board holding that employer must bargain with the exclusive bargaining
representative selected by a majority of employees in an appropriate unit); cf. Empo-
rium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65, 69-70
(1975) (holding that employee activity to achieve minority bargaining is not protected
by the Act).
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sively restrictive and doctrinally unnecessary. As long as management
or other shareholder representatives on the supervisory board cannot
negotiate with the independent employee representatives, the bargain-
ing position of exclusive representatives will not be compromised. By
expressing displeasure concerning a particular management course of
action, an employee board representative might persuade management
to alter the allocation of resources available to employees, but section
8(a)(5) would still require management to negotiate with an exclusive
bargaining representative prior to implementing decisions on
mandatory bargaining topics."1 5 Further, the active concurrence of an
employee board representative in a contemplated management course of
action should not undermine a union's bargaining position more than
the active concurrence of a strong faction of employees in the bargain-
ing unit. Section 8(a)(5) prohibits bargaining with minority representa-
tives;... it does not prohibit management from listening to their inde-
pendently expressed views.
D. The Principles Combined
The above analysis indicates that protecting traditional collective
bargaining does not require excessively cumbersome restrictions on the
participation of employee representatives on shareholder-controlled cor-
porate boards. Because such participation can offer significant supple-
mentary benefits to collective bargaining, union-initiated schemes for
employee board representatives should be the least restricted. The undi-
vided responsibilities principle requires that union leaders placed on
corporate boards have formally clarified and effectively observed duties
toward only the employees they also represent in collective bargaining.
If this principle is followed, the union may use board membership to its
best advantage to supplement collective bargaining whether or not the
union wishes to engage in bargaining through the board.
The use of corporate board membership by employee shareholder
1 5 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737-39 (1962). The placement of indepen-
dent employee representatives on a supervisory board probably should not itself be a
mandatory topic of bargaining. See Harper, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain Con-
cerning Business Transformations, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 25, 36-37
(S. Estreicher & D. Collins, eds. 1988). If it were, however, Katz would prevent an
employer from placing even independent employee representatives on a supervisory
board without first negotiating to impasse with any incumbent bargaining
representative.
"' The Board has interpreted the proscription to include adjusting grievances
with minority representatives, notwithstanding the proviso in section 9(a) concerning
the right of individual employees to present grievances. See Federal Tel. & Radio Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 649, 653 (1953).
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groups not affiliated with unions should be somewhat more restricted.
The distinction of functions principle prohibits these seats from being
used to conduct negotiations aimed toward the achievement of commit-
ments between the management, or the controlling faction of the board,
and the employees or employee representatives on that board. The in-
dependent employee representative principle limits management's au-
thority to place unilaterally employees or employee agents on its super-
visory board: management cannot present these employees or agents as
employee representatives who deal with management as would a labor
organization. These greater restrictions on employee board representa-
tion when collective bargaining agents are not involved ensure that if
employee board representation is not supplementary to traditional col-
lective bargaining, employee representation at least will not threaten
collective bargaining's development or continued existence.
The reconciliation of the two models of industrial democracy by
subordinating employee representation on supervisory boards to tradi-
tional collective bargaining may seem less compelling when employee
representatives can gain actual control of the supervisory boards. In
such situations the plausible goals of the second model of industrial
democracy become much more ambitious than supplementing tradi-
tional collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the next Section shall argue
that the three guiding principles that reconcile collective bargaining
with employee representation on nonemployee-shareholder-controlled
boards should also limit the structure of employee-controlled firms.
III. PRIVATELY ARRANGED EMPLOYEE CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION OF MANAGEMENT
Explaining why and how collective bargaining in employee-con-
trolled firms should be protected requires a brief description of both the
various structural types of employee control and the plausible goals
these variations could achieve. The variations require differing degrees
of departure from the traditional corporate model.
In traditional firms, shareholders of residual assets elect the super-
visory board. An investment group could own thirty percent, or perhaps
even less, of the voting shares of such a firm and control the firm if the
other shares are widely dispersed."' In order for the employees to con-
trol the election of a supervisory board, however, they genereally must
117 See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962)
(noting that "28.3 percent of the voting stock of a publicly owned corporation is usually
tantamount to majority control").
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control an actual majority of voting shares. 118 Although such a level of
ownership may seldom occur through random or even orchestrated
open-market transactions, it has occurred through the sale of particular
capital assets of a firm to a new corporation that is primarily owned by
employees who wish to continue to combine their labor with these as-
sets.'19 It also has occurred through the sale to employees of a majority
block of shares in the entire firm. 2 o These sales have been encouraged
in this country through provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that
grant significant tax advantages to certain sales of stock to employees
through qualified Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs").' 2"
12' Employees will need control of an actual majority because a group of employ-
ees may present claims that directly conflict with those of nonemployee shareholders.
Cf. D. ZWERDLNG, supra note 17, at 56 (In an employee takeover, the miners agreed
to sell at least 51 percent of the corporate stock to fellow workers so that they could
retain financial control.). The National Center for Employee Ownership counted 34
American firms in the spring of 1987 with more than 50 percent employee ownership
and more than 1,000 employees. Major Employee Ownership Companies, EMPLOYEE
OwNERSHuP REP., May-June 1987, at 6, 6-7.
11' The Vermont Asbestos Group, South Bend Lathe, and Saratoga Knitting Mill
are all prominent contemporary examples. See D. ZwERDING, supra note 17, at 53-
57, 64-67, 68-72.
120 The employee purchase of Rath Packing provides a recent example. See C.
GuNN, supra note 2, at 133-38. The purchase of Weirton Steel is another. See Green-
house, Employees Make a Go of Weirton, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1985, at F3, col. 2.
... Within certain limits, all employer contributions to a qualified ESOP are tax
deductible, and not taxable to employees until they are withdrawn from the plan. See
I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A), (a)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). Dividends paid on stock held by an
ESOP are also deductible. See id. § 404(k). Moreover, the employer-corporation can
use an ESOP trust ("ESOT") to borrow money to purchase authorized, but unissued,
stock from the corporation using the stock as collateral. See id. § 4975(d)(3), (e). The
corporation then repays the loan by making contributions to the ESOT that are in turn
paid to the lender. These contributions, including the repayment of principle, are fully
deductible, and one-half of the interest paid to a lending institution is now tax free. See
id. § 133; see also Horwood, The ABC's of ESOPILBOs-Past, Present, and Future,
13 J. CoRP. TAx'N 233, 249-50 (1986) (discussing ESOP loan interest exclusion from
income). Alternatively an employer may now obtain the same tax advantages by di-
rectly incurring a loan from a lending institution using the proceeds to acquire securi-
ties for the ESOP. Furthermore, if an owner sells a business to an ESOP and reinvests
the proceeds in the stock of another business within a year, the owner pays no capital
gains. See I.R.C. § 1042(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
The establishment of an ESOP usually has not entailed employee control of a
firm. Most ESOPs own only a small percentage of their corporation's stock. Further-
more, ESOPs need not pass through votes to employees until shares are allocated to
particular employee accounts, see id. § 409(b), and such allocations need not occur for
shares on which a loan has not yet been repaid. See Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11(b), (c)
(as amended in 1978). Voting rights on allocated shares must be passed through to
employees of corporations who have issued securities registered under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. See I.R.C. §§ 409(e)(2), 4975(e)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). For
closely held corporations, allocated shares must have the right to vote on major corpo-
rate restructurings, such as mergers, recapitalizations, liquidations, dissolutions, or sales
of the business or most of its assets. See id. §§ 401(a)(22), 409(e)(3). See generally
Horwood, supra, at 233, 244-45 (discussing ESOP participants' voting rights).
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Employee ownership of any fraction of the voting shares in a firm
is, of course, unstable as long as the individual employee owners are
not restricted from selling their shares to nonemployees and from con-
tinuing to hold their shares after they leave employment with the
firm.' 2 Unlike the traditional corporate model, one type of employee-
controlled firm would stabilize employee control by denying employees
a public market for their shares and by requiring them to sell their
shares to the firm upon termination or retirement.'23
Another type of employee-controlled firm would modify the tradi-
tional rights of corporate shareholders in order to achieve an equal
voice for all employees. Reaching this goal requires more than ensuring
that all employees own some of the firm; the employees of most em-
ployee-controlled firms do not possess equal numbers of shares. This
inequality may exist because the employees have contributed varying
amounts of their own capital to the firm, either directly,"' or indirectly
through wage diversion,125 or because an employee-controlled firm
might wish to compensate some employees more highly through a
higher share of "profits" or residual assets.' Therefore, it is usually
necessary to separate voting shares from residual claim shares in order
to give all employees an equal voice. The simplest method of separation
is to create two classes of stock, with each employee holding only one
share of the voting stock and each holding various amounts of nonvot-
ing stock.'
2 7
Although ESOPs have been primarily used by corporations for financial reasons,
the tax advantages of ESOPs can and have been used by unions and employees to
facilitate the establishment of employee-owned and even-controlled firms. See, e.g., in-
fra text accompanying notes 209-18 (discussion of Rath Packing). The tax advantages
accrue to the corporation regardless of who is the majority owner; employees can ensure
control as well as beneficial ownership by setting up the ESOT with employee selected
trustees and a pass through of voting rights. Furthermore, employees retain the pen-
sion-like tax advantage of not having to pay taxes on shares allocated to them until the
shares, or their cash values, are withdrawn.
12 The quick sale by employees of their stock in successful employee-owned firms
like Vermont Asbestos, see D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 60-62, illustrates this
obvious proposition.
.. ESOPS now can include such restrictions. Corporations whose charter or by-
laws restrict the ownership of substantially all its securities to employees or qualified
plans are not required to give plan participants the right to receive a distribution of
their accounts in transferable stock. See I.R.C. § 409(h)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
124 The employee-purchases of Vermont Asbestos Group and Saratoga Knitting
Mills provide examples. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 56, 71-72.
"5 See, e.g., 0. GUNN, supra note 2, at 147 (Rath Packing); Hyatt-Clark ESOP,
supra note 69, at 25 (Hyatt Roller Bearing Plant); Greenhouse, supra note 120, at F4,
col. 1 (Weirton Steel).
126 South Bend Lathe provides an example. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at
66-67.
127 Another method is two-tiered voting. This system requires the pooling of all
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A more radically structured departure of the employee-controlled
firm from the traditional corporate form divides levels of capital contri-
bution, not only from voting shares, but also from residual claims. In
this cooperative form all nonemployee contributors of capital, like tradi-
tional debt holders, obtain fixed returns. Claims to residual returns in
cooperatives are allocated between employees based on the amount,
quality, and type of their labor contributions to the firm.128 Voice
rights can be equally distributed between employees.
1 2
1
Thus, employee-controlled firms can markedly vary along several
dimensions. They can be totally or only partially employee-controlled.
The level of employee control can be stable or unstable. All or part of
employee shares in some kind of trust with the trustees pledging to vote the employee
owned shares as a block or proportionately according to one-employee, one-vote deci-
sionmaking. A two-tier block voting system could disqualify a plan from tax preferen-
tial ESOP treatment because it would deny a pass through of voting rights. See I.R.C
§ 409(e) (Supp. IV 1986). This section now expressly permits a plan to qualify as an
ESOP, however, by giving each participant one vote and requiring the plan trustees to
vote the plan's stock proportionate to the vote. See id. § 409(e)(5).
128 Such allocations are representative of many American cooperatives. See Jones,
supra note 6, at 40.
Cooperatives can also provide returns to their members based on the level and
timing of some limited initial capital contributions. This system is followed by the
Spanish Mondragon cooperatives through the use of individual capital accounts consist-
ing of contributions made by workers at the time of initial employment, portions of
retained earnings allocated to contributed labor, and accumulated interest on both types
of capital contributions. Except for the interest, these accounts cannot be withdrawn
until retirement and they are used by the firm until then. See Oakeshott, Spain: The
Mondragon Enterprises, in THE PERFoRMANCE OF LABOUR-MANAGED Fnums 122,
128-29 (F. Stephen ed. 1982).
129 Developing the work of the Yugoslav theorist, Jaroslav Vanek, and influenced
by the Mondragon model, see supra note 128, David Ellerman has argued forcefully
that only this more radical form of employee ownership can provide real employee
control and long-run viability. Ellerman's three major tenets are (1) employee-control
must be based on contributions of labor not capital, (2) the firm must borrow its exter-
nal capital at set interest rates rather than offering residual returns, and (3) most of the
net worth of the firm should be separated into individual capital accounts for employees
to be paid out at retirement with interest, rather than collectively pooled in the firm.
See Ellerman, Workers' Cooperatives: The Question of Legal Structure, in WORKER
COOPERATIVES, supra note 2, at 266-71 (discussing his third principle); see also R.
RussELL, SHARING OWNERSHIP IN THE WoRKPLAcE 47-48 (1985) (discussing tenets
one and two). In part through Ellerman's efforts, Massachusetts now has an Employee
Cooperative Corporation Act. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 157A, §§ 1-11 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988). This act facilitates the formation of cooperatives along the Mondragon
model. See Ellerman & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker Coop-
erative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441, 452
(1983). Connecticut and Maine have followed Massachusetts. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-418f-O (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1971-84
(Supp. 1987).
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code now offers some of the same encourage-
ment to employee-owned cooperatives as it does to ESOPs. For instance, owners who
sell their business to an employee-owned cooperative can escape recognition of gain by
profit reinvestment in another business. See I.R.C. § 1042 (b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
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the employees can control the firm. The share of control given to each
employee can be equal, or it can vary with the level of each employee's
claim on the firm's residual assets. Finally, the economic basis for the
employees' control of the firm (their claim on its residual assets) can
derive primarily from the contribution of capital or the contribution of
labor.
A. Goals of Employee Control
An analysis of the appropriate place of collective bargaining and
the protection it provides in all types of employee-controlled firms
should begin with an examination of why rational workers might wish
to be employed by such firms. This examination need not establish that
all employees should work in such firms; it need only explain why em-
ployees plausibly might wish to choose such firms.
The benefits that may accrue to employees through actual control
of the firm, unlike those that can accrue through minority participation
in the supervision of management, are not dependent on bargaining re-
lationships. The former benefits, moreover, seem to be of much greater
potential significance than the latter. Nevertheless, the former, like the
latter, are limited by economic constraints.
Most importantly, limits exist on the extent to which employee
control of an enterprise in our economy can lead to a substantial redis-
tribution of the firm's income from those who provide capital to those
who provide labor. Consider first the most radical variation of the em-
ployee-control model of industrial democracy in which employees claim
all the residual assets of a firm and "hire" capital at a fixed rate the
way capitalists have traditionally hired labor and incurred debt. This
fixed interest rate must be sufficiently high to compensate for the lack
of opportunity to achieve extraordinary returns if the firm is extraordi-
narily successful. Furthermore, those investors whose claims would not
be superior to the claims of any other class of investors would have to
demand especially high interest to compensate for their vulnerability to
any marginal business recessions.
Nor can employees hope to maintain actual control of the firm if
they shift the risk of business failure, as well as the potential rewards
of extraordinary business success, on to a class of nonemployee provid-
ers of capital. Investors are unlikely to accept uncertain residual claims
to a firm when the firm is controlled by employees who can exhaust
such claims through high labor compensation."' 0 As Oliver Williamson
130 See Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to
Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469, 487 (1979) (arguing
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has cogently argued, there are strong institutional and economic reasons
why those with residual claims on a firm's assets almost always con-
tract for control of the firm's management." 1 Those who make subor-
dinated capital contributions to a firm either must be given control of
the firm"32 or they must be promised high returns on their invest-
ment. 8 Even the most consistent advocates of granting residual claims
to employees qua laborers recognize this reality by accepting the neces-
sity for employee capital contributions as well as by advocating alterna-
tive non-market capital sources1 '
In a more traditional firm controlled by employees through their
ownership of voting capital shares, it is possible to imagine the realloca-
tion of resources from employees qua capitalists to employees qua la-
that it is unlikely that outside investors would entrust their funds to an employee-
controlled firm because of a possible loss of their residual claims); Levin, ESOPs and
the Financing of Worker-Cooperatives, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA,
supra note 2, at 246 (noting that lenders prefer to control the affairs of borrowers to
ensure that the borrower is following prudent financial practices).
"I1 See Williamson, supra note 47, at 1210 ("[T]he board of directors [is] a gov-
ernance structure whose principal purpose is to safeguard those who face a diffuse but
significant risk of expropriation because the assets in question are numerous and ill-
defined, and cannot be protected in a well-focused, transaction-specific way."); see also
F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 270 (1971). But see R. NADER, M.
GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 44, at 88-102 (citing SEC data that show a high
degree of management control over the board of directors).
182 For instance, the lenders that made the employee buyout of Weirton Steel fea-
sible maintained control of its Board of Directors. See Greenhouse, supra note 120, at
F4, col. 4. Even the cooperative bank that lends to the Mondragon cooperatives appar-
ently retains substantial control over their management. See Eaton, The Basque Work-
ers' Co-operatives, 10 INDUS. REL. J. 32, 38-39 (1979).
133 The reason investors demand high rates of return is to compensate for the
perceived high risk the project entails. See H. DOUGALL, INVESTMENTS 28 (9th ed.
1973) ("Differences in the quality of investments have an obvious influence on the
returns that will satisfy investors. Other things being equal, the higher the risk, the
higher the rate."); J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENTs: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 336 (2d
ed. 1976) ("Investors demand high rates of return to induce them to invest in risky
assets .... ."); W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTs 245 (1978) ("The greater a bond's risk of
default, the greater its default premium. This alone will cause riskier bonds to offer
higher promised yields-to-maturity."). The financial community views worker coopera-
tives as being extremely risky for two reasons. First, worker cooperatives, unlike capi-
talist firms, divorce outside investment from any management control. See Berman, The
United States of America: A Co-operative Model for Worker Management, in THE
PERFORMANCE OF LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS, supra note 128, at 85; Jackall &
Levin, The Prospects for Worker Cooperatives in the United States, in WORKER Co-
OPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 286; Levin, supra note 130, at 246. Second,
"cooperatives usually cannot offer their stock as collateral for a loan. All forms of exter-
nal ownership are usually proscribed by the cooperative agreement, meaning that banks
and other financial institutions cannot be treated as potential owners in the event of a
loan default." Id.; see also Jackall & Levin, supra note 2, at 286 ("[Llenders cannot
obtain a commitment from cooperatives to use equity of the firm as collateral for loans,
since this would be proscribed by the requirements of workers ownership.").
13 See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 48.
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borers. Unless there are minority nonemployee shareholders, however,
such a reallocation would not distribute resources from external capital
sources to employees. Any nonemployee minority shareholder, whose
protection by the corporation laws undoubtedly would be imperfect,
13 5
would most likely have some net worth expropriated by an assertion of
employee control. Even this reallocation, however, would be a one-time
windfall rather than a continuing transfer of income from capital to
labor."3 6
Giving employees the opportunity to be subject to the risks and
rewards of being their firm's residual claimants nonetheless can be
viewed as one of the plausible benefits of the employee-control option.
Employees should be entitled to trade relatively certain, defined returns
for riskier, but potentially more valuable, residual claims. 3' They
could do so by investing in their own firms' subordinated, voting capi-
tal; they could also do so in a more radical form, by exposing their own
compensation as laborers to more risk by substituting high interest,
non-controlling debt for voting capital with residual claims. In most
cases, however, for employees as for other investors, risk maximization
is not a desired business strategy. Most employees inevitably are heav-
ily invested in their own firm because of their firm-specific human cap-
... These laws, however, do impose duties on controlling shareholders to operate
corporations equitably in behalf of all shareholders. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,
162 F.2d 36, 45 (3d Cir. 1947); TWA v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. Ch.
1977). Compensation packages for controlling employee-shareholders could constitute
interested transactions to be judged under a "fairness" standard by the courts. See
TWA, 374 A.2d at 9; see also Yanow v. Teal Indus., 178 Conn. 262, 283, 422 A.2d
311, 322 (1979) ("The rule of corporation law and of equity involved is well-settled:
the majority has the right to control, but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary rela-
tionship toward the minority, as much as the corporation itself or its officers and direc-
tors"); Ferber v. American Lamp Corp., 503 Pa. 489, 496, 469 A.2d 1046, 1050
(1983) ("It has long been recognized that majority shareholders have a duty to protect
the interests of the minority.")
136 A continuing reallocation of income from some laborers to other laborers is
more likely than a reallocation from capital to labor. Employee owned and controlled
enterprises typically have more equal employee compensation structures than tradi-
tional firms. See, e.g., C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 45 (maximum three-to-one ratio at
Mondragon cooperatives between highest and lowest levels of before-tax income in a
firm); id. at 46 (examples of American co-ops with less than two-to-one ratios); D.
ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 147 (equal pay at motorcycle manufacturer); id. at 150
(maximum seven-to-one ratio of chemical company's highest to lowest salary); When
Employees Run the Company, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 75, 85 (an inter-
view with Leamon J. Bennett) (noting equal pay among other employees at plywood
cooperative).
13. Some workers do choose the riskier option. See, e.g., Egerton, Workers Take
Over the Store, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 164, 177 (noting about
one in ten unemployed Philadelphia grocery workers took option to invest in new em-
ployee-owned stores rather than return to newly opened outside investor-owned stores).
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ital.1 8' Placing a large portion of their discretionary liquid resources in
the same firm does not accord with traditional investment principles. In
general, a diversified portfolio of stocks is a better investment for em-
ployees than a concentrated financial commitment to the firm for which
they work."'9
The benefits of an employee-controlled firm, therefore, usually de-
rive not from the attractiveness of the investment of the employee re-
sources that make the control possible, but rather from other effects of
having the control. First, a substantial body of research suggests that, in
many situations, employee-controlled and owned firms can be more
productive. 40 Workers in such firms may "show lower absenteeism
138 See Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Ap-
proach, 87 AM. J. Soc. 548, 565 (1981).
139 See Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 327, 329 (1983). Given the advantages of diversification, employees theoretically
would charge more for capital contributions to their own firm. See id. This in turn
would discourage the employee-owned firm's investment in projects that would look
attractive to other firms. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 130, at 486.
One relevant exception to this general prudent investment principle might be
presented by firms or divisions that an employer intends to shut down and liquidate if
they are not purchased at a price above their general market value. In some cases, such
a purchase by employees might be a good investment precisely because the employees
have already contributed firm-specific, human capital to the firm. In other words, the
employees might not have confronted a monopolized labor market at the beginning of
their careers but they confront an ex-post monopoly after investing many years at a
particular firm. Their firm-specific investment may also be aggravated by home owner-
ship and emotional investment in their particular community. See K. BRADLEY & A.
GELB, supra note 9, at 35.
Even after considering necessary wage concessions as part of the purchase price of
the firm, many employees might be better off funding the firm rather than abruptly
facing a hostile labor market. There have been several recent examples of this situation.
The 1975 employee purchase of the Sperry Rand library furniture manufacturing
plant in the one-industry town of Herkimer, New York was attractive because the
plant was profitable, although not profitable enough for Sperry Rand. See O'Toole,
The Uneven Record of Employee Ownership, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at
183, 187. South Bend Lathe, Saratoga Knitting Mill, and Vermont Asbestos Group are
three more examples of employee purchases that may have been sound investments for
employees. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 53-63, 66-74 (1978); See also Liv-
ingston, Lessons From Three UAW Locals, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 35, 37-38
(discussing the employee purchase of Atlas Chain and Seymour Specialty Wire). The
reversion of some of these firms to conventional capitalist ownership, or the fact that
they may have closed, does not mean that they were poor transitional investments for
the employees. See K. BRADLEY & A. GELB, supra note 9, at 94.
140 See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 143 (noting that "overall productivity was up
an estimated 10 to 15 percent, exclusive of the impact of new equipment"); Jones &
Svejnar, The Economic Performance of Participatory and Self-Managed Firms: A His-
torical Perspective and a Review, in PARTICIPATORY AND SELF-MANAGED FIRMS 11
(D Jones & J. Svejnar eds. 1982) ("There is apparently consistent support for the view
that worker participation in management causes higher productivity."); Marsh &
McAllister, ESOPs Tables: A Survey of Companies with Employee Stock Ownership
Plans, 6 J. CORP. L. 551, 582 ("Simply stated, employees with a direct stake in their
company may be willing to work harder for their company.").
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rates, a greater work effort, greater work flexibility, and better mainte-
nance of the plant and equipment than do workers in capitalist
organizations."''
There appear to be several reasons for increased productivity. Re-
search indicates that a claim on residual returns increases employee
commitment to the firm. 42 Employees who understand that they will
reap a share of the rewards of extra effort are more likely to exert that
effort. 4 They are also more likely to monitor their fellow employees to
ensure that they are similarly motivated;" this peer monitoring may
control slack more efficiently than does supervisory monitoring.
1 45
Some research also suggests that a higher degree of employee par-
ticipation in a firm's decisionmaking process can increase productiv-
141 Levin, Employment and Productivity of Producer Cooperatives, in WORKER
COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 26 (citing evidence from Mondragon
cooperatives); see also C. GuNN, supra note 2, at 142-43 (evidence from Rath Pack-
ing); Marsh & McAllister, supra note 140, at 619. Other studies have shown that
employees who own their firms have less tolerance for poor performance by co-workers.
See Long, The Effects of Employee Ownership on Organizational Identification, Em-
ployee Job Attitudes, and Organizational Performance, 31 HuM. REL. 29, 42, 46
(1978).
142 See Conte, Participation and Performance in U.S. Labor-Managed Firms, in
PARTICIPATORY AND SELF-MANAGED FRMS, supra note 140, at 232. There is evi-
dence that employee ownership of stock can increase productivity, regardless of the
control given employees. See id. at 233-34 (discussing a study by M. Conte and A.
Tannenbaum analyzing profit related performance in worker-owned companies). A re-
cent study of ESOP companies compared to similar non-ESOP companies showed
marked relative improvement after adoption of the ESOP. See ESOPs Improve Corpo-
rate Performance, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP REP., Sept./Oct. 1986, at 1, col. 2.
14l See Cable and FitzRoy, Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee Par-
ticipation: Some Preliminary Results for West Germany, 33 KYKLoS 100, 104 (1980).
There is also supportive anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Egerton, supra note 137, at 164,
col. 2 (" 'Owning the company gives us more incentive to make it a success. We're
putting in about 60 hours a week- 40 as workers, 20 as owners. And you know what?
I actually enjoy coming to work.' "). This receptivity to work hard to increase profits is
in contrast to the "world where workers are expected to compete with one another for
promotion and employment security, [when] the attempt by one worker to outperform
his fellow workers is seen by his colleagues as a threat." Levin, supra note 141, at 26.
144 See Cable and FitzRoy, supra note 143, at 103.
145 Peer monitoring also reduces the need for unproductive supervisors. See Ben-
nett, supra note 136, at 90; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 193. From a management
perspective, employee ownership can be viewed as an alternative strategy of control in
economic organizations. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 197-98. There is evidence
that employee owners are more willing to accept vertical, hierarchical control without
alienation. See Bradley & Gelb, The Mondragon Cooperatives: Guidelines for a Coop-
erative Economy?, in PARTICIPATORY AND SELF-MANAGED FIRMS, supra note 140, at
155. There does not seem to be evidence, however, to support the theory that employees
willingly choose vertical control in a traditional firm because that control is more effi-
dent. Cf Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hier-
archy, 6 BELL J. EcON. 552, 557 (1975) (arguing that an individual's preference con-
cerning hierarchy is dependent on that individual's ability, knowledge of the job, and
perception of other risks).
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ity.14s To the extent that employees have a real voice in the operation
of the enterprise, they are likely to be more personally invested in the
enterprise's success and more satisfied and motivated in their work. 4"
Thus, a combination of employee control and employee ownership may
increase labor's share of the pie without contracting capital's share. 4
Second, employee control of management can change the content
of the share of the firm's assets allocated to labor. To the extent that
collective bargaining opens effective lines of communication between
management and labor, it should ensure that employees obtain the
greatest marginal satisfaction for their labor. Collective bargaining,
however, may not be in place and management's own lines of commu-
nication may be defective. Furthermore, employee control of a firm can
cause a significant change in the employee benefit package by altering
the culture of the workplace and, therefore, the desires of the
employees.
149
For instance, democratic employee control of the firm can nurture
ideals of equality among laborers.1"' It can also generate firm loyalty,
resulting in an emphasis on job security rather than maximum pay.151
Perhaps most significantly, democratic employee control could eventu-
14 See C. BELLAS, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE WORKER-OWNED FIRM
46-47, 50-51 (1972); Jones, The Productivity Effects of Worker Directors and Finan-
cial Participation by Employees in the Firm: The Case of British Retail Cooperatives,
41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 79, 90 (1987).
147 See Conte, supra 142, at 234-35.
148 Without presenting any particular empirical support, some scholars have ar-
gued that employee-owned and controlled firms will have a greater difficulty monitor-
ing and controlling management if there is no market for the employees' ownership of
the firm. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 787 (1972); Jenson & Meckling, supra note 130,
at 485. These writers contend that capital markets naturally discipline management
and that no individual employee has adequate incentive to do the same. Collectively,
however, employees probably have more of an incentive to monitor management than
do shareholders. Employees may have invested their careers and specialized training at
a particular firm. In contrast, shareholders are likely to have diversified investments
and a more realistic option for exiting the firm. See supra notes 60-62 and accompany-
ing text; infra note 259. Employees can establish a governance structure to express
their collective interests in the monitoring of management. Furthermore, the market for
corporate managers still serves as a disciplinary force, and competition between em-
ployee-owned firms could clarify which managers are less effective. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 130, at 499 (explaining the impact of market forces upon the
operations of cooperatives).
149 Studies have contrasted values of workers in more democratically-controlled
firms with those in firms where control is more centralized. See D. NIGHTINGALE,
supra note 2, at 93-101 (finding workers in democratic organizations place a higher
value on relations among workers, communication levels, and control over conflict-reso-
lution practices, than workers in hierarchical organizations).
150 Some employee-owned firms have even implemented policies of equal pay for
all owners. See Bennett, supra note 136, at 85.
151 See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 184.
1988]
48 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ally result in the redesign of jobs to give more workers greater discre-
tion over their own work effort. This discretion, in turn, could teach
employees to place more value on work satisfaction than on their mone-
tary compensation."5 2 In sum, a collective choice of employee control
may constitute a decision by employees to change themselves and their
desires as human beings.
The enhancement of the employees' power over their own work
and workplace should be considered the third realistic goal of em-
ployee-controlled firms. Although a marked transfer of wealth from
capital to labor probably cannot be achieved in employee-owned and
controlled firms, a dispersal of power from a relatively small group of
managers to a larger group of other employees most likely can be
achieved for several reasons.
First, it is not clear that power or influence distribution must con-
front the same zero-sum constraints as wealth distribution. Managers
may not perceive the same loss of power that rank-and-file employees
perceive as a gain. 5 Second, the employees could grant premiums to
managers to compensate for managers' loss of power in an employee-
controlled firm. This compensation would simply require a restructur-
52 See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 43.
Whereas the formal logic of a purely economic objective could be trans-
lated into a bureaucratic organization by a community of workers, eco-
nomic gain is unlikely to be the sole objective valued by such a community.
Human growth and development, pleasant relations with fellow workers,
and leisure time are other objectives the working community may have.
Self-management allows the organization to pull away from Weberian ra-
tional-bureaucratic behavior .
Id.
There is evidence that employee owners are willing to accept less pay in order to
obtain the benefits of ownership or control. See Bennett, supra note 136, at 90. For an
examination of how the values of employee members of plywood cooperatives broad-
ened the goal of maximizing financial return to include satisfaction from control over
work, see Greenberg, supra note 2, at 179-88.
153 See D. NIGHTINGALE, supra note 2, at 99 (finding the perceived "total
amount of influence is greater in the democratic than in the hierarchical organizations";
only for supervisors and middle managers "does the influence in democratic organiza-
tions fall below that for hierarchical organizations"); R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at
80-85 (finding that high levels of rank-and-file employee influence are compatible with
strong managerial leadership in employee-owned scavenger companies). The view that
it is possible to increase rank-and-file employee authority without reducing managerial
authority is associated with the theories of Arnold Tannenbaum. See A. TANNENBAUM,
CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 14-23 (1968). Under this view, the sphere of authority
is enlarged so that there is more power of authority created. By delegating this extra
authority to rank-and-file employees, their level of authority is increased without a
corresponding decrease in managerial authority. See id. This theory assumes, however,
that individual employees calculate their level of authority based upon quantitative
summation and not upon percentage distribution. To the degree employees calculate
their level of authority in terms of percentage distribution, this theory may not hold
true.
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ing of the benefits the employees obtained from work by substituting
increased power over their work for some other less desired good.
Third, at least over the long run, the market for potential managers is
not as homogenous as capital markets; some individuals can be trained
as. effective managers and would be willing to serve in employee-con-
trolled firms without demanding premium salaries. Fourth, through the
expenditure of effort in the processes of employee control, such as man-
agement decision meetings and rotating supervisory assignments, em-
ployees could reduce their firm's reliance on managers and thus the
need to compensate them."" Such an expenditure might not be viewed
as a cost by employees who take satisfaction in the political processes of
their workplace in the way that many citizens find political work in-
trinsically rewarding.
155
B. Collective Bargaining in the Employee-Controlled Firm
1. The Need for Collective Bargaining
Before attempting to determine whether these plausible benefits
can be achieved without compromising this Article's three principles of
labor law, the need to protect employees' capacity to choose collective
bargaining in employee-controlled firms must be examined. This analy-
sis need not establish that collective bargaining is good for all employ-
ees in employee-owned enterprises. It need only present plausible rea-
sons why rational employees might want to choose collective
bargaining.
The protection of the free choice of collective bargaining by work-
ers employed in firms owned by other employees should require no
extended discussion; the economic interests and political position of
nonowner employees in an employee-owned firm are almost as much in
tension with the interests and position of the employee owners as they
would be with those of nonemployee owners." 6 Furthermore, when
beneficial employee ownership does not entail employee control, the po-
'" There is evidence that employee ownership reduces the need for front-line su-
pervisors, see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text, and that a large number of
employees are interested in contributing to management. See Greenberg, supra note 2,
at 203.
"I Employee representatives in employee-controlled firms often have not required
extra compensation to discharge their duties. See, e.g., D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17,
at 147-49 (British Triumph Bonneville Meriden motorcycle manufacturing); Bennett,
supra note 136, at 76-77, 85 (plywood cooperative).
158 Cf NLRB v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d. 596 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding serious unfair labor practices committed by employee owners against employee
nonowners attempting to organize a union), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980).
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sition of employees vis-a-vis management is not fundamentally al-
tered."6 7 But should there be a concern with protecting the collective
bargaining rights of employees who own voting shares of an enterprise
they actually control? One answer is that unions and collective bargain-
ing offer employees the most effective structure to check the powers of
elites that emerge in employee-owned firms. Authority in employee-
controlled firms could remain partially concentrated in the hands of
managerial personnel and perhaps in an elite group of this manage-
ment's employee-supervisors. Modern sociological theory, as well as
empirical studies of employee-controlled firms, suggests that such con-
centrations will develop.
Weberian theory stresses the relative efficiency of rationalized, bu-
reaucratic, hierarchical decisionmaking.'58 One need not share the view
of Sidney and Beatrice Webb that these relative efficiencies make dem-
ocratically controlled firms economically unviable' 59 to accept the
probability that such firms will delegate some decisionmaking authority
to a managerial class of employees."' 0
Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," the tendency for hierar-
chical decisionmaking to develop even in democratic organizations,"'1 is
well supported by empirical research on employee-controlled enter-
prises, such as Yugoslavian firms16 2 and Israeli kibbutzim. 3 A few
employees tend to dominate the actual supervision of management in an
1.. This situation characterizes firms that employees "own" by virtue of being
beneficiaries of stock held by an ESOP trust and in which the stock is voted by man-
agement-appointed trustees and is not controlled by the employee beneficiaries. See,
e.g., D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 68-70 (example of South Bend Lathe). This
situation also characterizes some firms directly owned by employees, especially when
higher-paid employees control a disproportionate share of the stock. See id. at 58 (Ver-
mont Asbestos Group), 73-74 (Saratoga Knitting Mill).
158 See M. WEBER, supra note 1, at 30-55.
19 See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 28-29.
160 Democratic theory suggests that the delegation of authority through systems of
representation may be necessary due to the constraints of time, the advantages of face-
to-face deliberation, and other factors. See R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 68-73
(1970). Even the most prominent employee-owned cooperatives have not eliminated
managerial delegation. See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 109-11 (plywood co-ops); H.
THOMAS & C. LOGAN, MONDRAGON: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27, 28 (1982) (Mon-
dragon co-ops); Oakeshott, supra note 128, at 138-39 (Mondragon co-ops). In fact,
some employee-owned and controlled businesses appear to to be less efficient because of
a failure to delegate decisionmaking authority. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at
111-12, 128-32 (discussing McCaysville Cooperative and International Group Plans).
The experience of some employee-owned businesses suggests that even control over cer-
tain business information may also have to be delegated. See id. at 59 (describing Ver-
mont Asbestos Group's loss of a land purchase because of leaks to speculators).
161 Michels derived the rule from his study of European socialist political parties.
See R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHI-
CAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 390 (E. Paul & C. Paul trans. 1959).
162 See, e.g., R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 50-51 (describing several studies of
Yugoslavian employee-controlled firms with hierarchical structures).
16 See, e.g., Etzioni, The Functional Differentiation of Elites in the Kibbutz, 64
AM. T. Soc. 476, 478-79 (1959).
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employee-controlled firm regardless of the formal democratic processes
designed to equalize employee authority. 6 4 This tendency may be less
pronounced under particular circumstances: when employees have simi-
lar educational 6 5 and cultural backgrounds, when the division of labor
and technology within the firm permits relatively equal work experi-
ence,16 6 and when formal attempts are made to rotate employees among
supervisory positions. 67 Under these conditions, employees indeed may
feel there is no hierarchy that requires external balance. 6 ' Historical
experience suggests, however, that the tendency toward hierarchy will
retain some force as long as differences in managerial and political tal-
ents and interests exist among humans." 9
The same "iron" laws that affect the functioning of employee-con-
trolled firms also affect the functioning of labor unions. 70 Nevertheless,
persuasive social theory suggests that a hierarchical institution can be
moved to better serve its members if it is checked by another hierarchi-
cal, but independent, institution controlled by the same individuals.'
This theory, for instance, is the basis for the separation of the executive
and legislative branches of government, each of which is responsible to
184 See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 94-95 (describing how new managerial
elites emerged in the employee-owned San Francisco-area scavenger companies).
High illiteracy and low educational achievement may have impeded industrial
democracy in Yugoslavia. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 163. Decisions calling
for engineering or financial expertise, however, are less likely to be made with equal
participation by all workers anywhere because fewer workers possess such expertise.
... See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 209-10 (discussing plywood cooperatives); see
also R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 53-54 (stating that the division of labor under-
mines workplace democracy in Yugoslavia); D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 147-48
(discussing British Meriden motorcycle manufacturing).
167 See P. BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICI-
PATION 208 (1969) (discussing management board rules in Yugoslavian enterprises
that prevent the formation of a bureaucratic elite by limiting eligibility for re-election
and the number of terms one can serve); Etzioni, supra note 163, at 480-81 (discussing
how elite roles are highly fluid and informal in the formative stages of a kibbutz be-
cause of the intentionally high rate of turnover in elite positions). A lack of such rota-
tion strengthens hierarchy within employee-owned firms. See R. RUSSELL, supra note
129, at 82-83 (discussing this effect in employee-owned scavenger companies).
16I Some of the employee-owned plywood cooperatives may be applicable exam-
ples. See 0. GUNN, supra note 2, at 99-100; D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 103-04;
Bennett, supra note 136, at 81.
169 See K. BRADLEY & A. GELB, supra note 9, at 93; R. RUSSELL, supra note
129, at 54.
170 See G. BROOKS, THE SOURCES OF VITALITY IN THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 14-19 (1960); S. LIPSET, M. TROW, & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOc-
RACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE ITU 3 (1956) [hereinafter S. LiPSET].
171 This theory can be traced to B. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
150-161 (T. Nugent trans. 1949)
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and chosen by the same electorate. 172
Employee-controlled enterprises could establish a system of for-
mal, internal governance that separated and checked powers between
two sets of elites. It is doubtful, however, that most groups of employees
would have sufficient foresight and organization to check their new
elites by dividing their power in this manner. More importantly, it is
unlikely that formal governance could be efficiently separated in an ec-
onomic firm.173 Finally, even if this separation were possible, the two
sets of elites would most likely not serve as effective checks on each
other as long as both "branches" had similar priorities regarding the
firm and its employees.
In contrast, unions and collective bargaining promise a realistic
and effective check on the governing elites of employee-controlled firms.
The collective bargaining option can be offered and legally protected in
employee-controlled firms just as it has been in traditional firms.174
172 The theory also supports granting collective bargaining rights to public em-
ployees who are part of the electorate represented by the public officials with whom
they seek to bargain.
The union's role in an employee-controlled firm has been described as one of a
loyal or legitimate opposition. See D. Ellerman, The Union as the Legitimate Opposi-
tion in an Industrial Democracy 1, 2 (December, 1979) (unpublished paper on file
with the author). This analogy, however, is flawed for two reasons. First, a union
cannot achieve full power in a firm in the same manner as a legitimate oppositional
political force in a democracy. Second, a collective bargaining representative is never
totally out of power; it will always have some share of real power by virtue of its legal
position as exclusive bargaining representative.
17' Actual experience with employee-controlled firms, even in radically different
societies, does not provide models for such separation. Although the supervisory worker
councils in Yugoslavian enterprises have excluded executive managers of the enter-
prises, these councils have formal control over the executives, including the power to
elect and dismiss for cause. Thus the worker councils would need to be divided for true
separation of power to to be achieved. See Conner & Vukmir, The Legal Anatomy of a
Yugoslav "Enterprise," 32 Bus. LAW. 99, 113-17 (1976). See generally I. ADIZES,
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: YUGOSLAV STYLE 44-47 (1971) (discussing the functional
differentiation of various managerial groups in a Yugoslavian enterprise).
The Mondragon cooperatives have a complicated organizational structure that in-
cludes some separation of functions and "watchdog councils" that are to monitor even
the supervisory boards. See H. THOMAS & C. LOGAN, supra note 160, at 26-29. The
system does not provide for any internal checks and balances on firm power, however,
and no evidence exists to suggest that the system would produce two sets of elites with
divergent priorities.
174 This provision entails giving the employees the option of choosing collective
bargaining; it does not mean forcing collective bargaining on them. It also means giving
employee-owners who have chosen collective bargaining the same right to strike as em-
ployees in traditional firms, even though it is likely that this right would not be used as
frequently in employee-owned firms. Cf. Rudolf, supra note 68, at 419 (discussing
"small number of worker strikes or other forms of protest" that occur in countries like
Sweden and West Germany where processes of worker democratization are well ad-
vanced). But ef. K. BRADLEY & A. GELB, supra note 9, at 93 (arguing that the need
for unions does not disappear after employees take over ownership because true worker
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Each hierarchy will have a separate power base: the union from em-
ployees qua laborers; the management from employees qua owners.
Moreover, collective bargaining has distinct roles to play in employee-
controlled firms, and as a result, collective bargaining remains economi-
cally important. These roles also indicate that collective bargaining pro-
vides the most realistic structural check on any emerging employee-
managerial elite."'
There are several reasons union elites might be likely to press dif-
ferent economic priorities than would employee managerial elites. A
union will press conflicting employee interests against the management
of an employee-controlled firm when the employees' control derives
from their ownership of the firm's voting capital shares and when vot-
ing is by share, rather than by employee. In such firms, supervisers of
management are likely to represent employees as capitalists by attempt-
ing to maximize the value of the employees' capital shares, perhaps for
immediate or eventual resale. The supervisory board of such firms
would want to allocate the residual assets of the firm to employees in
proportion to the shares they own, rather than in proportion to the
work they perform. Whenever a majority of employees have a dispro-
portionately low share of capital, however, the union could serve its
traditional function of attempting to direct assets to employees in com-
pensation for their labor.
176
Regardless of whether each employee has an equal voice in the
selection of the firm's supervisory board, any employee-owner would
benefit from having labor compensated as highly as possible relative to
other employees' compensation. Thus, any union representing a bar-
gaining unit of only a fraction of the employees of an employee-con-
trolled firm would try to obtain a larger share of the firm's assets for its
control is rare; "[tiraditional patterns of adversarial industrial relations have therefore
tended to reappear between six and twelve months after employee takeover"); Stem,
Whyte, Hammer & Meek, supra note 87, at 85-86 (arguing that worker dissatisfaction
and unrest builds as employee-owners find that they have as little input in day-to-day
operations as before the takeover); Levin, supra note 130, at 251-52 (arguing that true
worker control does not necessarily follow an employee takeover; those employee-owned
businesses that do experience strikes allow little worker input and scant disclosure of
information by management).
175 It is noteworthy that American employees have very rarely voted to decertify a
union as collective bargaining representative after purchasing control of their firm. See
Stern, Whyte, Hammer & Meek, supra note 87, at 121. There is some international
evidence, however, of a lesser role for unions in employee-owned firms. See K. BRAD-
LEY & A. GELB, supra note 9, at 57.
178 A disproportionate distribution of shares must occur if employees are to be
compensated in shares according to their different salaries and tenures of employment.
See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 66-67 (discussing the South Bend Lathe em-
ployee ownership plan).
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employees. x7 The supervisory board of an employee-controlled firm
would more likely attempt to divide employee benefits differently than
would a union representing some of the firm's employees if the union
does not represent a dominant proportion of the employees. This analy-
sis suggests, therefore, that the NLRB could promote industrial democ-
racy by favoring smaller bargaining units in employee-controlled
firms.
178
Defining bargaining units along occupational and craft lines
would encourage a different union perspective on the division of an
employee-controlled firm's assets for another reason. Unions that re-
present a particular craft of employees in more than one firm tradition-
ally have been concerned about the impact of wages at one firm on the
wages at other firms . 79 Thus, many unions could appeal to employees
within a certain occupation by stressing that workers' careers could in-
clude a naumber of firms, some not employee-owned.
Two other conflicts are likely to develop between the perspectives
of union elites and employee-controlled firm elites, regardless of the
size and composition of bargaining units. First, union elites are more
likely to advocate vigorously the interests of individuals against the
firm.' Although they have an interest in maintaining a general image
177 It would be unrealistic to expect unanimity regarding compensation ratios
among groups of employees. Strikes over such ratios, although probably less frequent
than those in conventional firms, are to be expected in an employee-owned firm. See H.
THOMAS & C. LOGAN, supra note 160, at 35 (discussing a strike over compensation
ratios in a Mondragon cooperative).
"7 Furthermore, there is likely to be more internal democracy in smaller bargain-
ing units. See G. BROOKS, supra note 170, at 11 (arguing that multiplant bargaining
deprives local members of any effective voice in negotiations and union policy because
of the sheer size of the unit); R. DAHL, supra note 160, at 67, 69, 100 (arguing that
although smaller groups encourage greater democratic participation, their effectiveness
is limited to relatively small, self-contained problems); S. LIPSET, supra note 170, at 14
("it is probably true that the smaller a political unit, the greater the possibility of
democratic control"); L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION 146-47, 153 (rev.
ed. 1967) (arguing that local unions are more democratic and participatory because of
their smaller size; "[a]ny factor which increases the size of the local will make partici-
pation that much more difficult").
One additional factor that the Labor Board should consider when drawing bar-
gaining unit lines in employee-owned firms is the level of formal power that the various
groups of employees have over firm policy. For instance, consistent with its past prac-
tice, the Board should not include cooperative members and nonmembers in the same
bargaining unit. See infra text accompanying note 192.
179 Union officers have understood that concessions that are appropriate for an
individual employee-owned firm can threaten wages at other firms. See C. GUNN,
supra note 2, at 143 (UFCW response to concessions at Rath Packing). Where em-
ployees are represented by an independent union, concern about the external impact of
a contract is likely to be much less. Cf. Lynd, Why We Opposed the Buy-Out at Weir-
ton Steel, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 41, 48 (noting that the independent Weir-
ton local leaders were not concerned with steel workers at other companies).
10 At the employee-owned Denver Yellow Cab, one researcher found a division of
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of fairness toward individuals, employee-members of a firm's supervi-
sory board, and other firm elites, are likely to consider first the interests
of employees as an aggregate. Because their resources are inevitably
limited, union leaders must also balance the interests of individual em-
ployees against the interests of the collectives they represent.' Union
leaders in employee-controlled firms, even more than those in conven-
tional firms, however, would soon perceive that their legitimacy in the
eyes of the employees was more dependent than that of the firm elite on
representation of individuals against the collectivity. 82
Second, union elites are likely to favor the economic interests of
the current employees over the economic future of the firm.'83 In firms
in which employees own shares that can be voted individually and sold
in external capital markets, this proposition simply restates that super-
visory boards are more likely to attempt to maximize the value of the
employees' capital shares and less likely to want to distribute earnings
as wages. The proposition, however, requires additional explanation to
account for firms structured to avoid the loss of employee control by
placing restrictions on the sale of employee-owned capital shares.
Elites in such firms may wish to utilize retained earnings as a
source of capital necessary to the firm's long-term viability. The tempo-
ral horizon of all employees is limited by their working lives, however,
and for many older employees, this horizon can be very short. Distrib-
uting, rather than reinvesting, the firm's residual returns may benefit
older current employees who cannot sell their residual claims. Only dis-
interest between two elites, with leaders of the company "attending to the ongoing
health of the co-op," while leaders of the union concerned "themselves with the mate-
rial well-being of their members and the protection of their individual rights through
the grievance process." C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 161.
181 See Harper & Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1211, 1260-62 (1985). Harper and Lupu contend that the legal principles of
equal protection and the NLRA's duty of fair representation permit union leaders to
place the interests of the collectivity before those of the individual members. They do
not, however, predict that union leaders are as likely to do so as are the managers of a
firm, whether it be controlled by shareholders or employees.
182 This statement does not mean that individual grievances would not decrease or
change in character in employee-controlled firms. For example, in Rath Packing, one
unionized, employee-owned firm, grievances were both reduced and refocused on
achieving more employee-control over front-line supervisors. See C. GUNN, supra note
2, at 139.
183 In Poland, the priorities of unions and employees' self-management councils
have apparently differed in this way. See Rudolf, supra note 68, at 427 ("trade unions
favor a high share of premiums and rewards, whereas councils are most interested in
development funds"). In Yugoslavia, the experience seems to have been the exact oppo-
site. The imions often press for lower immediate compensation and higher investment;
however, this approach appears to stem from the greater central state control of unions
than of the system for worker control of management. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note
167, at 206.
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tribution enables the employees to generate returns after their
retirement.'"
Relying on a model provided by Spanish employee cooperatives,
some theorists have advocated mitigating this conflict by establishing
individual capital accounts for each worker that would include a share
of retained earnings accrued during a worker's tenure compounded by
some set level of interest.185 These accounts could be distributed to the
workers after their departure from the firm. Even if an independent
appraisal attempted to determine the value of the accounts based on
future expected returns, however, the accounts would be imperfect sub-
stitutes for diversification in efficient capital markets that reward inves-
tors for expected future as well as past extraordinary yields." 6 A large
number of employees are likely to continue to want a larger distribu-
tion of retained earnings (perhaps for reinvestment in external capital
markets) than would company leaders who take responsibility for their
firm's future viability.
Once again union elites, without any personal investment in or
special responsibility for the firm, would play a representational role.'
87
The likely union perspective is not necessarily preferable to that of a
firm's leaders; adopting the union's likely priorities indeed may hasten
the degeneration of employee-controlled firms. Ensuring that each em-
ployee consider the conflict between present distribution and future
yields, however, provides another functional justification for collective
bargaining in employee-controlled firms. 8
'" See Furubotn & Pejovich, Property Rights, Economic Decentralization and
the Evolution of the Yugoslav Firm, 1965-1972, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 275, 279-80
(1973); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 130, at 482-84; see also Gilson, Value Crea-
tion by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 253, 265-
66 (1985) (noting that when investors do not have common time horizons, opportunistic
behavior leading to a decrease in value of the firm will occur).
"I See Ellerman, Theory of Legal Structure: Worker Cooperatives, 18 J. EcON.
IssuES 861, 882-83 (1984).
188 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 272 (2d.
ed. 1984).
87 See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 47-49.
188 This analysis also agrees with the theories of the early Guild Socialists who
contended that democracy can be enhanced by granting citizens multiple representatives
(at least one for each functional role the citizen fills). See G. COLE, GUILD SOCIALISM
RESTATED 32-34 (1920), discussed in P. BLUMBERG, supra note 167, at 162. In con-
trast with this perspective, the official Soviet position contends that since members of a
particular social class have no internal antagonisms, there need not be a separation
between workers and "economic administrators"; both can be represented by the same
union. See I. DEUTSCHER, SOVIET TRADE UNIONS 123 n.1 (1950).
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2. The Legal Doctrine
This analysis rejects any argument that all employees who have a
voice in the supervision of management in an employee-controlled firm
should be removed from the protections of the Act. Such an argument
would be based on those judicial and Board decisions that exempt man-
agers from the definition of employees within the jurisdiction of the
Act.189 The Act expressly excludes only managers employed "as a su-
pervisor,"190 but the Board and the courts have concluded that Con-
gress meant to exclude any employees who "formulate and effectuate
management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions
of their employer."19 The managerial exclusion could eliminate
NLRB protection of collective bargaining for any employee-owners
who share control if the exclusion was read broadly and applied to
employee-owned and controlled firms. One can view any employee-
owners who elect representatives to managerial boards, or who vote di-
rectly on firm policy, as helping to "formulate and effectuate manage-
ment policies."
Such a broad reading, however, would ignore the primary ration-
ale for the managerial exclusion. This rationale was captured in an
opinion by Justice Douglas that influenced the exclusion's development.
Douglas argued that Congress did not intend for the Act to unite labor
and management against "ownership"; rather, Congress intended to es-
tablish an adversarial system between labor and management in which
management would remain loyal to the shareholder-owners that it must
serve. 92 This rationale supports giving no protection to union activity
by employees with significant discretionary authority to formulate or
implement management policy for the benefit of the firm's owners. If
such managers become engaged with unions, it is possible that they will
permit union priorities to influence their exercise of discretion.
"I9 See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 (1974); see also Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54
(1956) (finding that individuals exercising a managerial perogative are thus allied with
management and are not employees under the Act); American Locomotive Co., 92
N.L.R.B. 115, 117 (1950) (considering employees representatives of management if
they assume substantial responsibility in the day-to-day operation of the business and
therefore are such an integral part of an employer's enterprise).
190 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
191 Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 288; see Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317,
1322 (1946) (first formulation of the standard).
192 See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493-501 (1947) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting). Packard held that the Board could include supervisors as employees
within the protection of the Labor Act. See id. at 489-90. This holding was reversed by
one of the Taft-Hartley Act amendments. See Taft-Hartley Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1982).
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This rationale does not apply to most individual employees in em-
ployee-controlled firms. Under traditional corporate law principles, mi-
nority shareholders may exercise their shares of control in any manner
consistent with their interests;19 the same rights should extend to indi-
vidual minority employee shareholders. Voting shares, whether based
equally on membership or proportionally on capital contribution,
should not include a fiduciary responsibility to other employee holders.
There is no need to maintain the employee-owner's loyalty to the
"ownership" in general.
The rationale supporting the managerial exclusion, however, en-
dorses the exclusion of a limited class of employees of an employee-
owned firm from the protection of the Labor Act. Because employee-
controlled firms may retain specialized management and a degree of
hierarchy, some firm employees may possess the responsibility and dis-
cretion to implement policies established by the collective employee
ownership. The line defining this class of employees, like that defining
managerial employees of the traditional firm,"9 will never be precisely
drawn. Both lines, however, can be estimated if the analysis focuses on
the fundamental question suggested by the Douglas rationale: Do em-
ployees for whom a managerial exemption is claimed have the responsi-
bility to exercise significant discretion in implementing the policies of
owners other than themselves?.95 Presumably, any employee has such
responsibility if the employee is elected to represent other employees on
18 See, e.g., Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 97, 25 N.E.
201, 202 (1890) ("[Elach shareholder represents himself and his own [personal] inter-
ests solely, and he in no sense acts as a trustee or representative of others."); Ostlind v.
Ostlind Valve, Inc., 178 Or. 161, 184, 165 P.2d 779, 788 (1946) (same).
1" Bell Aerospace affirmed the Board's standard set forth in Palace Laundry Dry
Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320 (1947). See Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 287 n.14. The
Court did not, however, offer much guidance concerning how that standard should be
applied. The "question whether particular employees are 'managerial' must be an-
swered in terms of the employees' actual job responsibilities, authority, and relationship
to management." Id. at 290 n.19. The Court held that the Board must decide each case
on its facts. See id. at 294. Nor did the Court apply a more complete definition in
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); Yeshiva merely affirmed the standards
espoused in Bell Aerospace and Palace Laundry. See Yeshiva Univ. 444 U.S. at 682.
"Although the Board has established no firm criteria for determining when an em-
ployee is so aligned, normally an employee may be excluded as managerial only if he
represents management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that
effectively control or implement employer policy." Id. at 683.
'" See supra note 192; see also Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 695-96 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe pivotal inquiry is whether the employee in performing his duties
represents his own interests or those of his employer. If his actions are undertaken for
the purpose of implementing the employer's policies, then he is accountable to manage-
ment and may be subject to conflicting loyalties. But if the employee is acting only on
his own behalf and in his own interest, he is covered under the Act .... " (footnote
omitted)).
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supervisory boards or is given managerial discretion by those boards.
Such responsibility, however, is not given to employees who have no
collective authority beyond that provided to others for controlling pro-
duction processes in the part of the firm in which they work.19 Al-
though this last group of employees may possess significant discretion
to control their own work, they are not authorized to implement the
policies of other employee-owners; their discretion simply allows them
to serve their own interests by utilizing their managerial expertise or
work skills. 97
Board doctrine concerning the protection of employee-owners,
however, requires clarification. The doctrine's primary component is
the Board's consistent and sensible exclusion of employee-owners who
have an "effective voice" in formulating corporate policy from bargain-
ing units composed of employee-nonowners.' 98 The early Board deci-
sions reflected an understanding that defining appropriate bargaining
units entails vastly different considerations than defining the nature of
196 Cf Anamag, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 4-5, 10 (June 30, 1987) (stating that
temporary, rotating leaders of employee production teams that do not exercise indepen-
dent authority, but only implement decisions of the entire teams, are not supervisory
employees and can be included in bargaining units with other employees).
197 While all enmployees possess some discretion to utilize their skills and expertise
as laborers, this discretion is especially great for professional employees protected by
the Act. See Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 690 (indicating professionals are protected
employees); 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (same). The discretion of expertise, however, is not
the discretion to implement the policies of an external ownership, upon which the man-
agerial exclusion relies. Cf Note, Collective Authority and Technical Expertise: Reex-
amining the Managerial Employee Exclusion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 694, 730-38 (1981)
(setting forth a test, with results consistent with Yeshiva and this Article, for determin-
ing when employees' exercise of managerial authority excludes them from the Act's
protection). But cf. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 687-88 (noting that professional self-
interest may not be distinguishable from a duty to serve institutional goals).
199 See, e.g., Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971) (employee stock-
holders had significant control over choice of directors and officials), enforcement de-
nied on other grounds, 512 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975); Cab Servs., Inc., 123 N.L.R.B.
83, 85 (1959) (same); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 798-99 (potential
employee stockholder influence in management decisions more than "remote possibil-
ity"), judgment vacated on other grounds, 100 N.L.R.B. 431 (1952). But cf. S-B
Printers, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1274, 1274-75 (1977) (refusing to exclude employee-
owners from decertification election because they receiyed no individual privileges from
management and there was no evidence that they would vote in a cohesive bloc). The
Board has reached similar conclusions in other cases in which the employee owners
seemed to lack any real control over management. See, e.g., Coastal Plywood and Tim-
ber Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 300, 302 (1953) (holding that "mere ownership of stock in a
corporation does not preclude the inclusion of a stockholder in a collective bargaining
unit of a corporation's employees, unless the stockholder-employee's interest. . . give[s]
him or the stockholder group an effective voice in the formulation . . . of corporate
policy") (footnote omitted); Mutual Rough Hat, Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 440, 444 & n.14
(1949) (including two minority employee directors on board with only "nominal" pow-
ers complies with law requiring board to be elected and the names of the directors to be
filed every year).
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the employees protected by the Act."'9 Although employees who share
the control of a firm seldom show a "community of interest"20 with
employees who do not, each employee-group may benefit in a different
way from collective bargaining. For instance, in Everett Plywood and
Door Corporation,"'1 the Board found that although the employee-
shareholders' collective controlled seventy-eight percent of the outstand-
ing voting shares, the members' interest was insufficient to warrant a
loss of employee status. 2  Thus, the Board permitted the employee-
shareholders to form a bargaining unit excluding only those employees
who were supervisors or who served on the firm's board.203
Some later Board decisions excluding employee-owners from non-
owner bargaining units, however, indicate that even units solely com-
prised of employee-owners should not be protected.2v' Moreover, with-
out thorough analysis, the Board has more recently held that employees
who have "the potential for influencing management policy" as a col-
lectivity should be considered managerial.20 5 The Board can and
' When owners and nonowners have been represented by the same union, the
representation of the nonowner has been affected. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at
98-99 (study of employee-owned scavenger companies).
200 See, e.g., 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 32 (1949) (noting that the "Board is . . .
guided by the fundamental concept that only employees having a substantial mutuality
of interest in wages, hours, and working conditions . . . should be appropriately
grouped in a single unit").
201 105 N.L.R.B. 17, aff'd 105 N.L.R.B. 957 (1953).
202 See id. at 19-20 ("mere fact that an employee also has the rights and privileges
of a stockholder" should not prevent him from "availing himself, in his capacity as an
employee" of union representation); cf. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d
642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1966), enforcing 153 N.L.R.B. 204 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1017 (1967); ILGWU v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116, 121 (2d. Cir. 1964) (both holding that
union business agents were protected in efforts to organize and bargain with their em-
ployer-union).
20I See Everett, 105 N.L.R.B. at 19-20. Under the Act, a supervisor is any indi-
vidual who can effectively or authoritatively recommend work assignments or disci-
pline, or who can adjust employee grievances. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
I0 See, e.g., Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971) ("[Tlhe Em-
ployer's officers and directors would, in effect, be placed in a position of bargaining
with [those] who held the power to oust them from their positions, a situation hardly
conducive to arm's length collective bargaining.").
205 Florence Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 955, 957 n.4 (1982). The
Board in this case relied in part on the Court's holding in NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444
U.S. 672, 679 (1980), which specified that the university's full-time faculty were mana-
gerial employees. However, Yeshiva's troublesome implications for organizing profes-
sionals, see, e.g., FHP, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1142 (1985) (full time staff of physi-
cians and dentists falls within the definition of managerial employee); College of
Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 295, 298 (1982) (determination of
whether faculty are managerial depends on "the extent of managerial authority" held
by each particular faculty), and for professional employee participation programs in
both traditional and employee-owned firms, see, e.g., Lee, Collective Bargaining and
Employee Participation: An Anomalous Interpretation of the National Labor Relation
Act, 38 LAB. L.J. 274, 283 (1987) ("[Tlhe rights of professionals are distinctly inferior
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should, without legislative action, reject these later doctrinal
developments.
C. Maintaining the Independence of Collective Bargaining Agents
The above discussion of the potential importance of collective bar-
gaining in employee-controlled firms establishes that the application of
the undivided responsibilities principle in these firms is particularly
critical. The presence of a large number of employee-representatives on
a supervisory board increases the probability that the representatives'
responsibility for the firm's general fortunes will impair their advocacy
of the sometimes adverse interests of a limited group of employees. This
dilemma will be particularly common for employee-representatives who
possess majority control and thus have full responsibility. Those who
share this responsibility are not likely to be forceful critics of the firm.
Even if union leaders use their board seats to criticize management's
handling of a particular issue, their use of collective bargaining to check
management may be inhibited by their involvement in the supervisory
process.2 6
More importantly, regardless of the overlap of issues before the
supervisory board and at the bargaining table, continued exposure to
the firm's problems limits union leaders' capacity to confront the
problems of a narrow group of present employees or of an individual
employee with grievances against the firm.2"' The likelihood that union
to the rights of nonprofessionals."), need not extend to the protection of employee-
shareholders. The Yeshiva Court based its decision on the power and authority given
collectively to academic professionals. See Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 686-90. It did not
address the issue of employee-shareholders' residual interest in their firms.
20 Professor Stone asserts that an ideology of "functionalism" has prevented
many American industrial relations experts from accepting the possibility of one indi-
vidual simultaneously acting as a rank-and-file worker and as a manager. See Stone,
supra note 10, at 144-47. Stone contends, however, that because functionalism is "con-
structed and contingent rather than natural and necessary," id. at 146, "there is no
reason not to permit unions to exercise functions heretofore exercised by management."
Id. at 147. Although industrial relations ideology probably more often justifies rather
than causes the development of economic institutions, Stone's first assertion may be
partially correct. The capacity of one individual to serve concurrently as shop floor
worker and manager, however, does not preclude the existence of good pragmatic and
democratic reasons to separate power within the firm by preventing the same employees
from serving as union leaders and management simultaneously.
207 Such exposure might also impair the leaders' ability to represent employees of
other employers, especially those employers competing with the union-controlled firm.
Indeed, the Board has held that unions possessing a financial interest in one employer
may not represent the employees of competitors. See Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108
N.L.R.B. 1555, 1562 (1954); see also Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 631, 633
(1979) (holding that the Board may deny certification to a union if control of the union
by supervisors of third party employers creates conflict-of-interest).
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leaders' collective bargaining advocacy will be affected by experience on
an employee-controlled board is especially great because the board in-
terests to be represented may seem similar to those to be represented at
the bargaining table; the two roles are thus easily blended. If the value
of collective bargaining to an employee-controlled firm turns on its ca-
pacity to check emerging firm elites, the union elites must remain inde-
pendent and insulated from experiences that would merge their per-
spectives with those of the firm's leadership.2"'
The limited American experience with employee-owned and un-
ionized firms supports these conclusions. The highly publicized case of
the Rath Packing Company provides a good example. In 1980, a major-
ity of Rath's voting equity was purchased by its employees through a
tax-subsidized Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). A strong
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) local at Rath orga-
nized both the purchase and the ESOP, and then attempted to ensure
meaningful and democratic worker control.2" 9 The ESOP shares were
to be voted as a block by the elected trustees according to directions
from an ESOP membership meeting where each employee-shareholder
had one vote.2"' Union officials could not act as trustees but they could
serve on Rath supervisory boards and committees."11 Both of the two
leading union officers, the president and the chief steward, did so and
consequently became highly involved in management.212 One researcher
reported that this involvement "strained relations" with other union of-
ficers who alleged that the president and the steward had withheld im-
portant information from the union.21 The union president, who
served on the Rath Board of Directors during his term, ultimately be-
came president of the company after choosing not to run for re-election
to his union position. Soon after the president's transfer of roles, the
company successfully convinced a bankruptcy judge to void the firm's
contract with the UFCW.2"4
08 The example of the Israeli Histadrut suggests that it is possible for the same
union to both own an enterprise and represent its workers. This arrangement, however,
required the Histadrut to operate its firms in a traditional fashion rather than re-
present the workers as derivative owners. See H. CLEGG, supra note 4, at 67-69. Effec-
tive collective bargaining may have been achieved, but not employee supervision of
management.
209 See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 135-38.
210 See id. at 136-37; Olson, supra note 45, at 757-58.
21. See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 139.
212 See id. at 139-44.
213 See id. at 139-40.
24 See Redmon, Mueller & Daniels, A Lost Dream: Worker Control at Rath
Packing, LAB. Rzs. REV., Spring 1985, at 5, 7 [hereinafter Redmon]. Other union
leaders speculated that their former comrade sought to escape the labor contract so that
the firm would appear more attractive in a potential sale that would benefit employees
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The president was not necessarily "corrupted" by power; escaping
the contract may have benefited the long-run interests of the employee-
owners. Yet the president's priorities and perspectives must have
changed during his years of involvement with management, and with
that change came a corresponding decline in his ability to be an effec-
tive advocate of union employee interests against management's power.
Applying the undivided responsibilities principle to the Rath
Packing example presents an additional definitional question particu-
larly germane to the employee-controlled firm. At what level of author-
ity over a firm's management should employees be disqualified from
involvement in union affairs?215 The question is especially complicated
because of the many possible forms of employee supervision of manage-
ment. If hierarchy is to be tempered by democracy, employee-controlled
firms must establish a range of employee committees to supplement the
corporate board's supervision of management.
For example, Rath established two additional high-level manage-
ment-labor committees: a long-run corporate planning committee and a
labor-management steering committee that monitored ongoing plant op-
erations.216 The steering committee also coordinated the work of "ac-
tion research teams," each of which consisted of supervisory personnel
and several other valuable employees from a particular department.
These teams sought to increase productivity by involving workers in the
management of their own departments.217 The formation of such com-
mittees and teams raises the issue of whether the employees on them,
like those on boards of directors, should be disqualified from holding
union office.
The issue also arises for committees whose potential control en-
compasses the top-level supervisory board. Any member of the Rath
Board could have been voted out of office by the ESOP trustees whose
votes were to reflect decisions made by the majority of employee-share-
holders. A rule prohibited the Rath ESOP trustees from simultaneously
serving as officers or agents of the union.21 ' Should such a rule be le-
gally compelled?
This question can be best answered by recalling the purpose of the
first principle: to avoid placing leaders in positions where they would
be obligated to represent interests other than those to be represented by
as shareholders. See id. at 21.
215 All employees who share in the ownership of a firm cannot be disqualified
from positions of union influence if unionization of such firms is to be permitted.
21I See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 138-39.
217 See id. at 138, 141.
218 See id. at 139.
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their union.219 Thus, any employees having responsibilities to control,
supervise, or monitor management on behalf of non-union interests
should be disqualified from positions of influence in that union. This
disqualification would cover the Rath ESOP trustees who had fiduciary
responsibilities to manage or vote employee shares. It would also clearly
cover members of the Rath corporate planning and labor-management
steering committees.
Employee-members of the "action research teams" present a more
perplexing case. If employee team members only represented other de-
partmental employees within their bargaining unit to the supervisors of
the team, their membership did not conflict with union responsibilities.
If, however, the employee-members participated in the establishment
and elaboration of firm policy in order to maximize the firm's produc-
tivity and value, their membership did potentially conflict with their
union responsibilities.
An employee-controlled firm could both minimize managerial hi-
erarchy and directly involve employees in setting managerial policy by
establishing committees-of-the-whole in each department. The voice
granted by such committees, however, should no more disqualify em-
ployees from union office or influence than should the voice granted by
their firm membership or ownership share. Employees who share an
equal voice in setting firm policy on any level can be expected to ex-
press their own interests; they are not delegated discretion to accommo-
date the other interests potentially advanced by the firm. Only the grant
of some special supervisory or managerial authority to a minority of
employees can create the reality or even the perception that these em-
ployees are removed from union concerns. Similarly, only the grant of
such authority creates the element of hierarchy that must be checked by
an independent representative. Not surprisingly, the definition of man-
agerial authority sufficient to disqualify individuals from holding union
office reflects the definition of the managerial exclusion from NLRA
protection.22° Employees who, because of their discretionary responsi-
bilities, can be prohibited by management from dividing their loyalties
between a union and their firm also should not be permitted to influ-
ence union priorities.
Strict avoidance of conflicting roles for union leaders will help
achieve the goals of employee-controlled firms because achieving these
goals turns, to a great extent, on a dispersal of firm power from a man-
agerial class of employees. Such a dispersal may be threatened by the
219 See supra text accompanying notes 200-03.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
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emergence of a new class of uninhibited employee-managers. Unions
may only play an effective role in checking management if union lead-
ership operates independently. Thus, union leadership must not share
an identity with management and should not share management's per-
spectives on how to advance employee interests.
Two distinct arguments exist against the strict separation of firm
and union elites demanded by the undivided responsibilities principle.
First, independent, potentially adversarial unions could conceivably in-
hibit productivity and diminish job satisfaction by alienating employees'
loyalties. The history of employee-controlled firms, however, suggests
that employee alienation is a cause rather than an effect of adversarial
union tactics. Unions generally cannot alienate employees from the
firms they own. In some instances, like Rath Packing,22' South Bend
Lathe,222 and Vermont Asbestos,223 unions responded to employees'
frustration with their inability to control poorly dispersed managerial
authority. In others, such as Denver Yellow Cab Cooperative Associa-
tion, in which employees assumed control over their firm's destiny but
kept union leaders out of management, arms-length collective bargain-
ing appears to have been conducted in a non-hostile atmosphere of mu-
tual trust.224
To the extent that unions either foster employees' awareness of
their conflicting interests with other employees in the firm, or en-
courage employees to join with similarly skilled employees in other
firms, unions can dilute communal feelings among firm employees.
Such feelings, however, have not been tied to increased productivity or
job satisfaction. Furthermore, they are partially based on an illusion,
and, therefore, are not appropriate goals of employee-controlled
firms.
225
221 See Redmon, supra note 214, at 16-18 (hostile labor environment attributed to
Rath management's perceived unwillingness to cooperate with the union during a per-
iod of economic hardship).
22 See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 68-70 (worker hostility developed when
employee control failed to bring anticipated improvements).
223 See id. at 59-62 (worker hostility resulted when employees perceived an att-
empt by the new employee-managers to isolate the decisionmaking process). The union
at Vermont Asbestos continued its "traditional adversarial role" of representing the
large group of rank and file employees against management. See id. at 61.
224 See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 160-61.
225 Some might argue that unions representing the particular interests of a minor-
ity of employees in an employee-owned firm should not have two opportunities for
control of the firm. If they cannot form or merge into a political coalition that controls
the firm, they should not be able to thwart the political majority that emerges. A simi-
lar argument has been advanced against allowing collective bargaining for public sector
employees who have the opportunity to influence their employer through the general
political process. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES
24-26 (1971). Both arguments are more relevant to defining limitations on the scope of
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The second argument against preventing the involvement of union
leaders in the supervision of management in employee-controlled firms
is based upon the claim that only union involvement can ensure effec-
tive employee control of management.22 6 Most employees do not have
the intellectual training, organizational resources,228 or commitment
to industrial democracy 229 necessary to supervise management effec-
tively. Thus, strong management can convince most employee-directors
to accept their strategies for the firm. Union directors, by contrast, have
ample opportunity to receive managerial training and technical re-
sources, and presumably they possess a more certain commitment to
industrial democracy. 3 0
This argument fails to withstand analysis, however, as an attack
on the separation of union leadership from management advocated
here. Unions can affect the identities, capabilities, and commitments of
managerial supervisors in several ways. They can use their collective
bargaining power to influence the process for selecting supervisors.281
mandatory bargaining. On one hand, decisions not concerning the allocation of an en-
terprise's resources between sets of employees should not be subject to potentially coer-
cive collective bargaining. On the other hand, decisions affecting the allocation of re-
sources between groups of employees should not be made without giving each group an
opportunity to bargain about the allocation, regardless of the political processes that
control the enterprise's management. See Harper, supra note 50, at 1462-65, 1500-03
(discussing the application of the "product market principle," in which "all decisions to
determine what products are created and sold, in what quantities, for which markets,
and at what prices" are excluded from the collective bargaining process).
226 See Redmon, supra note 214, at 22 (union officers had greater awareness of
the goals of the ESOP and should have controlled a majority of the Rath Packing
Board); cf. Summers, supra note 7, at 162-63 (arguing that some union or other orga-
nizational base is needed to ensure the credibility and consequent effective representa-
tion of minority employee representatives on corporate boards).
27 See, e.g., Redmon, supra note 214, at 22 (union officers asserting that the
failure at Rath was partially attributable to the union's failure to educate the em-
ployee-board members about the real meaning of employee ownership).
22' See Slott, The Case Against Worker Ownership, LAB. RES. REv., Spring 1985,
at 83, 86 ("The potential for worker ownership is severely limited by the structure of
capitalist economies. . . . Workers simply lack the financial resources to challenge em-
ployer domination of the 'commanding heights' of the economy.").
22 See D. ZWERDLiNG, supra note 17, at 169 (quoting union leaders claiming
that workers do not want involvement in the management process); cf. G. BROOKS,
supra note 170, at 5 ("The vast majority of union members. . . have only intermittent
interest in, or connection with, the union.").
220 The AFL-CIO, in particular, regularly sponsors programs and workshops
designed to educate its members on leadership development, worker organization, and
other topics relevant to employees who become participants in the management process.
See, e.g., GEORGE MEANY CENTER FOR LABOR STUDIES, INC., THE 1981 LABORITE
1 (1981); Schedule of Labor Studies Center Courses, AFL-CIO News, July 30, 1988,
at 6, col. 2.
21 The union that established employee-ownership and control at Rath Packing
"explicitly retained" veto power over any changes in the planned system in order to
ensure the continued vitality of employee power. See Olson, supra note 45, at 758.
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They can provide technical or training resources to any employee-direc-
tor or management supervisor they choose, regardless of whether that
individual is influential in union affairs. Most importantly, union ad-
herents can advance the candidacies for board directors, or other elected
supervisory posts, of any individuals they feel are most committed to
industrial democracy in general, or to the union's priorities in particu-
lar. Union leaders that remain independent can serve as an oppositional
force not only at the bargaining table, but also at the next managerial
election, when "straying" representatives can be returned to rank and
file status.
The potential influence of union leaders over the votes of union
members in periodic supervisory board elections indeed suggests that
the independent union's hierarchy may require checking to ensure the
effective dispersal of power within the firm. As long as each employee
can vote secretly and independently, however, and union coercion is
proscribed, the union leaders' electoral power will always be limited by
their persuasive capabilities. The independence of an individual em-
ployee from union-controlled block voting should be a fixed corollary to
the rule that those who have any control over others' voting shares can-
not be union leaders.232
In addition, the undivided responsibilities principle requires poten-
tial candidates for board positions to resign any union positions and
disavow any union political influence before accepting a nomination.
Such resignations will not only protect unions from managerial influ-
ence; they will also protect the management of an employee-controlled
firm from excessive union influence.2 3
Perhaps of greater concern should be the capacity of union leaders
to maintain their independence from a supervisory board whose candi-
dacies they have recently and vigorously advocated. There is a natural
tendency for the leaders of any political interest group to feel a personal
investment in, and therefore defensiveness about, the policies of a suc-
cessful political candidate they have endorsed. This tendency, however,
is normally counteracted by the group's need to justify its continued
independent existence and this need should be dominant for unions that
must bargain for their constituency with a managerial hierarchy they
helped elect.
The policy traced above could be implemented by an elaboration
232 In order to prevent union coercion of the electoral process, the Board also
might proscribe the use of union dues to advocate the candidacy of particular board
candidates.
233 Cf 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(1)(B) (1982) (prohibiting a union from coercing manage-
ment in its selection of bargaining representatives).
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of present Board doctrine under sections 8(a)(2) and 8(b)(1)(B). Al-
though the Board has permitted union officers to serve on boards not
dominated by the union'", the Board has found section 8(a)(2) viola-
tions in cases in which the majority of a firm's supervisory board has
been officers, agents, members, or retired members of a union repre-
senting the firm's employees.235 The applicability of this Board doctrine
can be extended to union leaders serving on employee-controlled boards
as well as union-controlled boards.23 6
Section 8(b)(1)(B) proscribes union restraint or coercion of em-
ployers "in the selection of [their] representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining."23 Employees should be able to determine the
identities of the managers responsible for collective bargaining in firms
they own and control; employees need not, however, exercise control
over their labor-relations managers through their unions. Thus, section
8(b)(1)(B) should be interpreted as prohibiting union leaders from be-
ing delegated discretion to appoint or control a firm's management per-
sonnel, whether that discretion derives from supervisory board member-
ship or from control over the shares of other employees. 28  This
prohibition also should prevent a union from insisting on management's
4 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
2'3 See, e.g., St. Louis Labor Health Inst., 230 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 & n.9 (1977);
Medical Found. of Bellaire, 193 N.L.R.B. 62, 63 (1971); Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181
N.L.R.B. 135, 139 (1970).
I3 By contrast, no Board doctrine suggests that union adherents should be re-
stricted from attempting, without coercion, to influence employees' use of their rights of
ownership or other economic power. In addition, effective enforcement of a ban on
participation in firm politics may be both difficult to implement and constitutionally
questionable. Cf Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (non-coercive speech
concerning unions is protected); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793,
797-99 (2d Cir. 1985) (Winter, J. dissenting) (application of federal proxy regulation
to newspaper advertisements on matter of public debate raises serious first amendment
issue). Certain restrictions on labor-related speech, of course, have already been recog-
nized as a constitutionally permissible means of furthering industrial democracy. See,
e.g., NLRB. v. Realist Inc., 328 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir.) (eve of representation election
speech by employer that could reasonably be interpreted as a "veiled or implied threat"
to move operations destroyed "laboratory conditions" and invalidated election), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 (1962)
(employer may not use language that may generate an atmosphere of coercion or
hostility).
237 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1982).
238 See Plumbers Local 533, 271 N.L.R.B. 1361, 1362 & n.5 (1984) (dicta sug-
gesting union control of employer's board through stock ownership could "infect bar-
gaining process" and violate section 8(b)(1)(B)). Advocacy of the removal of a person-
nel officer by a minority employee representative on a nonemployee-controlled board
should not constitute coercion or restraint under section 8(b)(1)(B) because the minority
representative would not be in a position of real control. Cf. Craver, supra note 47, at
683 (asserting that board of director deliberations cannot constitute restraint or coer-
cion). Exercise of control over management by an employee majority on a supervisory
board, however, can be considered as coercive as any exercise of power.
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nomination of a particular employee to serve on an employee-controlled
firm's supervisory board. Such an interpretation would reinforce the
section 8(a)(2) doctrine advocated above, while allowing union leaders
to attempt to influence management through their personal shares of
ownership and their noncoercive powers of persuasion.
The adequacy of this doctrinal compromise for employee-con-
trolled firms renders unnecessary the primary compromise suggested
for nonemployee-shareholder-controlled firms-permitting union lea-
ders to serve on supervisory boards as long as their duty to represent
only bargaining unit employees on the board is formally clarified and
effectively observed.2 39 That the latter compromise is obviated in em-
ployee-controlled firms is fortunate because it carries special risks. The
purpose of keeping union leaders independent of management in em-
ployee-controlled firms is to encourage the formation of a rival elite
with different perspectives on employee interests. Regardless of how the
supervisory duties of the union leaders were defined, that goal would be
compromised if the union leadership participated in firm management.
These leaders would have difficulty respecting the formal distinctions
between the interests of employees qua employees and employees qua
owners.
240
Unions representing a relatively small proportion of a firm's em-
ployees might want to have their leaders on the firm's supervisory
board for the same reason that any union might wish to have its leaders
on a shareholder-controlled board-the supplementing of collective bar-
gaining through better communication and information flow. This ar-
gument, however, is only sufficient to permit union leaders to serve as
board representatives of nonowner employees; such representation is
not necessary for employee-owners. Employee-owners, regardless of
their union affiliation, can be expected to receive adequate information
and alternative channels of communication to management. Given the
potential costs of union leaders serving on employee-controlled boards
and the difficulty in drawing lines between dominant-majority and
subordinate-minority unions, a bright line rule is needed to prohibit
union leaders from concurrently representing employee-owners and
serving on employee-controlled boards.
.3 See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
240 The difficulty in making these distinctions is highlighted by the experiences of
union leaders as board members in employee-controlled firms. See supra notes 208-14
and accompanying text (failure of employees in positions with management responsibil-
ities to continue to act in the best interests of their union); supra text following note
214 (discussing the union leaders' difficulties at Rath).
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D. Avoiding the Preemption of Collective Bargaining
Some might argue that employee-owned firms do not require ap-
plication of the independent employee representative and the distinct
functions principles. Both of these principles are designed to ensure
that management does not utilize the processes of employee supervision
of management to convince employees to reject collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining in the employee-owned firm is likely to be less
plagued by suspicion and information-flow deficiencies than collective
bargaining in the traditional firm.
It might be assumed that management under the formal control of
employees, therefore, would not utilize its authority to discourage col-
lective bargaining.
Analysis suggests, however, that this assumption would be naive.
Employee supervisors of management, like nonemployee management
supervisors, will not want to have their discretionary authority checked
by collective bargaining agents. The supervision of management by em-
ployees might discourage both blatant discrimination against union ad-
vocates and nonproductive recalcitrance at the bargaining table, but it is
less likely to discourage the subtle use of employee-supervisory proce-
dures to manipulate employee sentiment toward collective bargaining.
A new employee elite may be uncomfortable with blatant anti-union
action; this elite may not be scrupulous, however, about protecting a
rival union elite from the competition of processes of employee supervi-
sion that created and sustained the new elite. Maintaining the indepen-
dence of employee representational processes from management in the
employee-controlled firm, however, presents special difficulties to the
extent that processes of managerial supervision in such firms are in-
tended to benefit employees. If all employees with discretionary deci-
sionmaking authority in the firm (including management supervisors as
well as full-time managers) are disqualified from initiating, implement-
ing, or modifying these processes, the firm's system of employee repre-
sentation would be encumbered. For example, who should conduct elec-
tions for a supervisory board of directors if not incumbent directors?
Who should formulate proposed constructive modifications in an em-
ployee representational committee structure if not those serving on ex-
tant committees? Who should operate an employee grievance system if
not those with managerial authority within the firm?
Answering these questions requires understanding that not all em-
ployee representational processes in an employee-controlled firm must
be insulated from management. Just as management in a nonemployee-
shareholder-controlled firm may help implement processes of control
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for all shareholder-owners, so may management in employee-controlled
firms help implement processes of control for all employee-owners, or
members. In each type of firm, only processes that are presented or
operated as systems for the representation of some special interest of a
limited group of employees need to be kept fully independent of the
firm's elite. Only the manipulation of such special processes can suggest
to employees that they have some form of independent special represen-
tation, akin to traditional collective bargaining, that they in fact do not
have. A selection process for firm elites with responsibility to the firm
and its employee-owners in general cannot preempt collective bargain-
ing in the employee-owned firm. Collective bargaining in such a firm
balances this selection process in the same way that collective bargain-
ing in a traditional firm balances the selection process of nonemployee-
shareholder agents. The general processes through which employee-
owners or members can assert their collective control over the firm do
not promise employees the same kind of independent representation
that is promised by collective bargaining in the employee-controlled
firm.
The distinction between implementing processes for collective em-
ployee interests and processes for the special interests of a limited group
of employees fits coherently within labor law doctrine. The Act's defi-
nition of the labor organizations with which employers are prohibited
from interfering includes any plan for employees to deal with employ-
ers concerning matters appropriate for collective bargaining.241 Any en-
tity with actual decisionmaking authority, such as a grievance commit-
tee, is part of the employer, according to the Board, rather than merely
a plan to deal with the employer, regardless of the participation of em-
ployees who have other responsibilities in the firm.242 Any members of
such an entity who possess discretionary authority are then managerial
agents. These individuals are not protected by the Act and should not
be influential in independent union affairs. The processes for the selec-
tion of these managerial agents thus should not be interpreted as the
processes for the selection of employee representatives who would deal
with a potentially adversarial group of firm agents.
By contrast, a process that selects individuals to advocate special
241 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
242 For example, the Board has held that an employer's creation of management-
employee grievance committees and its implementation of an employer's processes for
the selection of employee members is not unlawful when the committees have discre-
tionary authority to render a decision. See Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B.
1108, 1121 (1977); Spark's Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 275-76 (1977), enforced
in part and denied in part sub nom., NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
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employee interests to others with both different representational re-
sponsibilities and a degree of final discretionary authority should fit
within the Act's definition of a labor organization.24 This type of pro-
cess constitutes a plan to deal with an employer's agents. Employees
who participate in the process are doing so as direct employee repre-
sentatives, rather than as representatives of the employee-controlled
firm. If the process is designed to deal with matters appropriate for
traditional collective bargaining,2 44 it can be presented as a substitute
for such bargaining, and therefore must be insulated from managerial
control. This analysis indicates that management cannot designate seats
on a supervisory board for a special, limited set of employees, even if no
bargaining takes place on the board. Management should not operate
special elections for some employees, or assign individual board mem-
bers special responsibilities for a particular group of employees. Only a
special, fully neutral, voting scheme such as cumulative voting could be
used to encourage the representation of subgroups of employees with
minority views.
45
Combining the undivided responsibilities principle with the inde-
pendent employee representative principle, therefore, would most likely
cause most employee-controlled boards to consist of individuals with
similar formal duties who were elected to serve all the firm's owner-
employees. Groups of employees, independent of those involved in a
firm's management, could work together to try to elect individuals as
special representatives to the board. Such individual employee groups,
moreover, could negotiate with the management of the employee-con-
trolled firm to have their nominees included in a recommended slate or
assigned special representational responsibilities. In most firms, how-
ever, there would not be independent employee initiatives for special
board representation because any group that fell within the definition
of a labor organization, the most likely initiators, would not be able to
either place their own leaders on the board or insist on the inclusion of
2'3 See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
2," Such matters include "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
245 Cumulative voting grants shareholders votes equal to the number of shares
they have multiplied by the number of directors being elected. Shareholders can then
distribute their votes to either one candidate or any combination of candidates. See
Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d. 78, 85-86, 126 N.E.2d. 701, 706 (1955); Comment, Cumu-
lative Voting, Yesterday and Today: The July, 1986 Amendments to Ohio's Corpora-
tion Law, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 1265, 1265 (1987). This method of voting facilitates
minority representation by enabling minorities to stack their votes behind a particular
candidate. See Wolfson, 6 Il1. 2d. at 89-93, 126 N.E.2d at 708-10; Comment, supra, at
1266.
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particular nominees. 4"
Furthermore, the independent employee representative principle
operates to restrict a firm's structuring of employee supervisory com-
mittees at all decisionmaking levels. Such committees must either for-
mally provide equal participation rights to all employees or assign
managerial status to employees with special decisionmaking discretion.
Any committee without decisionmaking discretion, whose members act
as representatives of other employees, must be considered a labor or-
ganization24' 7 insulated from interference by managerial employees.248
Section 8(a)(2) should permit employee-controlled firms, like nonem-
ployee-controlled firms, to involve all employees equally in democratic
decisionmaking about firm operations. Processes that provide for for-
mally equal, nonrepresentative involvement should not be considered a
labor organization. 49 Moreover, section 8(a)(2) should permit all firms
to delegate managerial discretion to a few rank and file employees who
must then be classified as management, regardless of their other duties.
Section 8(a)(2) should prevent, however, any firm from presenting a
limited number of rank and file employees as "employee representa-
tives" with the power to deal with others with true managerial, deci-
sionmaking authority.
This type of analysis should apply to any system unilaterally es-
tablished by management to process employee grievances against mana-
gerial decisions. Equal formal rights to participation in a "general as-
sembly" review of managerial decisions should not make a manager of
an employee. Any employee, however, who is delegated a degree of spe-
24 See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
247 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982). Frequent rotation of representatives should
not change this result. But see NLRB v. Streamway Div., 691 F.2d 288, 294-95 (6th
Cir. 1982) (finding an employee representation committee not to be a "labor organiza-
tion" in part because of frequent rotation of members).
28 The firm should also not be permitted to "support" such a labor organization.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). The managerial employees, however, should be able
to discuss firm policy with an independently established and maintained representative
employee committee even if that committee has not proven majority employee backing
in a unit appropriate for bargaining. Such discussions, as long as they stop short of
bargaining toward formal agreement, need not be considered "support" for purposes of
section 8(a)(2). See supra note 112.
249 The Board's adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's opinion in General
Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977), supports this proposition. "The essence of a
labor organization ... is a group or a person which stands in an agency relationship to
a larger body on whose behalf it is called to act." Id. at 1234; see also U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERA-
TION, supra note 78, at 45-58 (arguing that the legislative history of § 2(5) and lan-
guage in prior Board decisions supports the General Foods decision). But see Kohler,
supra note 4, at 539 (criticizing General Foods, but not addressing the representational
or "agency" argument).
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cial discretionary authority to resolve disputes in such a system must be
classified as management and cannot be presented as an employee rep-
resentative. 50 Any rank and file employees can be permitted to use the
system and, in the absence of a certified exclusive representative, to be
represented by their own agent.25' The firm's management, however,
cannot choose or control any such agent.
These restrictions on the processes of decisionmaking and grie-
vance resolution should in no way prevent the employee-controlled firm
from dispersing power to rank and file employees or from generally
changing the firm's culture from that of the traditional firm. To some
undetermined extent, rank-and-file employee ownership of the firm and
control of managers may change the distribution of actual decisionmak-
ing authority through a reduction of hierarchy. To the extent that it
cannot, and hierarchy remains, rank-and-file employees may want to
choose an independent collective bargaining agent to help protect their
interests from that hierarchy. Employee representatives who are not in-
dependent of an employee-controlled firm's hierarchy, however, will
not effectively check that hierarchy; they can do nothing for democratic
control of the firm that cannot be done better by direct delegation of
actual decisionmaking authority. The only special impact of these non-
independent representatives could be the preemption of independent
employee representation.
The Labor Act, of course, expresses a preference for more than
independent employer representation. It also establishes a system for
the selection of exclusive bargaining agents who have the support of a
majority of the employees within a unit appropriate for bargaining.252
Moreover, section 8(a)(2) has been read to proscribe employer bargain-
ing with employee representatives who lack such majority support. 53
250 Cf. Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1121 (1977) (finding grie-
vance committees with final adjudicatory authority not to be labor organizations, al-
though the committees included employee representatives); Spark's Nugget, Inc., 230
N.L.R.B. 275, 275-76 (1977) (same), enforced in part and denied in part sub nom.,
NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906
(1981). The Board appropriately seemed to view the grievance committees as part of
management; in Spark's Nugget, however, the employee members and their process of
selection should have been seen as a labor organization because the employees were
outnumbered on the committees by traditional management.
251 The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1982), permits employers to allow individual employees to present grievances
under a collective bargaining agreement, but not to be represented by agents other than
their designated and independent majority bargaining representatives. See NLRB v.
Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 217-18 (1959); Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 649, 651-53 (1953).
252 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
252 See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
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Because management may always be tempted to convince employees
that independent bargaining agents are not needed, reserving tradi-
tional collective bargaining functions for majority bargaining agents is
important in any firm, whether or not it is employee-controlled. Thus,
in employee-controlled firms, as in nonemployee-shareholder-controlled
firms, the distinct functions principle requires that nothing that resem-
bles or represents collective bargaining occur on any management su-
pervisory board, unless it is approved voluntarily by majority-supported
unions that have bargaining authority for all potentially affected
employees.
Moreover, since the undivided responsibilities principle demands
that no union leaders serve on any board or committee with discretion-
ary supervisory or managerial authority in an employee-controlled
firm, the distinct functions principle must imply that the responsibilities
of such boards or committees would rarely include the negotiation of
commitments between the firm and groups of its employees. Unions
would want such negotiations to be conducted by union officials who do
not serve on the firm's managerial or supervisory committees, rather
than between two sets of employees who share the experiences of these
committees. Further, union officials would view negotiations that ex-
cluded them as a threat to their authority and power.
This significant restriction on the form that collective bargaining
can take, however, in no way inhibits the achievement of the realistic
goals of employee ownership and control. Collective bargaining in em-
ployee-controlled firms primarily serves not as a tool for the achieve-
ment of these goals, but as a check on the procedural power of the new
managerial elite. The employee-controlled firm that wishes to make
binding commitments to various groups of employees can do so with
individual contracts, without discouraging the emergence of the form of
majoritarian exclusive bargaining that could best serve this checking
function.
In sum, it is simplistic to view the separation of collective bargain-
ing from managerial supervision, demanded by the distinct functions
principle, or the separation of employee managers from employee rep-
resentatives, demanded by the undivided responsibilities and indepen-
dent employee representative principles, as barricades to labor-manage-
ment cooperation in employee-controlled firms. Such cooperation can be
part of the system of managerial decisionmaking in such firms. The
collective bargaining process may be a useful check both on that deci-
sionmaking as well as on traditional managers. The process can be pro-
tected as such a check by an elaboration of present labor law doctrine.
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IV. GOVERNMENT MANDATED EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
IN THE SUPERVISION OF MANAGEMENT
This Article notes the different types of mandatory employee par-
ticipation in management supervision as part of its discussion of the
plausible benefits of such participation. One descriptive factor, how-
ever, is important for the organization of the inquiry-whether em-
ployees' participation in management supervision includes at least par-
tial control of management. Legislation that provides the potential for
partial employee control should accommodate collective bargaining dif-
ferently than legislation that only provides for a minority employee
voice on management supervisory boards.
A. Mandating a Minority Role for Employee Representatives
on Shareholder-Controlled Supervisory Boards
1. The Plausible Goals
Some Central European governments, including West Germany,
have mandated a minority role for employees in the supervision of
management.254 Establishing that it would not be irrational for our
government to follow their lead requires more than an explanation of
why employees and equity shareholders might agree to such supervi-
sion. It also requires an explanation of why such supervision might be
imposed.
The explanation of the second issue starts by recalling why em-
ployees might wish to have a non-controlling role in the supervision of
management. Such a role can enhance employees' individual and collec-
tive bargaining position by ensuring a better information flow concern-
ing firm activities to employees, and a better communication of em-
ployee needs and interests to shareholders and management. A skeptic,
however, might accept this proposition yet still question governmental
imposition of employee representation. The skeptic might claim that if
employees in a particular firm can gain more from having supervisory
board representation than residual shareholders lose from granting such
254 For a discussion of West German codetermination, see infra note 264. See also
Ottervanger and Pais, Employee Participation in Corporate Decision Making: The
Dutch Model, 15 INT'L LAW. 393, 397-404 (1981) (discussing the Dutch codetermina-
tion system); Traub, Codetermination and the New Austrian Labor Code: A Multi-
Channel System of Employee Participation, 14 INT'L LAW. 613, 614-27 (1980) (dis-
cussing the Austrian codetermination system); Note, Employee Codetermination: Ori-
gins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States,
14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 947, 949-87 (1977) (discussing the codetermination systems of
West Germany and the Scandinavian countries).
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representation, imposition would be unnecessary; if employees gain less
than shareholders lose, imposition would be unwise. In turn, the skep-
tic might claim that if redistribution of wealth is the goal, the redistri-
bution can be effected more efficiently by directly transferring money to
employees that they can use as they wish.255
There are several fully rational and interrelated responses to such
skepticism, however. First, the skeptic's free bargaining, efficiency ar-
gument has less force against the governmental imposition of a process
that enhances bargaining between groups that remain free to assert
their own preferences within the process. Second, direct redistribution
of wealth may not be politically acceptable or practically feasible. For
example, which employees should receive payments and at what levels?
American law has viewed the imposition of bargaining processes as a
much more manageable way to serve redistributive goals." 6 Admit-
tedly, equity shareholders might have sufficient economic leverage to
reduce other employee benefits to compensate for employee supervisory
board representation; a comprehensive codetermination law, for in-
stance, would not eliminate all domestic or international alternatives for
investment. For those workers whose collective bargaining is enhanced,
however, some undeterminable level of redistribution could be
achieved.1
57
Third, legislators might conclude that the absence of voluntarily
negotiated minority employee representation on supervisory boards does
not establish that this representation is worth less to employees than it
would cost equity shareholders. The absence of minority representation
255 Cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 441-44 (3d ed. 1986) (noting
that transfer of benefits in kind may lead to an inefficient result because when goods
are provided at no cost, there is no way to determine preferences).
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (encouraging collective bargaining in order to re-
store equal bargaining power and avoid depressed wage rate). The Labor Act, however,
only compels good faith bargaining, not agreement. See id. § 158(d).
2517 Empirical studies have difficulty isolating the effects of employee representa-
tion on corporate boards. See Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspec-
tives From the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 69-70 (1966). One study of the effects
of codetermination in Germany found that minority employee representation did not
cause an increase in wages. See Svejnar, West German Co-determination, in THE PER-
FORMANCE OF LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS, supra note 128, at 224. The study, how-
ever, also did not find any decrease in traditional compensation; the total position of the
employees could well have been enhanced.
The extent to which redistribution is possible depends on other complicated eco-
nomic relationships that are difficult to predict in the abstract, such as the sensitivity of
the demand for and supply of labor to the codetermination benefit. Cf Kennedy, Dis-
tributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference
to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 609-14
(1982) (discussing the redistributive effects of compulsory contract terms). Compulsory
codetermination may be more likely to have a redistributive effect than would employee
ownership because it reduces alternative, non-encumbered investment opportunities.
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may be caused by hidden agency costs. 58 Employee representation may
be blocked by managements more threatened than shareholders by em-
ployee participation in supervision. Managers, for instance, may have a
stronger interest in fully maintaining firm hierarchy. They may also
fear that employee board representatives would more vigorously moni-
tor performance than do most outside directors.259
There may also be hidden transaction costs. Both shareholders and
employees may simply not possess adequate knowledge about the po-
tential benefits and costs of employee supervision to be willing to risk
its negotiation.26 Thus, it would be rational for legislators, convinced
that the benefits were greater than the costs, to require all firms to at
least experience employee representation. 6 '
Fourth, legislators might require all firms to permit their employ-
ees to experience some participation in management supervision in or-
der to encourage the development of employee attitudes toward indus-
trial democracy. Mandatory employee representation on supervisory
boards not only would provide employees more information with which
to determine their preferences concerning the worth of such representa-
tion, but it also would enable them to develop new preferences. This
response to the skeptic's efficiency argument might be deemed paternal-
istic, but is nonetheless compelling because it questions the static
human preferences assumption on which the efficiency argument is
based. Policy makers need not assume that the preferences of employees
before experiencing supervisory participation, rather than after, should
28 See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305-57 (1976) (discuss-
ing agency costs within the corporate framework).
259 Employee representatives may monitor managerial slack more closely than do
shareholder representatives because shareholders can insure against managerial slack
by diversifying their investments. Employees, of course, cannot diversify their labor in
the same way. See McCain, Empirical Implications of Worker Participation in Man-
agement, in PARTICIPATORY AND SELF-MANAGED FIRMS, supra note 140, at 41. A
recent example of more vigorous employee monitoring is the successful effort by unions
at Pan Am to negotiate, with the Pan Am Board of Directors, the ouster of a manage-
ment team with a lackluster record. See Salpukas, Pan Am, in a Union Deal, Ousts 2
Top Executives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
280 Cf. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1831-32 (1980) (dis-
cussing how high information costs cause employees to undervalue the benefits of job
security terms, thereby dissuading employees from negotiating for them).
281 Professor Sunstein has suggested that the possibility of "myopia" by individual
citizens who ignore long-term benefits in the face of high short-term costs conceivably
can justify state interventions. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1165-66 (1986); see also Elster, Self-Realization in Work
and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life, 3 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 97,
112-15 (1986) (discussing the possibilities of long-term strategies of planning, rather
than short-term strategies of adoption, in the context of facilitating job enrichment).
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be given weight in a social welfare calculus. A society's citizens can
collectively and rationally decide to create a social environment that
will change employee individual preferences in ways they find
desirable. 62
2. Applying the Three Principles: The Pluralist Model
The argument for mandatory employee representation on share-
holder controlled boards does not assume that such representation, any
more than voluntary representation on such boards, could alone lead
directly to a major reallocation of resources or a transformation of the
traditional hierarchial firm. By common consensus, it has not done so
in Western Europe.26 3 Instead, the justification for compelling em-
ployee representation on shareholder controlled supervisory boards
started with the assumption that such representation can both enhance
employee access to information about the firm and facilitate communi-
cation of employee interests and needs to shareholder representatives.
These information and communication goals of employee representation
on shareholder controlled supervisory boards fit well with the goals of
collective bargaining. It should therefore be possible to frame legislation
requiring representation that encourages both present and emerging
collective bargaining relationships.
The three labor law principles suggest requirements for that legis-
lation. As has been stressed above, the undivided responsibilities princi-
ple prohibits individuals from leading collective bargaining representa-
tives and, at the same time, supervising management on behalf of
interests other than those within the responsibilities of the bargaining
representative. Honoring this principle thus requires supervisory board
legislation either to preclude union leaders from sitting on boards or to
divide the responsibilities, as well as the electoral constituencies, of em-
ployee board representatives. 64 Although this Article suggested that the
282 See Sunstein, supra note 261 at 1136-38, 1148. Sunstein cites seat belt laws as
an example of a collective attempt to change individual preferences by forcing individu-
als to experience new cultural norms. See id. at 1136-38. He cites worker self-govern-
ment as an example of a good that citizens might come to value only if it were a
realistic option rather than something to reject as "sour grapes." See id. at 1148.
283 See, e.g., J. CRISPO, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE: A
NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 108-09 (1978) (noting that codetermination is only
seen as an initial step to those seeking firm distributive and hierarchical changes); H.
JAIN, WORKER PARTICIPATION: SUCCESS AND PROBLEMS 47 (1980) (stating that
codetermination is seen only as a step, albeit an important one, in the move towards
greater industrial democracy in America).
28 The West German codetermination system does neither. There is no prohibi-
tion of union leaders sitting as employee representatives. Indeed, two or three seats
(depending on the size of the supervisory board) are reserved for union nominees
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former option might be more easily privately negotiated,6 5 the latter,
pluralist, option is preferable for mandatory legislation intended to en-
courage collective bargaining.
Permitting union leaders to sit on supervisory boards, but dividing
responsibilities and electorates along bargaining unit lines, has a num-
ber of advantages. First, if union leaders were precluded from serving
as supervisory board representatives, employee board representation
could not provide maximum assistance to collective bargaining. Infor-
mation flow to union representatives would be somewhat impeded.
Moreover, supervisory board members could not influence union nego-
tiating strategy because to do so would transform them into union lead-
ers and disqualify them from board membership. Second, dividing
union leadership and employee board representatives would create un-
necessary friction between two competing employee elites, neither of
which has managerial control to be checked. While neither unnecessary
friction nor suboptimal bargaining coordination warrants rejection of
the undivided responsibilities principle,266 both indicate that an alterna-
tive pluralist employee representation system would be preferable.
Employee board representatives under a pluralist system would
represent only employee interests on the nonemployee- shareholder-
controlled board. Moreover, each employee representative would re-
present only a defined group of employees and the employee groups in
the firm would be defined to coincide with the firm's bargaining units.
When it is feasible, each bargaining unit would have at least one repre-
sentative; larger bargaining units could have more than one.267 For bar-
elected by all employees. See FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
Co-DETERMINATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 14, 17, 31 (1980).
For the other representatives, constituencies are divided between wage-earning and sal-
aried employees with no further regard to the nature of collective bargaining, either
through national unions or through firm-specific worker councils. See id. at 14, 17.
The different role of collective bargaining and unions in German industrial rela-
tions may reduce the significance of the undivided responsibility principle. In Germany,
unions engage in highly centralized national bargaining, and are thus less likely to
accommodate the interests of a single firm. See Summers, An American Perspective of
the German Model of Worker Participation, 8 COMP. LAB. L.J. 333, 340-41 (1987).
At the firm level, works councils, which are responsible for protecting many employees'
substantive rights that might be compromised by collective bargaining in the United
States, are "institutionally separate" from the union. See id. at 343. This institutional
separation serves the function of the undivided responsibility principle.
115 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
267 Admittedly, defining election units would pose some administrative problems.
For instance, some bargaining units might be too small to warrant a representative,
depending on the size of the board. Although perfectly proportional representation is
not necessary, in some cases combining small units of organized, or unorganized, em-
ployees would be warranted. See Summers, supra note 7, at 161.
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gaining units that had selected an exclusive bargaining representative,
the supervisory board representatives could be appointed by the bar-
gaining representative through processes they control. Those processes
could consist of open employee elections, if the bargaining agent so
chooses, but the law could also permit the agent to ensure that there
would be no competing electoral power base.
For bargaining units that had not selected exclusive bargaining
agents, board representatives could be selected by special employee elec-
tions conducted pursuant to rules formulated in part to ensure the inde-
pendence of the election process from any managerial influence. As
long as agents with the power to select employee representatives are
also kept free of managerial influence, this system would meet the re-
quirements of the independent employee representative principle. Em-
ployee board representative selection processes, labor organizations
under the Act's definition,268 would be kept free of employer interfer-
ence, domination, or support. 69
This system would also satisfy the distinct functions principle if
the employee board representatives selected directly by employees,
rather than by exclusive bargaining agents, were restricted from engag-
ing in negotiations on behalf of the employees in their election unit.
Employee representatives chosen by an exclusive bargaining agent
could, with their agent's approval, utilize their board positions to obtain
or receive commitments from the shareholder board majority or the
management that it controlled. Representatives from employee election
units without bargaining representatives, however, could not make or
receive such commitments.
The- disjunction between the authority of employee board repre-
sentatives chosen by employees represented by exclusive bargaining
agents, and those chosen by employees who do not have bargaining
agents, could benefit those employees with agents. Employee board rep-
resentatives given the authority to bargain on boards might be able to
garner a more satisfactory share of firm resources for their constituents
than employee board representatives without this flexibility. Any spe-
cial advantages of board representation for union employees, however,
would most likely derive directly from having the support of an organ-
ized, independent union bureaucracy. As was stressed above, the dis-
208 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
219 Professor Summers suggests that a system of employee representation on su-
pervisory boards could be strengthened by requiring independent employee or workers'
councils to be established in all unorganized election units. See Summers, supra note 7,
at 163. Summers is probably correct as long as such committees were kept independent
of employer or managerial influence.
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tinct functions principle simply requires nonunion employees to sacri-
fice the minimal advantage that a board representative could be able to
obtain from bargaining without the support of an exclusive bargaining
agent. In any event, those individuals desiring to achieve industrial de-
mocracy should not be concerned about the encouragement of collective
bargaining.
B. Mandating Partial Employee Control of Supervisory Boards
1. The Plausible Goals
Justifying the legislative mandate of some level of employee con-
trol of the supervision of management requires more than a statement
of how such a system might plausibly benefit employees. The plausible
goals set forth above-including possible increases in productivity,
transformed benefits and workplace culture, and a dispersal of firm
decisionmaking power 2 7°-explain why workers should have the oppor-
tunity to choose employee-controlled enterprises. The plausibility of
these goals alone, however, does not explain why some level of em-
ployee control should be imposed on all enterprises. A skeptic can easily
argue that if employee-controlled enterprises are more productive, they
should be able to thrive competitively against traditional firms.2 71 Simi-
larly, if employee-controlled enterprises provide employees with more
desirable compensation packages, workplace culture, or decisionmaking
power, such enterprises should be able to reduce their costs by at-
tracting workers at lower pay levels.
2 72
The argument against the imposition of employee control seems
stronger than the argument against the imposition of employee repre-
sentation on shareholder-controlled firms because workers can establish
employee-controlled firms without bargaining with an incumbent man-
agement that resists loss of its authority. Theoretically, workers at-
tracted to the alleged benefits of employee control should be able to
establish new firms or purchase old ones and attract capital by in-
creased productivity or reduced labor costs.2 73
Justifying the imposition of some level of employee control thus
requires analyzing why employee-controlled firms should not thrive
without government encouragement if they yield the benefits which
have been claimed for them. Such an analysis should begin by noting
two sets of reasons workers may not voluntarily form employee-con-
270 See supra notes 146 & 150-53 and accompanying text.
271 See B. HORVAT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIALISM 455 (1982).
272 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 130, at 490-91.
272 See id. at 473-74.
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trolled firms that would ultimately thrive.
First, most workers simply lack information about the plausible
benefits of employee control and about how such control might be
achieved. Incumbent elites lack substantial incentives to promote em-
ployee control or to provide sophisticated advice on its implementation.
Legislators might conclude that, because only the experience of em-
ployee control can give employees adequate knowledge of its benefits
and the mechanics of its operation, control should be made mandatory
for at least some trial period.274
Second, the values and priorities of the workers who decide against
taking the risks of employee control might be changed by the experi-
ence of working in an employee-controlled enterprise.7 5 The same
workers, with knowledge of the effects of employee control, could reject
control before the experience, but embrace it after being affected by its
culture. 276 Legislators again might plausibly, if paternalistically, decide
to override the pre-experience preferences of workers in order to deter-
mine or honor the post-experience preferences.
In light of our experience with employee-controlled and owned
firms, however, the information-deficiency and paternalistic rationales
do not alone adequately justify mandatory legislation. Many of the
American employee-controlled and owned firms that have been estab-
lished have either failed entirely or have degenerated into traditional
shareholder-controlled enterprises.2 77 Justification of mandatory em-
ployee control requires an exploration of this history and why it may
not be relevant to the form of employee control this Article advocates.
This explanation can build on some of the Article's prior analysis.
There are cogent, economic reasons a work force that wanted to build
an employee-controlled economy out of a traditional capitalist economy
would be unlikely to do so on its own.278
274 See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
275 There is some indication that workers' values in more democratic organiza-
tions differ from those in more hierarchical firms. See supra note 149. Moreover, evi-
dence suggests that values change through an experience in employee ownership and
control. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 179-85.
276 This reaction seems especially plausible if one believes that most schooling and
other acculturating experiences in modern society prepare workers to accept a depriva-
tion of power as natural. See Gamson & Levin, Obstacles to the Survival of Demo-
cratic Workplaces, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 224.
277 See id at 219, 220. Even some of the recently employee-purchased companies
have already reverted to more conventional ownership and control. See K. BRADLEY &
A. GELB, supra note 9, at 96, 101 (Herkimer Library Bureau), 103-04 (Vermont As-
bestos Group). Other companies have failed. See Lueck, Test of Worker-Owners is
Ending on Sour Note, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1987, at B1, col. 4 (Hyatt-Clark). For an
overview of the data on employee-owned firms, see Jones, supra note 6, at 37-53.
278 The following analysis is not intended to argue that an ideal labor-managed
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First, employee-controlled firms may have difficulty recruiting
managers at a reasonable salary." 9 In a traditional economy, managers
may view positions in employee-controlled firms as less attractive be-
cause managers would have less authority.
Second, employees who wish to control their firm may have diffi-
culty finding adequate sources of capital. If the employees use their
private capital to purchase their firm, they concentrate their savings in
the same investments upon which they depend for employment and on
which they have specialized their human capital. 8 0 If they try to avoid
extensive investment of their own funds by seeking outside capital, they
will have to sacrifice control of the firm to investors who are given
residual claims, or expose their wages to substantial risk by subordinat-
ing them to prior and extraordinarily high interest claims of outside
investors. Firms that maintain complete employee control of manage-
ment supervision have had great difficulty obtaining private capital at
reasonable cost.2"" Even a high guaranteed rate of return may not sat-
isfy investors worried about employees draining the firms' assets
through high wages.2"2 Restrictions (contained in trust indentures and
economy of internally efficient firms would be less efficient than an ideal capital-man-
aged economy of efficient firms. The analysis only suggests reasons why an imperfect
labor-managed economy might not naturally evolve from our present imperfect econ-
omy. Some economists have constructed models of an economy of labor-managed firms
maximizing income per worker; such models can reach equilibrium at Pareto optimal-
ity. See J. VANEK, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED MARKET ECONO-
MIES 124-60 (1970), discussed in C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 223-34. Several scholars
have analyzed the Vanek model and its variations. See Stephen, The Economic Theory
of the Labour-Managed Firm, in THE PERFORMANCE OF LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS,
supra note 128, at 4-24; see also Meade, The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and
of Profit-Sharing, 82 ECON. J. 402, 402-28 (1972) (discussing additional conditions
that would have to be met to make the Vanek model economically efficient). For impor-
tant precursors to Vanek, see Domar, The Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Coop-
erative, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 734, 747-49 (1966); Ward, The Firm in Illyria: Market
Syndicalism, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 566, 583 (1958) (describing the system of state-
owned worker-run firms prescribed by law in Yugoslavia in the 1950s). See also Jen-
sen & Meckling, supra note 130, at 476 (arguing that, for many of the reasons sug-
gested in the text, a labor-managed economy would not be efficient).
278 See B. HORVAT, supra note 271, at 456; Putterman, Some Behavioral Per-
spectives on the Dominance of Hierarchical over Democratic Forms of Enterprise, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 139, 157-58 (1982);
280 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
281 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 133, at 85 (study of plywood cooperatives indi-
cating difficulty of obtaining outside capital due to the divorce of outside investment
from any management control). This difficulty may derive'in part from an ideological
hostility of lenders toward employee control. See B. HORVAT, supra note 271, at 447.
This difficulty is also rational, however, for the reasons suggested in the text.
282 See Williamson, supra note 47, at 1226-27 ("The dilemma for workers' coop-
eratives is that workers cannot simultaneously ask for long-term financing to purchase
firm-specific durable assets and refuse those who provide such funding the opportunity
to intervene if the management of the cooperative thereafter dissipates (expropriates)
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other contractual instruments) on dividends and other distributions to
stockholders have protected senior securities in the traditional firm;2 3
investors with fixed claims to the assets of an employee-owned firm,
however, may not be able to obtain adequate protection from wage dis-
tributions without capturing full control from employees.2 4
Third, employee-owners have incentives not to make efficient use
of available capital. New owners may be a source of additional capital,
but incumbent owners of successful firms will not want to dilute their
claims on the firm's residual returns by giving these new owners equal
claims.28 5 This problem can be solved by requiring the new employee-
owners to compensate for the growth of the firm by contributing more
capital than did the old employee-owners. The new employees, how-
ever, may be unable to afford this adequate compensation.2"6 The
claims of the new owners can be proportionately reduced, but if voting
shares are kept equal, the old employees may feel threatened by the
new employees' authority to change the distribution pattern of the
firm's revenues. This potential change is probably particularly unac-
ceptable to old employees who undertook the entrepreneurial burdens
and risks of starting a successful employee-owned firm. In order to
avoid sharing high returns from past investments, incumbent employee-
owners of firms thus have been tempted to hire nonowner employees
and thereby gradually transform their firm into a more traditional
these investments.").
283 Conceivably, debt instruments could include restrictions on wage levels tied to
profit margins and asset to liability ratios. Employees, however, would want their basic
compensation package to be equal in status to the calls of fixed-interest lenders.
284 See Williamson, supra note 47, at 1210-12.
Unlike stockholders, lenders commonly make short-term loans for general
business purposes or longer term loans against ear-marked assets .... If
the assets cannot be easily redeployed, lenders usually require partial fi-
nancing through equity collateral. . . . As the exposure to risk increases,
...debt holders become more concerned with the details of the firm's
operating decisions and strategic plans. With high debt-equity ratios the
creditors become more like shareholders and greater consultation between
the management and its major creditors results.
Id. at 1211-12.
The employee-controlled and owned firm, however, would be less likely than an
equity shareholder controlled firm to have a risk preference that repelled fixed-interest
creditors. The employee-controlled firm is likely to be more risk adverse because its
owners are less diversified.
285 See Ellerman, supra note 185, at 887; cf. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 130,
at 484-85 (current workers may resist expansion and new hiring because firm income
would be shared with the new workers). The recent ESOP at Mansfield Ferrous Cast-
ings is an example of this situation. See Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc.: A Case
Study, THE EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP REP., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 10, 10.
28 See Ellerman, supra note 185, at 887.
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enterprise. *sT
Furthermore, employee-owners are likely to forego some efficient
investment opportunities because they resist further concentration of
their capital. In order to achieve diversification, employee-owners
would prefer to take capital out of the firm in which their human and
traditional capital is concentrated. Moreover, at some point, a large co-
hort of workers nearing retirement age might be attracted to a total sale
of the business, perhaps to traditional investors. 88
In addition, employee-owned and controlled firms may tend to
make financial decisions without considering the long-term conse-
quences. As noted above, incumbent workers who cannot sell their
ownership or membership at a price based on expected future returns
may not care about their firm's prospects for the years after they re-
tire.289 Therefore, these workers will resist investments with paybacks
that will accrue over long periods.2 90 In sum, the economic problems of
287 See id. Nonowner hiring, for instance, has been representative of the north-
western plywood cooperatives. See C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 112, 118-21; D.
ZWERDLING, supra note 17, at 102. At first the worker-owned scavenger companies in
the San Francisco area were not tempted to hire nonowner helpers because the compa-
nies' rates and income were regulated. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 76. None-
theless, technological changes have provoked an increase in such hiring. See id. at 97-
98.
The temptation to degenerate by hiring nonowner workers most likely exists
whenever cheap labor can increase the employee-owners' returns, regardless of the in-
vestment history of the firm. See Ben-Ner, On The Stability of the Cooperative Type of
Organization, 8 J. COMP. ECON. 247, 248-49 (1984).
288 See Ellerman, supra note 185, at 885, 887; see, e.g., C. GUNN, supra note 2,
at 124 (plywood co-op sale); R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 101 (scavenger company
sale). Not surprisingly, this pattern also seems to be emerging for firms owned through
ESOPs, whether or not with employee control. See, e.g., Developments in Employee
Ownership, THE EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP REP., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 3, 3 (sale of Sea
Ray Corporation, 85 percent ESOP owned, to outside investor-owned company).
28I See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
210 A number of these economic problems can be addressed to some extent by the
Mondragon cooperative form, in which retained earnings are accumulated in individ-
ual-employee rather than collective-firm accounts. See Ellerman, supra note 129, at
270-73; Ellerman, supra note 185, at 883, 888-89. For instance, the long-term horizon
problem can be substantially mitigated by having the individual accounts factor in an
expected future yield. Furthermore, new employees could enter membership without
diluting incumbent employees' share of the firm's collective accumulated capital.
Nevertheless, research suggests that individual capital accounting would not elimi-
nate all tendencies for employee ownership to degenerate. Regardless of the initial eco-
nomic and legal form of an employee-owned business, employee owners can be tempted
either to sell that business's assets to outside investors for diversification, or to change
the legal or economic form in order to hire low wage workers to enhance returns. See
R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 109-10, 188-89. Moreover, individual capital accounts
may not ensure an adequate stream of capital, at least without the involvement of some
external lenders such as the cooperative bank that is part of the Mondragon system. See
Oakeshott, supra note 128, at 132-33. It has been suggested that this bank, as would be
predictable for an external lender at risk, influences the management of the Mondragon
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employee-owned and controlled firms suggest why this form of organi-
zation has generally been limited to enterprises with small economies of
scale,291 low efficient capital to labor ratios,292 and homogenous work
forces,293 regardless of the overall interest of employees in industrial
democracy. If some form or level of mandatory employee control can be
devised that is insulated from these problems, it should be attractive for
a society wishing to modify significantly its industrial culture.294
The Western European model of parity codetermination offers one
possible solution. Under a simplified version of the model, employees
and claimants to the firm's residual assets would each elect an equal
number of members of the firm's supervisory board, but neither group
would elect a majority. One or more neutral members, selected either
jointly by the employee and shareholder representatives or by some
cooperatives. See Eaton, The Basque Workers' Cooperatives, 10 INDUS. REL. J. 32, 32-
40 (1979).
21 See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 180; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 209-10.
292 See, e.g., C. GUNN, supra note 2, at 78-79, 112-17 (forest worker and ply-
wood cooperatives); R. RussELL, supra note 129, at 106 (taxi cooperatives). The de-
generation of the Boston taxi cooperative that Russell studied was in part explained by
Boston's success at making the taxi industry more capital-intensive by adoption of a
medallion system. See id. at 119. Labor intensity seems especially likely to support
employee ownership for highly skilled employees, such as lawyers and accountants,
whose work is both difficult to monitor and easy to transfer to other firms. See Russell,
Employee Ownership and Internal Governance, 6 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZA-
TION 217, 232-33 (1985).
The Mondragon cooperatives in Spain have attracted attention in part because
most of them are engaged in capital-intensive, heavy manufacturing, such as iron and
steel production, and in manufacturing consumer durables. See Levin, supra note 141,
at 18. Notably, these cooperatives operate efficiently with a lower capital-labor ratio
than firms engaged in comparable production. See id. at 19-20. This efficiency recom-
mends the Mondragon cooperative form to societies "with a surplus of labor, a shortage
of capital, and low productivity." Id. at 20.
291 Common cultural and ethnic ties seem to have played a role in the success of
some American cooperatives. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 129, at 92-93 (scavenger
companies), 112-13 (taxi cooperatives). Moreover, the "common culture and ethnic sol-
idarity" of the Basque workers are often cited as reasons for the success of the Mon-
dragon cooperatives. See Levin, supra note 141, at 29. A shared culture and ideology
most likely contributed to the success of the Israeli kibbutzim. See R. RUSSELL, supra
note 129, at 33-34.
Perhaps more important than a common culture, however, is a common level of
skills among the employees. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 210. Most members of
successful American cooperatives, as well as partners in professional employee-owned
businesses such as law firms, have similar skills. This similarity avoids certain funda-
mental disagreements between owners concerning firm goals, and reduces the tendency
for hierarchies to develop. Cf S. LipsET, supra note 170, at 13-16, 393-400 (conclud-
ing that relatively small group size, the predominance of persons of middle-class status,
and identification of members with well-organized subgroups within the larger organi-
zation are factors that favor a democratic rather than an oligarchical structure).
294 The requirement would have to be imposed by federal law. Individual state
statutes would prompt companies to relocate. See Summers, supra note 7, at 168. It
could apply to all firms of some minimum size, regardless of their form.
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governmental agency, would hold the balance of power.295
Such a model could avoid the economic problems that have
plagued employee-owned firms in capitalist societies. First, by granting
employees supervisory control as employees rather than as contributors
of capital, adoption of this model could avoid the degeneration of em-
ployee control and the distortion of investment decisions. If the employ-
ees' share of the control of a firm does not depend on their claims to the
firm's residual assets, the employees will not be threatened by the addi-
tion of new employees. Nor will such employees be so concerned about
the firm's future investments because those investments can be funded
by external sources of capital that will not dilute the employees' power
over the firm.
Indeed, codetermined firms might make more efficient investment
decisions than many traditional firms. The managements of American
firms have been charged with having too short a temporal horizon.296
One interesting explanation, which would account for the longer time
horizon of German codetermined firms, is that American shareholders
can disproportionately benefit from short-term profits because labor can
adjust its collective bargaining demands to higher profits only in the
long-term.2 97 Thus, a management that is responsive only to residual
295 This model is based loosely on West German parity codetermination in the
iron-steel and coal-mining industries. German corporations have two supervisory
boards, a board of directors concerned with major policy decisions which meets only a
few times a year, and a board of management which sets and implements short term
policy. See FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 264, at
11-12; Svejnar, supra note 257, at 216. In the iron-steel and coal-mining industries, all
boards of directors provide equal representation to employees and shareholders. These
boards include one neutral member selected jointly by the employee and shareholder
representatives. The management boards also include one labor director who cannot be
appointed or dismissed without the concurrence of the employee representatives on the
higher board. The labor director is in charge of the firm's employment and compensa-
tion policies. See FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note
264, at 72-74. Svejnar, supra note 257, at 216.
The parity codetermination model described in the text also reflects the basic pro-
posal of the Bullock Commission established by the last Labour Government in Great
Britain. Under this proposal, worker representatives would take one third of the seats
on supervisory boards, shareholder representatives would retain one third of the seats,
and together both representatives would elect the final third. If they could not agree, a
special government commission would select the last third. See Report of the Committee
of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, Cmnd. No. 6706 (1977) (Bullock Report); D.
ZWERDLING, supra note 17 at 144-46; U.K. White Paper on Industrial Democracy,
EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., June 1978, at 23, 23-29 (British government policy statement
revising the Bullock recommendations).
298 See, e.g., Hayes & Garvin, Managing As If Tomorrow Mattered, HARV. Bus.
REV., May-June 1982, at 70, 72 ("A dangerous slowdown in long-term investment" is
the result of the emphasis American managers place on short-term profits.).
297 This idea was advanced to me by my colleague, Professor Stephen Marks. See
S. Marks, Why American Business Is So Shortsighted (July 1, 1984) (unpublished
paper on file with the author).
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claimants and their portfolio managers will make distorted investment
decisions that account too highly for short-term yields. Codetermination
would avoid this distortion by ensuring that the calculation of invest-
ment returns includes the returns captured by labor, as well as those
captured by shareholders.2"'
Second, because it does not grant employees working majority con-
trol, parity codetermination need not threaten capital contributors with
unlimited compensation claims from employees.2"9 Shareholder repre-
sentatives and neutral board members, for instance, could ensure the
fulfillment of promises made regarding employee compensation in capi-
tal subscription contracts. Third, by giving employees supervisory
board representation equal to that of shareholder representatives, the
model could afford employees the realistic opportunity to transform the
firm's culture and decisionmaking processes.
These second and third advantages may be obtainable together if
the obligations of the neutral board members are carefully defined and
enforceable.300 One definition, more fully explained below, 01 would
obligate the neutral members to direct management to maximize the
total welfare generated by the firm. This would require consideration
of the costs and benefits of decisions to employees, as well as to share-
holders. The definition, however, would also obligate the neutral mem-
bers to support efforts to maximize the residual claimants' share of this
total welfare by limiting the compensation of each group of employees
and the compensation offered to new sources of capital. 02
2" It has been suggested that parity codetermination in Germany may have en-
couraged investment because labor representatives preferred having earnings reinvested
rather than distributed as dividends. See Vagts, supra note 257, at 72. For a mathemat-
ical explanation of why a parity codetermined firm will not underinvest, see McCain,
supra note 259, at 33-35.
299 A study of the effects of parity codetermination in the iron-steel and coal min-
ing industries in West Germany found wages were increased only by five to seven
percent in the former industry and not at all in the latter as a result of codetermination.
See Svejnar, supra note 257, at 224. The protection of job security, through the crea-
tion of new positions or retraining, may have been more significant. See J. FURLONG,
supra note 19, at 42, 54; Vagts, supra note 257, at 71.
"0 Some productivity gains may also be achievable to the extent that such gains
can derive from partial employee control without employee ownership. See supra notes
146-48 and accompanying text. Productivity gains have not been established for West
German codetermination. See Svejnar, Codetermination and Productivity: Empirical
Evidence from the Federal Republic of Germany, in PARTICIPATORY AND SELF-MAN-
AGED FIRMS, supra note 140, at 210-11.
"I See infra text following note 311.
102 West German codetermination statutes define the duties of directors on
codetermined boards. See FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 264, at 46-72 (the 1976 codetermination act), 76-83 (the 1951 act on
codetermination in the coal and steel industries); Conard, Reflections on Public Interest
Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 948-49 (1977); Vagts, supra note 257, at 40.
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Management in the traditional firm theoretically can maximize re-
turns to residual shareholders by considering the costs and benefits to
employees of the firm's decisions. A management that believes better
job security, less restrictive production processes, or greater worker par-
ticipation in firm decisionmaking, will be valued more by employees
than these benefits cost the firm's residual shareholders, can offer these
benefits in exchange for direct monetary compensation. In practice,
however, management may resist many innovations that could jointly
benefit employees and shareholders, but which threaten managerial au-
thority and control. This agency problem may be more easily addressed
if employee and shareholder representatives cooperate and discover cer-
tain joint interests in the supervision of management. °30 Moreover, em-
ployees may need a collective leadership to help them develop a new
industrial culture. Without such leadership in a position of authority,
employees may not even consider the possibility of changing their firm's
decisionmaking processes.
2. Parity Codetermination and Collective Bargaining
The goals of the parity codetermination model of industrial de-
mocracy just outlined overlap with the goals of the collective bargaining
model. Collective bargaining also constitutes a channel through which
employees can communicate their interests, including such nonmone-
tary concerns as job security and decisionmaking participation. Never-
theless, the potential contributions of these two models to industrial de-
mocracy are sufficiently distinct to warrant adopting both. On the one
hand, collective bargaining's adversarial nature, its timing,304 and its
restriction by subject matter.. 5 and bargaining unit, may prevent it
from transforming a firm's decisionmaking or its priorities. On the
other hand, adversarial collective bargaining by a limited bargaining
unit is better adapted than codetermination to expressing and protecting
the special claims of defined groups of employees on the firm's re-
sources. It is important to inquire, therefore, through application of the
three labor law principles, how the goals of this form of employee su-
pervision of management can be secured without sacrificing collective
o See supra note 259-60 and accompanying text.
304 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
305 Employers must only bargain "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). This phrase has been held
to exclude fundamental business decisions such as the modification of product lines and
discontinuance of operations. See International Woodworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 263
F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1959); General Aniline and Film Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1217,
1219-20 (1959).
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bargaining.
The undivided responsibilities principle indicates that independent
collective bargaining can be protected under employee supervision of
management in either of two ways. First, those employee representa-
tives with general managerial supervisory authority can be prohibited
from exerting influence over collective bargaining representatives. Sec-
ond, all employee representatives can be selected by, and have manage-
rial supervisory responsibility to represent, only employees in defined
units appropriate for bargaining. It was further suggested that the sec-
ond option seems preferable for mandatory employee representation on
shareholder-controlled boards because such representation can best
serve to facilitate collective bargaining.' 0 6 The second option could also
be structured to meet the independent employee representative principle
by having public administrators oversee elections to ensure that the spe-
cial employee representatives are independent of a parity codetermined
firm's management. The first option, however, would better serve the
somewhat more ambitious goals of parity codetermination.
The second, or pluralist, option should be rejected for parity
codetermination for two reasons. First, if it effectively keeps employee
agents from supervising management on behalf of general firm inter-
ests, it would frustrate achievement of maximum employee control of
management. Assigning each employee representative the responsibility
to represent only a group of employees defined along bargaining unit
lines would relegate those representatives to a minority role on the
board. Each employee representative would be directed to make claims
on the firm's resources only for its limited constituency. As suggested
above, this kind of special interest advocacy on the supervisory board
could facilitate communication and information flow between employee
and shareholders, and thus could be a good supplement to collective
bargaining. It is less likely, however, to help achieve goals that collec-
tive bargaining generally has not achieved, including fundamental mod-
ification of a firm's culture and decisionmaking processes."' 7
Furthermore, even the collective bargaining benefits would not be
30 See supra text accompanying note 266. It was also noted that the basic Ger-
man codetermination system does not strictly observe the undivided responsibilities
principle. See supra note 264. The parity codetermination system in the iron-steel and
mining industries also does not strictly observe the principle. See FEDERAL MINISTER
OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 264, at 50-51.
307 Consider, for instance, the British Post office experiment. The union-nomi-
nated employee representatives on the board attempted to voice their own union's poli-
cies and to aid their union's collective bargaining. They were, however, generally inef-
fective at initiating corporate policy that would be favorable to employee interests. See
E. BATSTONE, A. FERNER, & H. TERRY, UNIONS ON THE BOARD: OUR EXPERIMENT
IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 124-27, 143-45 (1983).
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enhanced for employees who have no collective bargaining representa-
tive. Without the support of a union organization of its constituents, an
employee representative would have little leverage in pressing a minor-
ity interest before a supervisory board. Moreover, the distinct functions
principle prohibits any board representative of employees who could
have an exclusive bargaining agent from bargaining without the ap-
proval of such an agent.
The second reason the pluralist option should be rejected for par-
ity codetermination is that it is likely that union leaders on parity
codetermined boards would function as more than advocates for their
particular constituencies. Union leaders on shareholder-controlled
boards should be able to accept the role of minority advocate; but ac-
ceptance of such a role seems doubtful when the numerical division of
the board promises that the leaders could become part of a majority by
appealing to the neutrals through reason and the invocation of general
firm interests. The pressure to compromise on a parity codetermined
board would be likely to influence the perspectives of any employee
representatives, including those in union leadership positions. Individu-
als who become accustomed to considering one set of interests in one
role are likely to accommodate these same interests in the fulfillment of
other roles.308
Yet the goals of parity codetermined boards may be achievable
precisely because compromise is required on such boards. The pressure
placed on shareholder as well as employee representatives to compro-
mise, under some principle that incorporates both labor and capital in-
terests, offers hope for the early consideration of employee interests and
views at all levels of firm decisionmaking; a goal that collective bargain-
ing has generally not accomplished. If the potential benefits of parity
codetermination are to be achieved, employee representatives should be
encouraged, rather than prohibited from becoming part of a principled
308 See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. The likelihood of employee
representatives taking a non-adversarial, broader "firm perspective" is supported by
Germany's experience with a codetermination system that does not disqualify labor
leaders from serving as management supervisors. See H. CLEGG, A NEw APPROACH
TO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 50-57 (1960), discussed in P. BLUMBERG, supra note
167, at 148-50; Vagts, supra note 257, at 67-68. Although this experience has not
crippled the German labor movement, see id., one can only speculate about more subtle
effects. Some German labor leaders apparently feel that union leaders who have taken
managerial supervisory positions have "become imbued" with the management or oper-
ational point of view and pay less heed to the wishes of the rank and file. See id. at 77.
Regardless, German labor history and its industrial relations system are too distinct
from the American system to draw any compelling conclusions. See generally Summers,
Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an
American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 391 (1980) ("any conclusion would be
questionable because the comparison is inevitably incomplete").
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majority coalition on their board.
Such encouragement can be made consistent with the protection of
independent collective bargaining agents only by adoption of the first
option presented by the undivided responsibilities principle-no em-
ployee board representative should be permitted to be influential in the
affairs of a collective bargaining agent.'s 9 Employee board representa-
tives not influential in union affairs could be permitted to become part
of a controlling majority coalition and could be encouraged to do so by
being placed, along with shareholder representatives, under the same
obligations as neutral board members. 1°
Based on the discussion above, it should be possible to articulate
those obligations in a manner that both facilitates a partial democrati-
zation of the firm and protects a necessary role for collective bargain-
ing. For example, all members of parity codetermined boards, as well
as the management they supervise, could be placed under an obligation
to make all decisions, other than those that divide the firm's wealth,
only after they account for the decisions' impact on affected employees
as well as on shareholders' residual returns.
An aggregate wealth standard of this sort would enable the board
to structure the firm's decisionmaking processes more democratically
and to influence the mix of employee benefits, while leaving final nego-
tiation of benefits and the total level of benefits to collective bargaining.
Board consideration of the decisionmaking processes and the level of
hierarchy within the firm could account for employee job satisfaction
and personality developments as well as productivity. In turn, board
consideration of the nature of production processes could also specify
the work that would be experienced by employees-including its safety,
its affect on the worker's personality, and its general capacity to give
satisfaction. A decision on business opportunities to expand or contract
production could take into account the impact on employment levels
and the prospects for alternative employment.
309 Professor Summers predicts that without a union or other organizational base,
a minority employee representative election will "generate indifference and cynicism."
See Summers, supra note 7, at 162. Regardless of whether this prediction is accurate, a
parity codetermination system that gives employees equal voice in the supervision of
management should encourage widespread active employee involvement. Furthermore,
as stressed above, unions can be very involved in the election and support of employee
representatives without those representatives being their own leaders. See supra text
accompanying note 232.
31 Adoption of the first option under parity codetermination, as well as volunta-
rily by a firm, could lead to more rapid turnover of union leadership as employees who
show leadership traits in union affairs are elected to supervisory boards. It is not clear,
however, that somewhat more frequent change of leadership would impede the efforts
of collective bargaining agents.
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Requiring that all supervisory board members maximize aggregate
firm wealth would also help satisfy the distinct functions principle and
protect collective bargaining from preemption. Since all board members
will work collegially toward the same goal, no formal bargaining or
commitments between employee and shareholder representatives could
be permitted. Some negotiation between representatives selected by
shareholders and those selected by employees is admittedly inevitable;
however, as long as an adequate system existed for the selection of neu-
tral members, the establishment of workable principles of decision
should channel bargaining-type discussions toward principled advocacy
and analysis aimed at those neutral members.
Moreover, two important functions for collective bargaining would
be preserved. First, since management would continue to have the re-
sponsibility to limit the draw of all employees on firm resources, collec-
tive bargaining representatives would continue to have the exclusive re-
sponsibility to maximize the share of firm resources obtained by the
particular group of employees they represent. The supervisory board
would not determine the allocation of firm resources. Bargaining be-
tween particular employees, or their particular agents, and the agents
of the entire firm, its management, would continue to make these
determinations.
Second, collective bargaining in the parity codetermination system
would function as a check on supervisory board miscalculations of the
value of particular business decisions to employees. Many job satisfac-
tion benefits are clearly very difficult to quantify compared to monetary
returns. Neutral board members would look for some basis to believe
that job design or decisionmaking changes recommended by employee
representatives would lead to an aggregate increase in firm wealth. One
basis would be a record of increased productivity from employees af-
fected by similar changes within another firm, or within another divi-
sion of the same firm. Another basis would be the willingness of af-
fected employees to accept reduced monetary benefits as compensation
for any loss of productivity caused by the changes. If collective bargain-
ing agents prefer, however, to trade the innovations instituted or pro-
posed by a codetermined board for other improvements in benefits that
cost the firm less than the innovations, they should be able to do so.
Another check on the judgment of employee representatives would be
provided by their need to stand for reelection. Employees could replace
board representatives who have jeopardized their firm and their benefit
package for unimportant innovations, or who have calculated too highly
the cost to employees of job loss from a firm contraction. Similarly, a
decision to keep a relatively unprofitable division open could affect col-
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lective bargaining throughout a firm and thereby become an issue in
supervisory board elections. Such scenarios suggest that it would be im-
portant for a parity codetermination system to observe the independent
employee representative principle so that the employee representational
system would not become controlled by a new firm elite. 11 This would
require the selection of supervisory board members to be publicly regu-
lated and independent of the incumbent board and the firm manage-
ment that it supervises.
In sum, it seems plausible that parity codetermination legislation
could be framed that would protect and use collective bargaining. That
legislation, similar to more moderate, mandatory minority representa-
tion legislation, should first, incorporate the three labor law principles
to ensure that a role remains for collective bargaining representatives,
and second, confirm that bargaining representatives are not asked to fill
managerial roles that sometimes demand conflicting perspectives. If the
three principles are respected, the parity codetermination system for
employee supervision of management, like other systems discussed
above, need not threaten, or be undermined by, collective bargaining.
The goals of codetermination and collective bargaining are complemen-
tary and the ideals of industrial democracy can be simultaneously
served by both.
A CONCLUDING THOUGHT
The speculative nature of this Article may seem in tension with
the specificity of its conclusions. These conclusions rest on numerous
assumptions about human behavior that, while reasonable, can only be
tested by in-depth study of actual experiences with employee supervi-
sion of management. Formulating specific legal doctrine in the antici-
pation of such experiences and study is nonetheless appropriate because
of the special contributions that legal analysis can make to the develop-
ment of public policy.
Legal analysis can be both liberating and restraining. It can liber-
ate by showing that very different social institutions can be developed
and regulated by legal doctrine. It can restrain, often through ex-
tracting collective wisdom from old doctrine, by showing that new legal
doctrine and institutions may have important implications for, and pose
significant threats to, valued existing doctrine and institutions. In order
to either liberate or restrain, legal doctrine must be specific. A general
description may show that a new institution can be imagined; it does
11 See supra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
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not establish that it can be implemented. A general description may
show that a new institution may conflict with a valued old institution; it
cannot show whether that conflict can be resolved.
Lawyers can thus function effectively as social engineers in the
development of public policy. Legal analysis can formulate doctrine
that best implements certain values, with minimum sacrifice of other
values, assuming that particular hypotheses about human behavior are
correct. Legal analysis alone, however, cannot test those hypotheses or
judge and balance values; such functions require the tools of social
scientists, philosophers, and politicians.
This Article therefore leaves much undone. Its assumptions, both
explicit and implicit, should be tested. Its values, both firm and tenta-
tive, can be questioned. The Article will be successful if it provokes
such testing and questioning. The Article will also be successful if it
contributes to a more realistic assessment of how hierarchy within the
modern firm can be mitigated.
